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 ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines religious fundamentalism in light of structural-
developmental theory.  Reciprocally, it provides a critique of the structural-
developmental approach in light of its application to religious fundamentalism.   
The product is a conceptual synthesis between observed fundamentalist 
characteristics and the evolving tradition of developmentalism.  The findings of 
this conceptual synthesis are used to generate principles for developmentally 
sensitive religious education. The thesis focusses on Protestant Christian 
Fundamentalism while utilising illustrative examples from diverse faith traditions 
described in current literature as fundamentalist. 
                                                                                                                                                   
This conceptual synthesis adopts a historical-chronological approach to 
developmentalism in order to reflect the historical context of the current debate 
between the associated discourses of both paradigms.  This historical-
chronological approach to developmentalism enables a more explicit critical 
analysis of the implicit assumptions of the modern discourse.  The conceptual 
synthesis culminates with an interpretation of religious fundamentalism in light 
of James Fowler's Seven Aspects of Faith.  
 
The thesis provides a conceptual synthesis between fundamentalism and 
structural development. It does not purport to offer a definitive empirical testing 
of this theory at this stage.  It uses existing empirical evidence of development 
to analyse descriptions of fundamentalism in current literature. 
 
The methodology used to mediate the reciprocal analysis of fundamentalism 
and structural-development is based on Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis 
(1989).  This methodological approach offers tools and terminology for the 
examination of fundamentalism and developmentalism as discourses while 
offering a structuralist reference for value judgments implicit in the analysis and 
discussion of implications for religious education.   
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 Findings revealed general congruency between early developmental structures 
and elements of fundamentalism.  The contents and dynamics of 
fundamentalism resist the development of later stage structures.  Hence, 
ontogenetic development is affected by the phylogenetic structure of the 
fundamentalist discourse; cultures can reflect stage-specific structuring 
tendencies and therefore affect individual development.  Stage crises and 
transitions provide a powerful interpretive model for the dynamics of interaction 
between fundamentalism and other discourses.  The analysis revealed the 
potential for a form of recapitulated fundamentalism prompted by dissonance 
between convergent epistemologies and emerging divergent epistemologies of 
later development.  This suggests that purely content-based assessments of 
fundamentalism may not account for its developmental range. 
 
The recapitulation of fundamentalism and its appearance in phylogenetic forms 
challenges traditional developmental assumptions concerning stage 
progression.  It provides a rationale for further investigation of the structuring 
powers of contents within the developmental discourse.  This investigation 
necessitates the integration of concepts including compartmentalisation, 
cognitive dissonance and consonance into the structural developmental model. 
 
The thesis offers a theoretical defense of facilitated development beyond 
fundamentalism as a structural developmental representation. It proposes broad 
principles for the facilitation of such development in the context of schooled 
religious education.  These principles of a developmentally sensitive religious 
education are holistic, dynamic, progressive, experiential, interpersonal, 
intrapersonal, meta-contextual, objectified and critically reflective.       
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1.       INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1     Rationale 
 
Identifying a gap in the research 
 
This rationale identifies a gap in the research dialogue concerning 
fundamentalism and religious education.  This thesis seeks to fill the gap with 
the application of a structural developmental discourse to fundamentalism.  
Several developmental models are applied to fundamentalism throughout the 
synthesis culminating in the application of James Fowler's Aspects of Faith.  
Though Fowler does not mention fundamentalism in Stages of Faith (1981) he 
does predict such an analysis: 
The formal structural characteristics of faith stages can be employed, I contend, 
to test the normative structuring tendencies of a given content tradition.  They 
can also be employed to evaluate a given faith community's particular 
appropriation of the content-structural vision of its tradition. (302) 
As such, the purpose of this thesis is twofold; first, to examine fundamentalism 
as an expression of structural development and, second, to discuss the content-
structural implications for religious education in light of the first application. 
 
The conceptual synthesis will seek to reveal a gap in approaches to 
fundamentalism that exists between the disciplinary poles of psychology and 
sociology.  This gap is noticed, though left unfilled and vaguely defined, by 
existing commentators on fundamentalism.  Structural developmentalist James 
Fowler, acknowledges a gap in his own research:  
It is true, however, that in trying to construct these empirically founded 
descriptions of structural stages in faith I and my associates neglected, until 
very recently, any effort at a theoretical account of the interplay of structure and 
content in the life of faith. (1981:273) 
Similarly, James Barr author of the definitive Fundamentalism (1981) indicates  
(in hindsight to the first edition of his book) acceptance of the possibility for 
more collaboration between doctrinal and psychological approaches to 
 fundamentalism: 
My reason for avoiding the psychological argument was, first of all, a reluctance 
to accept that any doctrinal position could be explained simply as a 
consequence of psychological conditions; and secondly, the observation that 
those who experience an evangelical conversion are often free and open 
people, both in themselves and in the first stages after their conversion, and 
that it is the increasing involvement in fundamentalist doctrine and in the life of 
a fundamentalist society that produces the marked psychological characteristics 
which so many have noted.  Thus I have thought that the people concerned 
were not inherently this way; rather, fundamentalist doctrine and life made them 
so. (xii) 
Here, Barr does not account for the place of content in a psychological 
approach to fundamentalism.  He separates psychology and cultural contextual 
approaches, choosing the latter. However, the developmental approach bridges 
the gap that Barr has legitimately identified.  It is an approach that observes and 
allows for an interaction between psychological predisposition and the effects of 
particular socialisation and indoctrination.  Barr continues: 
However lacking as I do any deep knowledge of psychology, I feel I have to 
hesitate in this, when so many experienced observers see it otherwise; and 
perhaps on deeper investigation it would turn out that the doctrinal and the 
psychological accounts of fundamentalism are not as fully in contrast as I have 
supposed. (xii)  
Other authors on fundamentalism have also noted the possible synthesis of 
psychological and cultural-content based approaches. 
 
Marty and Appleby, editors of The Fundamentalism Project (1991), containing 
primarily descriptive accounts of religious fundamentalisms, note the possible 
existence of a fundamentalist mentality: 
The present point in adducing the term [religious] is to suggest that while there 
may be such a thing as a "fundamentalist mentality" which finds its expression 
in various ideological or scientific forms, here the prime interest has to do with 
fundamentalisms in which the religious dimension is foremost (1991:vii) 
This thesis utilises the developmental approach as a discourse that is inclusive 
of religious and psychological dimensions. 
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 The synthesis of fundamentalism and structural development is intimated, 
though not rigorously pursued in two sources known to the author.  Marlene 
Winell identifies developmental change as a reason for leaving fundamentalism 
(1993) and quotes a second source - Robert Shinn.  Shinn's brief eight-page 
article Fundamentalism as a Case of Arrested Development (1984) makes the 
tentative connection between fundamentalism and development that this thesis 
seeks to explore in detail.   As such, this thesis forwards the developmental 
discourse, both as a place for the synthesis of existing disciplines and as an 
area of new insight. 
 
The application of the structural developmental discourse is warranted by the 
nature and extent of fundamentalism as a pervading, multidisciplinary 
discourse.  
Fundamentalism seemed an appropriate subject for an interdisciplinary public 
policy study in part because it inspires the effort to create structures and 
institutions comprehending every aspect of human existence...Accordingly, 
economists, social theorists, political scientists, cultural historians, 
anthropologists, legal scholars, and social psychologists must collaborate if the 
phenomena is to be analyzed in all of its dimensions. (Marty & Appleby, 
1991:815)  
This tendency of fundamentalism to involve itself as a total ideology in all 
aspects of human existence also provides a rationale for the later educational 
discussion in this thesis.  The implications of a developmental theory of 
fundamentalism are particularly pertinent to the institution of schooling and the 
theory and praxis of pedagogy.  Formative structures and contents are most 
deliberately brought together within such environments.  Schools are powerful 
environments because of this union.  Consequently, developmentally sensitive 
religious education is of paramount importance.   
 
Oser and Gmünder (1991) anticipate the synthesis within this thesis in the 
context of religious education: 
If theology wants to unearth the possibilities for future faith education, it cannot 
limit itself to advancing abstract speculative arguments...Rather it becomes 
necessary to do theology decisively from the perspective of structural 
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 development, even if the distinction between phylogenetics and 
ontogenetics...must be clarified further with new and progressive research. 
(153)   
Fundamentalism represents such a phylogenetic phenomenon.  The 
mechanisms of ontogenetic development provide powerful tools for 
understanding the interaction between individual structuring tendencies and the 
reflective structures of phylogenetic movements such as fundamentalism.   
 
The concept of education for developmental facilitation assumes that stage 
arrest is a common occurrence.  Oser and Gmünder note: 
…movement from one structural developmental stage to another is not 
automatic or inevitable...One can "arrest" or equilibrate in one of Piaget or 
Kohlberg's intermediate stages. (1991:50)  
The concept of developmental arrest has been given little attention in 
developmental literature.  Fundamentalism is a powerful field of study for the 
concept of arrest because it maintains equilibrium with demonstrably effective 
mechanisms.  As such, this thesis explores the mechanisms of arrest in 
fundamentalism to enlighten the broader concept of phylogenetic structures and 
their role in facilitating developmentally sensitive education. 
 
 A theoretical approach 
From the outset, it is important to state that this thesis is primarily a theoretical 
synthesis rather than a gathering of empirical data.  A developmental theory of 
fundamentalism must seek to derive structuring tendencies from reliable 
descriptions of fundamentalism.  Such descriptions must come from inside and 
outside of the discourse.  The observations most enlightening to the 
developmental theory are perhaps those provided by former fundamentalists.   
 
While there are many theoretical approaches to fundamentalism, there are few 
attempts to apply a developmental discourse.  An equally important objective of 
this thesis is to critique developmental theory as a heuristic tool.  Does the 
study of fundamentalism raise theoretical complications for the developmental 
discourse?  Are there subtle prejudices in the developmental tradition that 
disqualify its objectively detached application to fundamentalism?  The 
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 theoretical approach must be examined in light of its own tradition. The 
empirical burden of proof lies with existing developmental data as utilised in the 
literature of Chapter Two, Conceptual Synthesis.  
 
 The socio-religious context of a synthesis 
This thesis, as any, is a response to a particular socio-cultural context.  As 
author, I participate in many levels of societal discourse:  As an educator, I 
observe and appreciate the psychological, developmental, and social power of 
school-specific discourses.  As a participant in fundamentalist, evangelical, 
liberal, and postmodern discourses, I observe and appreciate the dimensions 
and dynamics of the religious-secular divide.  As a citizen of a nation that 
foregrounds the discourse of multiculturalism, I observe the theory and praxis of 
its implementation.  As a spectator to mass media representations of a current 
conflict between fundamentalist Muslims and the democratic West, I observe a 
lack of psychosocial investigation of the same.  Hence, I locate this thesis at the 
intersection of my own discourses.  What follows, is a brief elaboration of this 
socio-religious context as a rationale for the thesis topic.        
 
It is a tentative observation but one worth noting nonetheless, that the 
fundamentalist-liberal-secular rift is a manifestation of a crisis in religious-
secular epistemology.  This crisis is not new but its intensity seems heightened 
by the popularisation of poststructuralist theory and religious pluralism in 
response to increasing religious diversity in Australia.  
 
Demographic analysis reveals this diversification of religious affiliation in 
Australia.  Carey (1996) reports in Believing in Australia that, "there seems little 
doubt that the decline in adherence [to major Christian denominations] evident 
from the census returns reflects a real change in the pattern of religious belief" 
(114). According to the 1991 census 74% of Australians stated their religion as 
Christian as opposed to 96% in the first national census of 1911 (Healey, 1998:1).  
The number of census respondents reporting a non-Christian religion doubled in 
the period between the 1981 and 1991 census returns (Carey, 142).   
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 There are several reasons for such a perceived decline in Christian affiliation, 
including immigration trends and changes to the census itself.  However, these 
factors are themselves indications of Australia's developing social policy to 
accommodate ethnic and consequently religious diversification.  Australia's 
politically promoted multicultural identity is indicative of this increasingly 
religious pluralism.   
 
The Christian Church in Australia has responded to and been affected by, such 
pluralism.   In the period between 1901 and 1991, adherence to Anglican and 
Mainline Protestant churches steadily decreased while adherence to 
Catholicism slightly increased (Carey, 1996:114-115).  Pentecostals, Protestant 
evangelicals, Mormons, Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses have all 
continued to increase in affiliation since the 1970s (Carey:193-195).   
Fundamentalisms are increasing in paradoxical proportion to pluralism.  A mark 
of such smaller but growing groups is the internal coherence of their philosophy.  
Carey argues that this internal coherence "has a particular attraction for many 
Australians in post-modern times" (195).   Such internal coherence is a mark of 
fundamentalism.  It is often facilitated through a form of strict Biblical literalism.  
This literalism manifests itself in, or is at least related to, the social attitudes of 
fundamentalist belief. 
 
The National Church Life Survey reveals a strong link between the Biblical 
views and social attitudes of Australian Christians.  The denominations with a 
predominantly literalist view of the Bible differ consistently with denominations 
with a predominantly contextualist or valuist view of the Bible in almost all 
aspects of the survey.  These aspects include attitudes toward euthanasia, 
alcohol, Aboriginal people, sex, remarriage, migrant intake, the nature of God, 
evolution, and divine judgment.  Anglican and Uniting Churches tend to be the 
most socially and theologically liberal while Baptist and Pentecostal churches 
tend to be the most socially and theologically conservative (Kaldor & Powell, 
1995).  The social pervasiveness of religious mentalities provides a rationale for 
the synthesis between fundamentalism and development and the subsequent 
discussion of implications for religious education. 
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As Kaldor and Powell note, the views of the Bible (literalist, contextualist, 
valuist) of such churches are manifest in the education choices of their 
adherents: 
While the sample is too small for detailed denominational analysis, some 
relevant trends emerge.  While 5% to 8% of attenders in the Anglican and 
Uniting Church have children in independent Christian schools, 22% of 
Assemblies of God attenders and 26% of Baptist attenders do so (1995: 108). 
Kaldor goes on to acknowledge the link between those adherents with a 
literalist view of the Bible and Christian schooling; noting that literalists are, 
"twice as likely to enrol their children in an independent Christian school (33% 
vs. 16% overall) (108).  He concludes, "the decision to enrol children in an 
independent Christian school appears to be related to both faith type and 
denominational context" (108).  The establishment of such schools reflects a 
perceived gap between Biblical literalism and secular postmodern theory.  This 
religious dichotomy contributes to and reflects in turn, a secular conservative - 
liberal divide.  It is both a contention of, and rationale for this thesis, that the 
developmental discourse provides a powerful interpretive model for this divide. 
 
There are several manifestations of the epistemological debate between 
fundamentalism and conservativism (though these are not synonymous), and 
poststructuralism in education in the nation's popular psyche.  For some, the 
ideological debate has been simplified to traditional values versus new fangled 
ideas.   It is the good old days of the Three Rs versus the inclusive and inverted 
curriculum. It is back to the basics versus individualised education. It is what to 
think versus how to think. 
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Such simplified dichotomised approaches to education are resurfacing as 
school syllabus documents begin to reflect a postmodern epistemological 
approach.  Public speculation about the philosophical foundations of the 
Queensland SOSE (Study of Society and the Environment) Syllabus (2000) and 
the Senior English Syllabus (2002) has been evidenced in the popular press in 
recent years.  Australian education is perhaps beginning to encounter the 
religious-legal conflicts evident in the United States.  The establishment of 
 
 
 independent fundamentalist schools is perhaps in part, a reaction to the 
increasingly postmodern philosophical foundations of public schooling.  This 
thesis provides a perspective on this perceived dichotomy. 
 
Recently, the dichotomy has been intensified as a reaction to recent debate 
concerning state funding of independent schools.  While this debate is 
presented predominantly as a socio-economic debate, religious-secular 
epistemological division between independent Christian and traditional Church 
schools and state schools is a foundational issue.  The magnitude and 
consequences of this epistemological division, as perceived by fundamentalists, 
is evidenced in The Cause of Christian Education (1999) by the current principal 
of the National Institute for Christian Education in Australia, Dr. Richard Edlin.  
Referring to Christian parents with children in public education Edlin states:  
If these parents thought for a moment that they were deliberately immersing 
their tender children into an irresistible cauldron of systematic antipathy to 
Christianity that would have eternal consequences, they would protectively 
withdraw them from that detrimental environment without a moment's hesitation.  
It's the assumption or assertion that public school education doesn't deliberately 
lead their children away from God that enables many Christian parents to keep 
their children there. 
The frightful tragedy is that the claim that education is religiously neutral is a 
myth of gigantic proportions.  It's a lie that has the most fearful implications for 
generations of Christians and their children. (42) 
These are sentiments that Edlin equally applies to liberal Christian education.  
As principal speaker at the 1999 Young Leader's Conference involving young 
teachers from Christian Parent Controlled Schools around Australia Dr. Edlin 
stated that there is “no such thing as a liberal Christian” and that “anyone 
outside the beliefs of the orthodox creeds is not a true Christian”.   The 
epistemological marks of religious affiliation and allegiance are clear and vital 
for the fundamentalist. This thesis attempts to engage these questions of 
epistemology as encounters between ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
development. 
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 Polemic or Defence? 
This thesis offers neither polemic against, nor defence of fundamentalism.  It is 
an attempt to understand it developmentally while using it to highlight strengths 
and deficiencies in the structural developmental discourse.  In hindsight, this 
means to affirm the continuing importance of structures that give rise to 
fundamentalism while holding up to criticism those practices that arrest the 
developmental process.  
 
The words of theologian Williams Adam Brown in The Essence of Christianity 
(In Reardon, 1968:61) though somewhat rhetorical provide guiding sentiment for 
this thesis: 
The attempt to destroy dogmatic Christianity is giving place to the more fruitful 
attempt to understand it.  We must see the good which it contains as well as the 
evil, and recognise that in this development of Christian thought even those 
parts which seem to us less honourable have a necessary part to play...What is 
needed is not denunciation, but insight; not polemic but sympathy.  
This thesis is an attempt to postulate a developmental understanding of the 
structural foundations of fundamentalism.  The subjects of criticism and 
judgment will be those characteristics of fundamentalism that hinder rather than 
facilitate this development.  
 
Summarily, this rationale has identified a gap in research that this thesis 
attempts to fill.  The gap exists in the lack of synthesis between ontogenetic 
structural development and fundamentalism as a phylogenetic discourse.  The 
thesis was identified as primarily theoretical.  Finally, the synthesis was located 
in the socio-educational context in which it was formulated. The destructiveness 
and divisiveness of the fundamentalist-liberal-secular divide, a void of 
conciliatory dialogue, and the descriptive power of the structural developmental 
model provide the primary rationale for this thesis.  The following objectives 
focus and organise the conceptual synthesis of fundamentalism and structural 
developmental theory. 
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 1.2    General Objectives 
  
The encompassing objective of this study is to synthesise or correlate the 
discourses of fundamentalism and structural-developmental psychology (Figure 1) 
Both discourses make claims of universality.  A synthesis helps to define each 
discourse and reveal its descriptive strengths and weaknesses.  The application 
of Socratic and rational analysis helps to expose paradigmatic weakness by 
revealing exceptions to the rules of each discourse and forcing redefinition.  
Similarly, the encompassing objective of the study is to reveal the descriptive 
power of each discourse.  The objective of Chapter Three, is to apply the 
insights of analysis to the practical implementation of religious education.  
 
The discourse analysis of structural-developmental psychology and 
fundamentalism has several objectives.  Firstly, the study of fundamentalism 
provides the opportunity to reflect on the appropriateness of the metaphor of 
development.  Secondly, fundamentalism raises important questions concerning 
the structuring power of contents often overlooked in the developmental 
discourse’s traditional emphasis on universal psychological tendencies.  Thirdly, 
fundamentalism provides powerful examples of the tension between stage 
transition and equilibration as key concepts of the structural-developmental 
model.  Similarly, it serves to reveal the moral foundations and epistemological 
assumptions of development by providing an example of the psycho-social 
effects of a developmental equilibrium sustained by socio-cultural contents.  
Fundamentalism’s indirect rejection of developmentalism’s structuralist 
assumptions helps to reveal the epistemological traditions and biases of both 
discourses.  The exploration of these concerns form key objectives for this 
study. 
 
The synthesis raises broader social and psychological questions for the 
concepts of faith and religion in postmodern societies.  The exploration of these 
questions likewise, forms the objectives of this thesis.  Are fundamentalism and 
structural-developmentalism compatible? Is religion accommodated or 
assimilated by postmodernism? Can developmentalism provide a structuralist 
10
 
 
 response to postmodern critiques? These questions are focussed clearly 
through James Fowler’s Stages and Aspects of Faith.  Collectively they aid the 
pursuit of the encompassing objectives of this study. 
 
A broad objective of the synthesis between fundamentalism and 
developmentalism is to add to the definition of both discourses.  The 
developmental discourse can be further defined and refined by comparing it 
with other theoretical approaches to fundamentalism.  This collective analysis 
and fundamentalism’s response helps to define the dimensions, dynamics and 
contents of the fundamentalist discourse.  This objective is approached 
throughout Chapter Two, culminating with the specific application of Fowler’s 
Aspects of Faith to examine the compatibility of developmental and 
fundamentalist dynamics. 
 
This conceptualisation of fundamentalism as a representation of developmental 
stages raises objective questions central to this study. Can fundamentalism be 
conceived as representing concrete developmental structures of the aspects of 
faith? Can fundamentalism be conceived as representing formal developmental 
structures of the aspects of faith? Do fundamentalisms and liberalisms 
represent incremental stages of normal development? What contributions can a 
developmental approach make to the nature of dialogue and debate concerning 
fundamentalism? 
 
The final objectives of this study concern the application of the results of the 
analysis to the principles and praxis of religious education.  The practice of 
religious education is a real space-time interface between fundamentalism and 
developmental theory.  There are two objective questions guiding this 
discussion. What are the implications of a structural developmental perspective 
of fundamentalism for religious education? How might such factors affect the 
construction and devolution of school ethos and pedagogy? The Thesis Outline 
to follow identifies the structure of the thesis in its qualitative approach to these 
objectives. 
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 Figure 1. 
General Objectives: Diagrammatic Representation 
 
Objective Question: Do the dynamics and contents of religious fundamentalisms characterise 
particular stage structures of development?  
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Objective Sub-Questions. 
 
 
DISCOURSES OF 
RELIGIOUS 
FUNDAMENTALISM 
 5
3
Preoperational
stage 
   2 
Concrete 
operational 
stages 
DISCOURSES OF
STRUCTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT
1 
Formal 
operational 
stages 
 
1. Can religious fundamentalism structurally represent the highest stages of 
operations? 
1.1       If not, how viable are faith and religion-based extrapolations of    
             developmental theory? 
2. Do religious fundamentalisms structurally represent earlier concrete stages of 
operations? 
3. If so, what elements of the fundamentalist discourse inhibit or arrest development to 
later stages? 
4. How does the fundamentalist discourse relate to (by subordination, 
compartmentalisation, or permeation) other discourses engaged in by an 
individual? 
5. How does fundamentalism respond to a developmentalist critique? 
5.1      Can developmentalism be embraced within fundamentalism? 
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 1.3     Thesis Outline 
 
This introductory chapter has served to provide a rationale for the thesis and set 
some clear, though general objectives for the synthesis between structural 
development and fundamentalism.   The following outline describes the 
organisational approach for the achievement of these objectives. 
 
The next section of this introductory chapter will provide a brief overview and 
rationale for the methodological approach of the thesis synthesis.  The final 
section of the introductory chapter will be devoted to a position statement 
concerning the value judgments assumed by the use of a developmental 
discourse for an analysis of fundamentalism.  The position statement will 
include a meta-narrative discussion of the topic and a summary 
autobiographical reflection.  The former will establish a premise for the latter.  
This premise is briefly, that the initial relationship between developmental theory 
and fundamentalism was conceived from the author's own experience of a 
fundamentalist worldview, deconversion and concurrent exposure to a 
developmental discourse.  It is reasoned that research born out of such 
experience may be as legitimate or as illegitimate as the author's attempts to 
actively locate it in the context of his own relativity.  To fail to acknowledge the 
existential influences of authorship is to fail to research thoroughly.   Therefore, 
the Position Statement is an important attempt to provide a tone for the thesis 
and make overt its inevitable value judgments of fundamentalism and the 
structural developmental approach. 
 
Chapter Two, Conceptual Synthesis, engages the primary concepts and 
discourses to be synthesised.  The synthesis is divided into three sections.  The 
first section (2.1.1-2.1.7) provides a chronological and epistemological analysis 
of the structural developmental discourse in light of the qualitative religious 
nature of fundamentalism.  It traces the evolution of the developmental 
discourse in order to establish its essential epistemological, theoretical, and 
empirical foundations.  These foundations are critiqued in light of fundamentalist 
and postmodernist positions. To achieve this and the aforementioned 
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 objectives, it systematically and chronologically reviews relevant theorists of the 
developmental tradition. It culminates with a review and analysis of the 
developmental model deemed most directly applicable to fundamentalism - 
Fowler's Stages and Seven Aspects of Faith.  
 
The chronological-historical approach to the structural-developmental discourse 
is seen as a necessary organisational tool for the achievement of the study’s 
objectives.  Firstly, it acknowledges the centrality of historical context and 
tradition to the nature of the two modern discourses (fundamentalism and 
developmentalism) and the debate and dialogue between them.  Secondly, 
concepts, contents and issues that are the subtle assumptions of a modern 
discourse may be best revealed and examined by revisiting the historical 
context of their genesis.  For example, if examining the incongruity between 
fundamentalist conceptualisations of morality and Fowler’s aspect of moral 
judgment, it makes sense to trace Fowler’s assumptions about moral 
development to Kohlberg’s original work in order to focus and clarify the issues.  
The historical-chronological approach therefore provides more clarity of analysis 
and a necessary acknowledgement of the indebtedness and continuity of the 
modern developmental discourse.  It respects the nature of fundamentalist 
objections to the developmental discourse while reflecting the development and 
evolution of developmentalism itself. 
 
The second section (2.2.1-2.2.10) of Chapter Two reviews and analyses 
existing analytical approaches to fundamentalism.  It begins with a brief 
discussion of the problem of definition. It is structured thematically throughout 
the rest of the conceptual synthesis.  These thematic approaches to 
fundamentalism are reviewed in the following order: apologetic, ex-apologetic 
and liberal, socio-historical, multi-religious, epistemological, hermeneutic, 
psychological (including psycho-pathological and psycho-apocalyptic 
approaches), and developmental.   
 
The examination of other approaches to fundamentalism in light of the 
developmental approach is seen as a necessary inclusion for the fulfillment of 
14
 
 
 the study’s objectives.  It adds to the critique of the developmental approach by 
challenging its relative emphases and possible oversights.  It also serves to 
reinforce the descriptive strength of the developmental model where other 
models fail to accommodate the criticisms of fundamentalism.  Finally, the 
analysis of other approaches to fundamentalism acknowledges the breadth of 
debate and the need for a more inclusive dialogue acknowledging the range of 
interested discourses. 
 
The final developmental literature for review focusses on an article by Robert 
Shinn - Fundamentalism as a Case of Arrested Development (1984).  It is the 
only literature known by the author to make a deliberate connection between 
fundamentalism and developmental theory.  A brief article (8 pages), it serves to 
highlight some of the issues and objectives that this study explores in detail. 
 
The third and final section (2.3.1-2.3.9) of Chapter Two provides an original 
analysis of fundamentalism using developmentalist, James Fowler’s, Aspects of 
Faith.  Each of Fowler's aspects is applied to the concept of fundamentalism as 
described in the conceptual synthesis.  The application is the culmination of the 
analysis of developmental theory and fundamentalism. 
 
Chapter Three, Discussion, relates the theoretical insights of the synthesis 
between structural development and fundamentalism to religious education. 
This section generates principles from the previous synthesis for a 
developmentally sensitive approach to religious education.  
 
Chapter Four, Conclusions, summarises findings in relation to the general 
objectives posed at the beginning of the thesis.  This section is followed by a 
brief discussion of further research.  It ends with a conclusion reflecting on the 
thesis process.   
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 1.4   Methodological Approach 
 
The methodological approach adopted for the analysis is based the principles of 
Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis (1989,1992,1995,2001) and of 
discourse analysis in general.  The conceptual tools and terminology of 
discourse analysis are used to mediate the synthesis between fundamentalism 
and developmentalism (Figure 2).  Thus, the methodology for the conceptual 
synthesis is threefold: firstly, fundamentalism is used to analyse 
developmentalism; secondly, developmentalism is used to analyse 
fundamentalism; and thirdly, discourse analysis is used to interpret the 
synthesis and inform the conclusions and discussion of the implications for 
religious education. 
 
This methodology will be implicit in the analysis. It is recognised by the use of 
key concepts including discourse, positioning, marginalisation, representation, 
construction, and deconstruction.  As a methodology, critical discourse analysis 
provides tools to examine: 
• activities and techniques in discursive practices 
• meanings in systems of knowledge and beliefs 
• social relationships among people 
• subjectivity and identities for people (Gilbert, 1999). 
It is primarily for these reasons that discourse analysis was seen as an 
applicable, flexible methodology for the thesis analysis. 
 
Inevitably and inescapably, Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis is itself, a 
discourse.  As a structuralist discourse it is more sympathetic to 
developmentalism, than to fundamentalism.  This methodological approach 
reflects in part, the value judgments implicit in the findings and later discussion 
of the implications for religious education.  The final section of this introductory 
chapter offers an explicit position statement to firmly state and locate these 
assumptions and value judgments. 
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Figure 2. 
 
Methodological Approach: A Diagrammatic Representation  
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• The tools and assumptions of Discourse Analysis provide a mediating 
discourse for the synthesis of fundamentalism and developmentalism 
and a foundation for conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1.5    Position Statement 
 
It is important to make explicit the often tacit assumptions and positions of the 
thesis body.  Tone and register, so often hidden in the subtle selection and 
omission of words, often implies judgment on the concept and topics under 
analysis.   
 
My positions and opinions as researcher have been subject to inevitable 
change over five years of research and writing.  This is hopefully a sign that the 
thesis was not a preconceived and foregone conclusion – research used to 
prove what I believed a priori to be true.  The following position statements are 
written in hindsight to the research process.  
(a)  Fundamentalism is the observable product of interaction between 
religious contents and stage specific structuring tendencies. 
(b)  The social contents of fundamentalisms usually construct total ideologies 
and meta-narratives. 
(c)  The contents and social dynamics of fundamentalisms perpetuate stage 
equilibrium and arrest the development of late stage structures within a 
compartmentalised domain. 
(d)  Fundamentalisms representing convergent structures may be 
recapitulated in rejection of the uncertainties of divergent epistemologies 
of later stages. 
(e) Fundamentalism reveals the need for a more detailed developmental 
account of the structuring power of contents. 
(f) Fundamentalism reveals the need for a more detailed developmental 
account of stage transition, compartmentalisation, and conscious 
regression. 
(g) The study of fundamentalism challenges popular understandings of the 
metaphor of development.    
(h)  The synthesis of fundamentalism and structural development provides 
insights and principles for the formulation of developmentally sensitive 
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 religious education. 
 
 
At this stage, it is necessary to address the term development, for the use of 
this term positions the fundamentalism to which it is applied.  The particulars of 
structural developmental psychology will be discussed and analysed early in the 
next chapter. However, the very term development carries connotations that are 
important to examine here. 
 
Fundamentalism and the metaphor of development 
 
The etymological union of fundamentalism and development is understandably 
controversial.  The metaphor of development can connote change from inferior 
to superior, least to most, last to first, with all the value-laden implications of 
usage in an economic context (Rossiter, 1988).  The association of 
fundamentalism with a particular stage of psychosocial development is bound to 
be controversial so long as the metaphor of development shares a value laden 
economic context.  Therefore, it is important from the outset to remythologise 
and specify the metaphor of development before applying it to fundamentalism. 
 
It is not useful to perceive the early and late stages of development as inferior 
and superior respectively. Divergent, abstract thinking does not surpass 
convergent, concrete thinking. The concrete and convergent psychology of 
fundamentalism necessarily precedes the divergence and abstractions of later 
stages.  One cannot abstract unless one has something concrete to abstract. 
The risk of using the metaphor of development is exposure to the connotations 
of succession, inferiority and superiority - the new rejecting, rather than 
reconstructing the old.   
 
Development is a cumulative process - stages are incremental.  Each stage 
builds on the foundation of the last, just as new abilities require previous skills. 
Development is incremental and holistic.  To pose a metaphorical question of 
development - which rungs on a ladder are the most important?  There is a 
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 danger of fundamentalism inhibiting further development but there is also a 
danger of a later stage discourse cutting the ground from under its feet.   
 
 
The epistemological studies of Cobern (1996), and Burbules and Linn (1991) 
reveal diversity in the types of epistemologies valued and used in different 
situations by adolescent individuals.   It is a position of this thesis that the 
emergence of new epistemologies does not necessitate their dominance - they 
may be considered less useful than the epistemologies of earlier stages or 
compartmentalised to particular domains.  Such developmental arrest or 
compartmentalisation may be quite deliberate if development seemingly leads 
away from the security and truth of familiar fundamentalist epistemologies.   
 
A more concrete, though somewhat anecdotal analogy from neuroscience may 
serve to clarify this thesis’s position on the relative values of different 
epistemologies.  Clinical Professor of Neurology at Albert Einstein College of 
Medicine, Oliver Sacks, recounts the case history of a patient suffering from 
visual agnosia: 
While we were walking, my attention was caught by the pictures on the walls...I 
strolled past them curiously - they were in chronological order.  All his [the 
patient's] earlier work was naturalistic and realistic, with vivid mood and 
atmosphere, but finely detailed and concrete.  Then, years later they became 
less vivid, less concrete, less realistic and naturalistic; but far more abstract, 
even geometrical and cubist. Finally, in the last paintings, the canvasses 
became nonsense, or nonsense to me - mere chaotic lines and blotches of 
paint...This wall of paintings was a tragic pathological exhibit, which belonged to 
neurology, not art...Perhaps, in his cubist period, there might have been both 
artistic and pathological development, colluding to engender an original form; 
for as he lost the concrete, so he might have gained in elements of the abstract, 
developing a greater sensitivity to all the structural elements of line, boundary, 
contour - an almost Picasso-like power to see, and equally depict, those 
abstract organisations embedded in, and normally lost in, the concrete...Though 
in the final pictures, I feared, there was only chaos and agnosia. (Sacks, 
1985:16)  
The case in point serves to exemplify the importance of both concrete and 
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 abstract images familiar to fundamentalisms and liberalisms respectively. The 
capacities for such images are arguably developmental but both are necessary 
for normative function. By analogy, at their pathological extremes 
fundamentalisms (concrete images) and liberalisms (abstract images) represent 
two exclusive epistemologies - mutually and definitively opposed.  Normal 
development, at least neurologically speaking, requires not exclusivity of the 
concrete and the abstract - but interaction between the two (1985:18).   
 
The stage structures that this paper purports to underlie fundamentalism serve 
a specific purpose in the ongoing development of the individual within 
community.  Many of the parts that together make fundamentalism a 
recognisable whole, are never relegated by later development - they are 
assimilated.  However, development is a dynamic process; it provides a 
standard for value judgment inasmuch as fundamentalism arrests the dynamic 
changes of development.  
 
Commentators are divided in their approaches to fundamentalism.  Its 
defenders embrace the term with pride.  Its detractors range from the tolerant to 
the scathingly critical.  Regardless of approach, all agree that fundamentalism in 
its various guises is a phenomenon that has shaped and will continue to shape 
the course of history in powerful ways.  Its social and historical significance 
coupled with its increasing prominence at the frontiers of the religious east and 
west, warrants such attempts as this to understand it.   
 
The position espoused by this thesis is twofold.  It embraces the structures that 
give rise to fundamentalism but is critical of fundamentalism (or any other ism) 
as a phylogenetic structure that arrests ontogenetic development.  In order to 
understand and appreciate the developmental approach to fundamentalism 
contained herein, it is necessary to first locate it in an understanding of self as 
researcher. 
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Meta-Narrative Context 
 
This final section leads to the conceptual synthesis.  It is a unique section, 
perhaps overlooked or omitted in many similar theses but necessitated by the 
nature of the study.  It concerns the personal, subjective genesis of this thesis 
and the positions assumed therein.  I am confident that such a subjective 
inclusion is necessary for increased objectivity.  In keeping with the purpose of 
this section, the tone is inevitably more narrative than the conventions of 
academic writing endorse.  However, to hide the first person in the false 
objectivity of a third person narrative undermines the precise intent of this 
section - which is to lay open my own development towards a developmental 
approach.  It is for a similar reason that I have chosen to use a chronological-
historical approach to analyse developmentalism in the first section of Chapter 
Two.  A discourse, like an individual is a product of historical development.  It is 
often in the context of this development that the discourse (like the individual) is 
best understood. 
 
Theoretical research is not conceived in a vacuum.  It is the product of every 
level of an individual's experience.  Inasmuch as an individual is determined 
within community, it is a product of community interests.  Inasmuch as 
community is determined within the spirit of an age or sui generis, it is a product 
of that age.  This is not to say that the researcher is a mere puppet of context 
(though this has been argued).  I as researcher have a relative autonomy, a 
limited freedom, a right to, and a right not to participate in the discourses of my 
contexts.   Paradoxically, I choose and am chosen by the paths that lead me to 
this thesis. 
 
My life has been lived and perceived through a single discourse that I call 
Protestant Fundamentalism-Evangelicalism.  It is a powerful discourse.  It is a 
relatively well-defined discourse.  It is an exclusive discourse.  It admits no other 
and represents no other.  It is a mega-discourse or meta-narrative 
encompassing experience (past, present, and future).  Few experiences are too 
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 small and none too large to escape its interpretive grasp.  I have never known 
another worldview.  I had no initial conversion to just immersion in.   
 
As an individual, I have thrived within the fundamentalist-evangelical discourse.  
To many around me I had mastered this discourse.  I could move quickly and 
decisively within its web to repair and reinforce, to repel and to attract.  I have 
spent most of my life being trained and training others in its ways.   It has 
governed my relationships, my hobbies, my career, and my emotions.   Yet 
somehow the passion for truth that made me its most vocal advocate has 
pushed me beyond its confines. 
 
There are many ways of viewing my development.  Indeed development is one 
of them and the one I am most willing to defend; hence the topic of this thesis.  
Other's descriptions may be (and have been) less euphemistic.  Perhaps I have 
backslidden, turned my back on the cross, strayed from the flock or perhaps I 
am to be the prodigal for a time.  These are the attributions of the 
fundamentalist discourse that I have exited.   
 
There are other attributions from other sources. Perhaps I have succumbed to 
the impersonal selfish memes of a more liberal faith. Perhaps I have had a 
crisis of faith and not returned.  Perhaps my cognitive dissonance reached 
critical mass resulting in a worldview change.  Perhaps in a postmodern sense, 
I have been passed between discourses by chance and circumstance while 
living with the real illusion that I was an active participant in the passage.   
There is little I can do (outside of personal relationship) to allay potential critic's 
fears except to say that I have tried and tested many attributions and 
development is the one that accounts for the most data, and feels right.  The 
former is the only evidence defensible in a thesis to warrant a critical synthesis 
between model and experience.   
 
The question is, whether my own understanding and experience of this 
synthesis is demonstrable in other contexts.  For this, I turn to the existing 
literature describing and analysing fundamentalism including accounts of 
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 fundamentalists and former fundamentalists.  The test of development’s 
applicability lies in the congruence between the stage structure descriptors and 
the existing analyses, observations, descriptions and representations of 
fundamentalism.  Writing in hindsight, the fit between the structural descriptors 
and fundamentalism is for the most part, recognised and accepted by 
fundamentalists themselves.  To anticipate the literature of academic 
fundamentalists discussed in the next section, their disagreement is with, (a) the 
order of these descriptors in the broader discourse of development, (b) whether 
or not cognitive development affects religious belief, (c) whether belief has form 
as well as content and, (d) whether or not development, however demonstrable, 
is at all necessary or desirable.    
 
Questions (a-c) are answered by the empirical evidence of developmentalists, 
while question (d) is a less approachable metaphysical matter.  While such 
evidence of development (like all evidence) has been questioned by other 
disciplines, it is not the primary purpose of this thesis to test the developmental 
discourse empirically.  The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and articulate a 
theoretical link between developmental stages and fundamentalism.  Its 
success in such an endeavor is measured by the degree of synonymy and 
congruence between the descriptors of the former and existing descriptions of 
the latter. Its failure or difficulty will rightly expose weaknesses that the 
developmentalist must address in order to maintain a structuralist approach. 
  
I am well aware of the contentiousness of my own development.  It raises many 
questions.  The stakes of religious discourse are always high.  However, 
structural developmentalism is a meta-narrative discourse.  It can accommodate 
all other attributions of my own change at the level of structure while denying 
the exclusivity of any one attribution.   
 
The final concern expresses itself in the value of former structures and the 
nature of the structure/s now embraced.  Human development is incremental. 
To repeat the aforementioned analogy; one must build in order to climb; if one 
destroys what is below one will fall; one cannot climb higher than the top of a 
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 building considered complete.  This analogy assumes a structuralist position.  It 
would be rejected by a postmodernist approach as containing a teleological 
bias.  However, my claim that development has worth is founded on the 
evidence of the conflicts and social divisiveness of early stage representations 
rather than a sense of teleological idealism.  This position is not so far removed 
from an affirmative postmodernism that assumes a position of social 
responsibility for the distribution of power.  The alternative, skeptical 
postmodernism, makes any response meaningless by its very nature.  
Protestant Fundamentalism was a stage in the building of my faith. The 
experiences it pointed me to; the experiences it encouraged me to explore; and 
the experiences it protected me from, are still the stuff of my existence.   
 
However, I contend that an uninhibited course of development leads beyond 
fundamentalism.  I contend that this position is both theoretically and empirically 
sustainable.  Truly embraced, new stages of development allow deeper 
understandings, more intrinsic motivations, and in some ways a chance to draw 
a step closer to the truths fundamentalism seeks to protect. I want to explore 
ways of making the transition between the two more feasible, less difficult and 
prolonged.  I want to know what can remain of one discourse developing into 
another.  I want to know how ontogenetically developing faith is constructed and 
deconstructed within such discourses.  Finally, as an educator, I want to explore 
such things in the context of schooling.      
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 2.     CONCEPTUAL SYNTHESIS 
 
2.1  Structural Development: A Critique of an Evolving  
      Discourse in Light of Fundamentalist Epistemology. 
 
2.1.1      Structural development: Epistemological        
     Foundations and Immanuel Kant 
 
 Introduction 
The application of a structural developmental discourse to fundamentalism 
assumes an epistemological position.  The broader structuralist discourse of 
developmentalism lies between two oft-competing epistemologies.  One is 
characterised by objectivism, absolutism, a priori knowledge, and 
fundamentalism.  The other is characterised by subjectivism, relativism, a 
posteriori knowledge, and poststructuralism.  The structural developmental 
discourse lies within a philosophical tradition that finds expression in the 
thinking of German philosopher, Immanuel Kant.  It is important, for the sake of 
objectivity and understanding, to reveal the epistemological foundations of the 
structural developmental discourse in light of its application to fundamentalism.  
Developmentalism is indebted to Kantian philosophy.  It is with the Kantian 
assumptions of developmentalism, that fundamentalism takes issue.  It makes 
sense therefore, to examine these assumptions in their initial form; to reengage 
past epistemological debates, foundational to the synthesis of two modern 
discourses, at their place of origin.  To ignore the legacy of modern 
developmentalism would be to take the debate out of context and to ignore, the 
historical dimensions and indebtedness of the modern discourse.     
 
Fundamentalism and poststructuralism alike, question the foundations of 
structural development as embedded in Kantian thought.  Structuralism tends to 
lie between these two positions.  It is the underlying epistemology of 
fundamentalism and poststructuralism, expressed as rationalism and 
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 empiricism that Kant sought to synthesise.  As such, he is criticised by 
fundamentalists as being naturalistic, agnostic, and fideistic (Geisler, 1999:401-
4), and by poststructuralists as being too objectivist and foundational in his 
descriptions and use of categories.  
 
Thus, through its embrace of the developmental discourse the essential 
philosophical assumption of this thesis concerns the perennial philosophical 
contenders - rationalism and empiricism.  These terms are to be understood in 
their Kantian context.  The brief ensuing review of Kant's philosophy will 
establish the philosophical foundations on which Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg, 
Erikson, Oser and Gmünder, and Fowler (the developmentalists) built their 
theories. It will examine the essential epistemological critiques of structuralist 
philosophy and thus provide a deliberate context for the continuing application 
of structural developmental theory to the concept of fundamentalism. 
 
 Kant's epistemological synthesis 
All theses logically (if not consciously), assume a philosophical position. 
Empiricism and rationalism are the chicken and the egg of philosophy - which 
came first? Is the empiricism of yesterday, the rationalism of today? Is the a 
priori of today, the a posteriori of yesterday?  In the legacy of Kant, 
developmentalism offers a response to a dilemma, which in many guises has 
been debated since the pre-Socratics.  
 
All philosophical theories of knowledge lie between or at the extreme of 
rationalism and empiricism.  The complexities of Western philosophy are 
essentially derivatives of this epistemological divide.  Rationalism is the belief 
that reason, untainted by experiential subjectivity is a universal source of 
knowledge.  Kant contrasts rationalism with empiricism where empiricism is the 
claim that all cognition should derive from experience alone (Caygill, 1995: 344).  
Rationalism is synonymous with a priori knowledge.  A priori knowledge is that 
which (in Kantian terms) is absolutely independent of all experience. It is pure 
and universal (Kant in Want & Klimowski, 1996).   
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 Empiricism is largely synonymous with a posteriori knowledge.  A posteriori 
knowledge is that which is "gathered from experience" (Caygill: 35).  These 
concepts pose fundamental questions for the structural developmental 
discourse and the worldviews of fundamentalisms (plural intended) explored in 
this thesis.  Is a fundamentalist worldview wholly the product of experience? 
Alternatively, is experience organised by pre-existing (a priori) structures? 
Would such structures be necessarily universal? Can it be known if knowledge 
exists before experience?   Are there any valid criteria for judging one discourse 
more legitimate than another discourse?  Should such criteria be derived from a 
posteriori or a priori knowledge?  This thesis's implicit and explicit answers to 
these questions are located within the Kantian tradition.  
 
Immanuel Kant's answers to these questions were not formulated in a 
philosophical vacuum.  His synthesis came at a time when the rift between 
rationalism and empiricism was foremost in scholarly consciousness.  Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650), Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), and Gottfried Leibniz 
(1646-1716) represented the rationalists.  The empiricists were represented by 
John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), and David Hume 
(1711-1776).  Kant was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Hume, Locke 
and Rousseau.  Though trained in rationalism, he respected the scepticism of 
Hume: "[Hume] interrupted my dogmatic slumbers and gave my investigations 
in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction" (Korner, 1987:220).    
 
This new direction ultimately led him to defend a priori axioms from Hume's 
attacks on causality.  Kant appreciated Locke's effort to establish pure ideas but 
disagreed with Locke's view that such ideas could be derived wholly from 
experience (Blakney, 1960:44).  He aspired to the humanitarian romanticism of 
Rousseau.  His intellectual regard for Hume; his dissatisfaction with Locke's 
pure ideas derived from experience; and his appreciation for Rousseau's ideals 
perhaps motivated his attempt to synthesise the empirical and the rational in 
human ontology.  This synthesis is reflected in the structural developmentalist 
claims that universal stage structures interact with the contextual particulars of 
logico-mathematical and social experience. 
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Kant's central thesis was that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes 
the active participation of the human mind.  His monumental work Critique of 
Pure Reason (1781, 1787) was an attempt to show that reason determines the 
conditions under which knowledge through experience is possible.  To 
appreciate this deceptively simple assertion and its relationship to structural 
development one must first examine Kant's conceptions of a priori and a 
posteriori knowledge in more detail. 
 
 A priori and a posteriori knowledge 
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is prefaced by the likening of his epistemological 
position to a Copernican revolution in perspective (Want & Klimowski, 1996:64).  
This revolution upturned the traditional assumption that knowledge must 
conform to objects by asserting that in reality objects conformed to knowledge.  
Kant then continues to prepare a defence of a priori knowledge: 
There can be no doubt whatever that all our knowledge begins with 
experience...but, although all our knowledge begins with experience it by no 
means follows that it all originates from experience.  For it may well be that 
experience is itself made up of two elements, one received through impression 
of sense, and the other supplied from itself by our faculty of knowledge on 
occasion of those impressions (7-8). 
Herein Kant establishes the two elements of Piaget's later interactionism - 
experience and pre-existing faculties. 
 
The traditional assumption that Kant refuted was that human knowledge 
conformed to some external reality - a sort of Platonian theory of forms; the 
human mind revolved around external objects like the pre-Copernican sun 
around the earth.  Intellectual endeavour was about revealing external truths 
and reality.  In the realm of religion, knowledge from revelation, royal and 
ecclesiastical authority assumed to interpret experience a priori. In the Kantian 
system, ontological knowledge of an external reality was impossible.  
Revelation and reason were separate.  
 
Thus began a pivotal shift (not necessarily representative of Kant's intention) in 
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 Western worldviews.  Attention turned from the external to the internal, from 
knowledge of a transcendent and detached God to knowledge of human 
consciousness.  Rousseau championed a revived humanism while Hume 
explored some of the darker implications of such an axiomatic shift.  The 
Humean being existed as string of reactions and sensations in "perpetual flux 
and movement" (in Sacks, 1985:119).  Hume's somewhat pessimistic implication 
was that the individual did not exist with a conscious, centred identity, being 
instead a "consecution of sensations, or perceptions" (119).   
 
For later developmentalists like Erikson and Fowler, Hume's description of 
human identity described a deviation rather than a standard; a failure to centre 
faith in a secure ultimate (Fowler) or the effects or unresolved crisis (Erikson).  
More recently, neurologist Oliver Sacks (1995:118-119) has described Hume's 
human as more typical of a rare neuro-pathology exhibited in extreme cases of 
Tourette's syndrome or Korsakov's disease.  The normal individual has a 
centred, owned sense of perception and proprioception.  Fowler would call this 
faith. 
  
Herein lies a core point in understanding the epistemology of fundamentalism.  
There is a distinctive fundamentalist fear (to be addressed later in the Chapter) 
that Kant's agnosticism and naturalism are stages on the path to a scepticism of 
Humean proportions.  Such scepticism (fundamentalists fear) leads inevitably to 
a nihilism and despair made manifest in the most hideous immoralities and 
sociopathic behaviours.  This fear will be discussed in developmental terms in a 
later section. 
 
Kant's philosophy functioned as a dialectic between the rejection of external 
noumena and fear of existential nihilism.   However, as a dialectic, Kant's 
categories and later developmentalists’ universal stages are seen as flawed by 
fundamentalists and poststructuralists alike - but for opposing reasons.  As a 
self-professed Christian, Kant sought to escape the scepticism of Hume (and 
hence a form of nihilism) through his defence of a priori axioms as marks of a 
creator God. 
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Kant's Axioms and Moral Imperative 
In Kantian terms, a priori knowledge “is independent of all experience...pure, 
when it is unmixed with anything empirical” (Kant, 1946:XI).  Kant was eager to 
escape Locke's mistake of trying to derive universal axioms from a posteriori 
knowledge.  Kant's a priori knowledge necessitates itself and is obligatorily 
universal.  In his Critique of Practical Reason Kant postulates three such a priori 
axioms: the freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of 
God (Kant in Jones, 1971:Ch 1).  These three axioms act as foundations for 
human experience but cannot themselves be accurately described or revealed 
by particular experience.   They are revealed through pure analytic judgments 
and mistakenly transferred into and corrupted by, the a posteriori realm of 
synthetic judgments.    
 
The fundamentalist criticism of Kant's agnosticism is leveled at his rejection of 
supernatural epistemology or knowledge from revelation.  Geisler, Schaeffer, 
Rushdoony and LaHaye, all fundamentalist apologists later reviewed, argue that 
Christ as the human embodiment of God reveals the character of God.  In 
Kantian terms fundamentalists believe that Christ was both a priori and a 
posteriori - that he was the one human who transcended the law of non-
conversion between analytic and synthetic judgments.   
 
Kant's axiom of free will gave rise to his universal standard or ethic - the 
categorical imperative.  The one and only categorical imperative is, “act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law” (Kant in Caygil, 1995:100).  Kant distinguished the 
categorical imperative from hypothetical imperatives that he defined as morals 
directing actions towards ends.  Hence, hypothetical imperatives are not purely 
a priori.  The categorical imperative on the other hand, as outlined in Kant's 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), is self-necessitated and 
derived independent of circumstance or synthetic judgment.  It underpins Kant's 
deontological (duty centred) ethics.   The implications of Kant's axioms and 
imperatives for the concepts of faith and fundamentalism are significant. 
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Kant's moral axiom of free will and its implied categorical imperative enable his 
philosophy to access ought judgments rather than is statements.  As such, Kant 
escapes philosophical nihilism or moral relativism.  However, his categorical 
imperative is less prescriptive than fundamentalism allows, and more 
prescriptive than relativism allows.  This access to moral or value judgment is a 
vital part of any treatment of faith development and worldview because it 
enables (rightly or wrongly) a limited value criticism of the same.  Kantian 
philosophy would rebut a view of faith and ethos founded upon moral scepticism 
or relative antinomy inasmuch as such metaphysics motivated action.  Kant's 
existential world contained a polyglot of contents and synthetic beliefs, 
legitimated only by their conception from a priori axioms.  In a Kantian system, 
faith may have diverse contents but should be founded on true axioms.  
 
Fundamentalism's moral particulars are not derived from a categorical 
imperative.  Rather, they are prescribed from revelation (often Scripture).  
Though it is true that such revelations may be seen to prescribe their own 
axioms (i.e. do unto others), the moral particulars of fundamentalist 
communities are held to be inextricable from the character of the divine.  In 
addition, in monotheistic fundamentalisms the character of the divine is 
perceived to be infallibly revealed in the particular detail of Scripture.  Kant 
thought such particulars to be the culturally embedded periphery of religions.  
Poststructuralists are likely to criticise Kant's categorical imperative and axioms 
on the same grounds. 
 
 Kant and religion 
Kant’s axioms presupposing the existence of God and human immortality could 
not be used to support the particulars of religion when translated into the world 
of phenomena (Rushdoony, 1971:299).  This accounts for Kant's reluctance to 
discuss the particulars of religions.  His Critiques of pure and practical reason, 
his works on the metaphysics of morals and ethics (1796,1797) and Religion 
Within the Limits of Pure Reason ([trans] 1973) equate God with the notion of 
the highest good.  The highest good cannot prescribe morals as commands, for 
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 ethics then becomes heteronymous (Korner: 169).   
 
Kant delves beneath the particular creeds of worldview in his concept of true 
religion: 
There is only one true religion; but there can be many varieties of religious 
creeds...It is therefore more appropriate to say: this man is of the Jewish, 
Mohammedan, Christian religious creed, than: he is of this or that religion. (In 
Korner: 170). 
Kant himself was religious but drew his respect for religion from the moral 
doctrines they contained: 
I distinguish the teaching of Christ from the report we have of the teaching of 
Christ, and in order to get at the former I try above all to extract the moral 
teaching separated from all precepts of the New Testament.  The former is 
surely the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, the latter can only be an auxiliary 
doctrine (170-171). 
He received a royal warning for his writings on religion on October 1, 1794.  In a 
letter signed by the King, he was threatened not to mention religion or 
Christianity in his future writings.  Previously in 1794, in an article The End of All 
Things, Kant had written: 
Should it once happen that Christianity stops being lovable (which could indeed 
occur were it armed with imperious authority, instead of its gentle spirit), then 
rejection and rebellion against it would inevitably come to be the dominant way 
of thought among men. (In Want & Klimowski, 1996:153) 
Kant retained his Christianity at a symbolic level, denying that he had "made 
any judgment on the Bible or Christianity in his teaching" but ceased to discuss 
religious matters in the public arena (Want et al, 1996:154). 
 
Fundamentalist apologists criticise Kant on several fronts, including his Biblical 
reductionism.  Apologist Norman Geisler argues that Kant's philosophical legacy 
has "devastated Western epistemology" (1999:403). Geisler concludes his 
rebuttal of Kant: 
However, Kant's agnosticism is self defeating, he begs the question by 
assuming a moral uniformitarianism, and he assumes the nature of a scientific 
"law" to be a universal sine qua non, rather than a statistical generalization.  For 
Kant to avoid the miraculous, he had to eliminate the miracle accounts from 
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 the basic documents of Christianity, without any historical reason for doing so. 
(199:405) 
Postmodern critics would perhaps agree with Geisler's criticism of Kant, "he 
assumes the nature of a scientific "law" to be a universal sine qua non, rather 
than a statistical generalization".  However, the agreement between 
fundamentalism and poststructuralism would cease concerning the nature of the 
miraculous.   
   
Kant's work inspired both functionalist and phenomenological philosophy.  The 
functionalists turned Kant's a priori conditions into underlying social facts.  
Phenomenological adherents developed the implications of his a posteriori 
philosophy while rejecting his axiomatic postulates.  Hence, somewhat ironically 
Kant is seen by some fundamentalists (Rushdoony, 1971; Geisler, 1999; LaHaye, 
1979) as the instigator of poststructuralism and by poststructuralists as the 
defender of a fundamentalistic innate objectivism. 
 
It is a valid criticism that developmentalism bears a Kantian tradition prejudiced 
against fundamentalism.  Kant reacted against the fundamentalist religious 
establishments of his day.  This criticism is best answered by the empirical 
evidences provided by later developmentalists.  Nonetheless, the Kantian 
origins of developmental theory prescribe to some extent the very nature, 
collection and interpretation of this empirical data. 
 
Summarily, Kant's philosophical contribution to the context of development and 
fundamentalism is grounded in his understanding of a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge; in his promotion of the categorical imperative as an axiomatic rule 
for the construction of creed; and in his consequent unity of religious intent. 
Thus, Kant's philosophy is most practically applicable as a universal ethic.  In a 
Kantian framework the divisions between fundamentalisms and relativisms 
result from impossible attempts to reconcile the concept of an absolute Being 
with a concept of representation (Want & Klimowski, 1996:41).  Herein lies the link 
to structural developmental theory which views such attempts at reconciliation 
as differentiated by structure and stage. 
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 2.1.2 Stage Theories: Freud and Piaget 
 
 Introduction 
In this section, the concept of development will be examined in light of two 
theorists, Jean Piaget and Sigmund Freud, representing genetic epistemology 
and psychoanalysis respectively.  These theories approach the same problems 
of fundamentalist epistemology from slightly different perspectives; though both 
tend to operate within a Kantian framework.  The intent of the following review is 
to provide a context for the further analysis of fundamentalism. Specific 
attention is given to the Piagetian mechanisms of development assumed by 
Kohlberg and Fowler as discussed in later sections. 
   
This section utilises the term fundamentalist worldview to refer to 
fundamentalism.  This term is used in order to focus the Piagetian frame of 
reference.  It is perhaps the term most useful when analysing religious belief in 
the context of Freudian and Piagetian theory.  The term worldview will be 
subsumed under the term faith when discussing Fowler's developmental 
approach in a later section. 
   
 Fundamentalism and Worldview 
In this context a worldview is organised macrothought that determines 
behaviour and decision-making (Kearney, 1984).  Complementing this definition 
is William Cobern's definition as used in the context of science education: 
Worldview refers to the culturally-dependent, generally subconscious, 
fundamental organization of the mind.  This organization manifests itself as a 
set of presuppositions or assumptions which predispose one to feel, think, and 
act in predictable patterns. (1998:1) 
This definition raises several questions that serve to focus the following 
discussion.  Is a fundamentalist worldview a legitimate epistemological 
concept?  Is a fundamentalist worldview developmentally dynamic? What 
cognitive processes described by Piaget facilitate the construction of a 
fundamentalist worldview?  What Freudian a priori motivations and a posteriori 
structures govern such processes?  Are fundamentalist worldviews nativist or 
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 empiricist, ontogenetic or phylogenetic according to Freudian and Piagetian 
theory? 
 
  Freud and Developmental Stages 
Freud’s contribution to developmentalism is significant.  The combination of his 
legacy in developmental theory and his analyses of religion justify a brief 
exploration to highlight some considerations for the synthesis of 
developmentalism and religious fundamentalism. 
    
Freud’s theories evolved out of his studies with psychiatric patients and his 
attempts to rationalise his own perceived neuroses in later life.   Freud, like 
Piaget was dissatisfied with existing transcendent explanations of the mind.  He 
sought to find a rational explanation for neuroticism and its pathogenetic effects. 
 
Freud studied the sublimated mental effects of a reproductive urge he termed 
eros.  His thesis was that innate sexual desire manifested itself in complex ways 
through human behaviour.  To Freud, the human mind maintained a fragile 
equilibrium between sexual desire and fear.  He studied cases of neurosis and 
concluded that such behaviours were the pathological results of a subconscious 
in which the equilibrium had been disturbed. 
 
Freud's search for a neuropathological theory of the mind led him to develop the 
notion of a repressed conflict that surfaced as neurosis when the equilibrium of 
the conflict was disturbed.  Freud's observations of patients (Anna O, Hans, and 
Rat man) and his interpretations of his own dreams and sufferings led him to 
the conclusion that eros or sexual desire was the primary cognitive and 
behavioural motivator. In 1923 Freud published The Ego and the Id, expounding 
his theory of the human mind; a cognitive civil war between the id and the 
superego, mediated by the ego which itself was often attacked (Church in Neu, 
1991:217-8). 
 
In 1905, Freud published Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.  In these 
essays, he identified four stages of psychosexual development - oral, anal, 
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 phallic, and latency  (Appignanesi & Zarate, 1992:77-99).   The adolescent 
encounters the phallic and latency stages.  In his previous publication, The 
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901 in Neu,1991)  Freud identified a conflict 
between the preconscious  or the reality principle and the unconscious or the 
pleasure principle.  His thesis was that sexual desires (pleasure principle) are 
repressed (latency) for fear of repercussion if they are recognised (reality 
principle).   
 
Between 1923 and 1930 Freud labeled the mental structures he had identified 
and applied his theory to social organisation.  The primitive desires of the 
unconscious he called the id.  The facilitator of reality and the unconscious he 
called the ego.  In Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), he proposed a super-
ego; the institutionalised fear of parental authority (In Strachey Trans. 1961).  
Freud noted that the challenge for a student of cognitive development was to 
“chart the course of growth of these compromising mental structures” (Kessen in 
Mischel, 1971: 289).  This challenge is accepted and addressed in the later work 
of Piagetian developmentalists. 
 
 Freud and Religion 
In Freudian terms, a fundamentalist worldview is a cognitive structure 
dominated by forces of super-ego repression.  The nature of the content 
assimilated into this structure may be traced to this conflict.  In Totem and 
Taboo (1912-13), and Civilisation and its Discontents (1930), Freud postulated 
that repression was institutionalised through religion (Paul in Neu, 1991:267).  He 
generalised that religious practices were forms of group neuroses. In Freudian 
terms, religious fundamentalist worldviews are structured super-egos that 
repress selfish ego instincts concerning the survival of the organism (270).   
 
Freud believed that there is truth in religion; that it arose from a shared human 
sense of dependence; that some of its moral axioms are quite desirable; and 
that it is genuinely comforting (Geisler, 1999:264).  However, he also 
considered religion to be illusory, primitive, immature, authoritarian, and 
harmfully arresting of sexual development (264).  
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According to Freud, the confusion, anxiety, and rebellion common to 
adolescence are the results of a conflict between a maturing libido  (sexual 
instinct) and fear of repercussions of expression.   Hence, the adolescent 
worldview is a construction of the ego that regulates this expression.  The 
specific content and creed of a worldview serves either purpose.  It will be used 
to either repress or release adolescent sexual desire depending upon the 
complex combination of maturational and social factors.  Neuroticism is the 
result of extreme repression or extreme release.  Freud contended that 
authoritarian religions requiring extreme repression, when rejected, often 
resulted in a reactionary case of extreme release.   
  
In Interpretation of Dreams (1896) and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
(1901) he identified ways in which the id escaped, disguised, into the reality of 
the conscious (Freud in Strachy [trans.], 1961).   As such, a worldview as a 
construct of the ego may serve to reveal or aid in the disguising.  This depends 
on its content.  Freud acknowledged this dependency in his later works such as 
The Future of an Illusion (1928 in Strachy [Trans], 1961). While not wishing to 
embrace the holistic summations of Freud's theory of religion (for this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis), his concern with the authoritarian religious repression 
of development is a primary concern in the thesis.  It is to be explored in more 
detail in the next chapter under Fowler's Aspect of Faith - Locus of Authority.   
 
Summarily, Freud's theories observe the broader religious context of 
fundamentalism as an early developmental illusion sustained by powerful 
institutions.  He likens authoritarian religion to a repressive neurosis.  He 
believes that sexual development is often arrested by the repression of such 
neuroses.  Freud's broader judgments on religion are not assumed in the 
position of this thesis.  Indeed, such judgments are far beyond its scope.  
Nonetheless, Freud's observations are valuable, both as a historical precedent 
to the developmental discourse and as empirical (his case studies) evidence of 
socio-religious discourses affecting otherwise normal development.  Whether or 
not such religious intervention is necessary, and normal development is actually 
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 entropic, is an issue for fundamentalists and certainly not the primary concern of 
this thesis.   
 
Freud's concepts of stage development, repression, and arrest contributed to a 
broadening developmental tradition that was to be popularised by Swiss 
epistemologist, Jean Piaget. 
 
 Piaget, Structural Development and Fundamentalism 
Piaget contributes the essential terminology and understanding of modern 
developmental theory.  He also contributes greatly to the methodological 
development and collection of empirical data to test and question the theory.  
Piagetian concepts are at the centre of the synthesis between 
developmentalism and fundamentalism.   
 
Jean Piaget pursued doctorates in both philosophy and biology.  Dissatisfied 
with transcendental explanations of the mind, he sought to produce a biological 
explanation of cognitive functions.  James Fowler summarises Piaget's 
approach and relationship to Kant assuming a first person role: 
My central question across nearly sixty years of work may be stated in terms of 
the decisive legacy of Kant's critical philosophy.  What operations of mind can 
be scientifically demonstrated to underlie the achievement of rationally certain 
knowledge and how do those operations take form in human beings?  To Kant's 
interest in the a priori forms and categories by which we shape and reflect on 
experience, I bring the question of development. (1981:44)  
In Introduction a`l Epistemologie Genetique (in Messerly, 1996:54) Piaget defined 
genetic epistemology as, “the study of mechanisms whereby bodies of 
knowledge grow”.  He rejected the Darwinian notion that external natural 
selection tests internal mutations and the Lamarckian notion that external 
changes caused the internal inheritance of previously acquired characteristics 
(Messerly: xi).  He sought to formulate and test a genetic theory of knowledge.  
 
In Freudian and Piagetian terms, a fundamentalist worldview may be 
considered developmentally distinctive inasmuch as the processes that 
organise it and the motivations behind these processes are affected by 
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 cognitive development (Piaget) and psychosexual development (Freud). A 
fundamentalist worldview is a legitimate developmental and epistemological 
concept to the extent that it exists (in Piagetian terms) as a manifestation of 
developing cognitive structures and a coordination of transferable schemes.  
Their respective theories offer answers to the questions: What cognitive 
processes form fundamentalist worldviews, and what motivates these 
processes?   
 
Piaget's stage theory asserts that cognitive development proceeds through a 
series of stages.  A stage is a period of time in which thinking and behaviour 
reflect underlying cognitive structures (Miller, 1993:38).  Piaget identified four 
such stages or periods - sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete operational, 
and formal operational.  During the sensorimotor stage (birth to 2 years) infants 
make sense of the world by direct physical engagement with their immediate 
environments.  During the preoperational stage (2 to 7 years) children develop 
the ability to represent objects symbolically.  During the concrete operational 
stage (7 to 11 years) children develop the ability to perform and organise 
internalised mental operations.  During the formal operational stage (11 to 15 
years) children acquire the ability to apply mental operations to abstract 
concepts and hypothetical situations.   
 
According to Piaget, stage development is governed by several principles; a 
stage is a structured whole in a state of equilibrium; each stage derives from the 
previous stage, incorporates and transforms that stage, and prepares for the 
next stage; stages follow an invariant sequence; stages are universal; and 
stages are marked by a transitional period, equilibrium and a preparational 
period (Miller, 1993:38-40).  The application of these stages to fundamentalism 
is a primary objective of this thesis.    
 
Piaget describes the processes of a cognitive system in terms of function, 
content organisation, adaptation, accommodation, assimilation, structure and 
scheme. Interacting within these cognitive processes are factors of maturation, 
physical experience, logico-mathematical experience, social transmission, and 
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 equilibration (Boyle, 1969:28-29). These concepts provide the basic tools for the 
structural developmental deconstruction of fundamentalism.  In a Piagetian 
framework, a fundamentalist (as any) worldview is a product of these processes 
and interactive factors.    
 
A function is an invariant cognitive process.  All cognitive systems function 
using adaptation and organisation.  Adaptation is a system's ability to change 
and filter content (input and output). Organisms adapt through assimilation and 
accommodation.  Assimilation is the cognitive reception of content resulting 
from the application of an existing scheme to a new situation (Campbell, 2000:6).  
Accommodation is the process by which the content changes the nature of 
cognitive reception in order create schemes to better fit the environment:  
This interaction leads to cognitive stages which represent the transformations of 
simple early cognitive structures as these are applied to (or assimilate) the 
external world and as they are accommodated to or restructured by the external 
world in the course being applied to it (Phillips, 1975:13).   
Organisation refers to the fact that cognitive systems seem to operate in an 
ordered way - to achieve or fulfil an evolutionary goal - survival.   
 
These invariant processes act on dynamic structures and schemes.  Structure, 
“refers to the systemic properties of an event” (Phillips, 1975:9) and scheme 
refers to the generic units of structure that may generalised to a variety of 
contents. The extent to which a fundamentalist worldview is a cognitive “action 
that may be generalised to other contents” is not quantifiable.  However, such a 
structure is observable in the coherence and scope of metaphysical beliefs that 
affect behaviour.  The very existence of cognitive dissonance between different 
worldviews would suggest that some form of structure exists that may be 
generalised to accommodate, assimilate, or reject incoming content.   
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To incorporate Cobern's definition, a worldview is organised macrothought that 
affects behaviour and decision-making.  Macrothought refers to metaphysical 
assumptions or cognitive content that act as first principles.  In Piagetian terms, 
a worldview is organised content subject to the dynamism of cognitive schemes 
and structures that operate by assimilation and accommodation.   Therefore, a 
 
 
 fundamentalist worldview is constant inasmuch as it operates within a particular 
structure. 
 
While a fundamentalist worldview may be a cognitively legitimate concept, in a 
popular sense it is usually defined by its content.  Content is grouped 
characteristically into various social discourses that are used to describe 
worldviews.  Whether one begins with the dynamics and particulars of social 
discourse or the generative cognitive structures is a matter of epistemological 
preference.  The difference in approach separates sociology and psychology 
respectively.   
 
A person may be holistically labeled as being a fundamentalist, a 
poststructuralist, structuralist, humanist, etceteras (Sire, 1988).  The problem 
with such generalised labels is the inexactitude of their application; their failure 
to acknowledge that conflicting schemata may be compartmentalised within a 
single mind; their failure to acknowledge the dynamism of schemata; and the 
ambiguity of the content that defines the schemata.   
 
Piaget's own quest to find a genetic explanation for epistemology resulted from 
his frustrations with traditional transcendental and supernatural explanations of 
the mind.  He revealed the complexity of the cognitive process and the 
inadequacy of many pseudo-psychological explanations.  An appreciation of 
Piaget's epistemology is essential for a developmental understanding of 
fundamentalism. 
 
 Interactionism 
Piaget's epistemology is the product of creative interactionism.  Freud's 
epistemology reflects a mediated cognitive conflict between primal desires and 
instituted fears.  The early motivations and methodologies of each theorist 
provide an insight into their holistic approaches to the psychology of the mind. 
 
Piaget's search for a theory of genetic epistemology led him to develop the idea 
of interactionism between the mind and the environment.  
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 ...There is no longer any need to choose between the primacy of the social or 
that of the intellect: collective intellect is the social equilibrium resulting from the 
interplay of the operations that enter into all cooperation. (Piaget, 1970:114) 
This is a fundamental assertion of developmental theory - that development 
occurs through interaction.  Piaget theorised that the mind could respond 
creatively to changes in the external environment.  His avoidance of the classic 
nature-nurture dichotomy is commonly expressed in the developmentalist 
cliché`:  
Development is not simply the unfolding of a pattern dictated by the genes, nor 
is it simply the importation of structures from the physical and social 
environment (Campbell, 2000:9).   
While concentrating on cognitive action and its ontogenetic development, Piaget 
acknowledged the dynamism of the relationship between the intellect and the 
external social environment.  Importantly, a structural developmental approach 
to fundamentalism assumes that it is a product of interplay between socially 
formulated and transmitted contents and basic universal structuring tendencies. 
 
Piaget's interactionism is the holistic result of the interrelationships between 
maturation, physical experience, logico-mathematical experience, social 
transmission, and equilibration (Phillips, 1975:17-19). The interaction between 
these factors is being tested as current cognitive neuroscience looks for the 
creation of new biological systems through dynamic interaction with external 
influences (Johnson, 1997).  Any notion of a fundamentalist worldview in a 
Piagetian system must account for the characteristic contributions of these 
factors.    
 
Maturation refers to the genetic capabilities that would determine the level of 
content able to be assimilated to form a worldview.  Physical experience refers 
to experience with the nature of physical objects that results in knowledge of the 
object.  Differentiation between worldviews caused by different physical 
experiences would only be so inasmuch as physical experience gives rise to 
logico-mathematical experience.  Logico-mathematical experience is the 
construction of relationships between objects.  This would have an effect on a 
worldview inasmuch as a worldview acts as a logico-mathematical function 
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 that assimilates and systematises knowledge according to a particular 
epistemology.   
 
Equilibration refers to the cognitive tendency to maintain balance between 
assimilation and accommodation.  Development occurs through the perpetual 
counterbalancing of the relationships between these factors.  A fundamentalist 
worldview may be seen as a cognitive filter that regulates the level of input and 
the type of content assimilated from these factors.      
    
Social transmission refers to the gaining of secondary knowledge from others.  
It is almost certainly organised to an extent by socially transmitted structures.  
The extent to which this is the case, is contested by the disciplines of sociology 
and cognitive psychology.   Sociology emphasises the primacy of community 
dynamics in determining individual identity whereas psychology emphasises the 
primacy of individual cognition as guiding social process.  A brief digression to 
this sociological approach enables an appreciation of Piaget's factor - social 
transmission.  The observation of social transmission from a sociological 
perspective serves to reveal a shared interdisciplinary perspective between 
Anthony Giddens’s Structuration Theory and Piaget’s developmental 
interactionism.  This perspective informs an important factor in the 
developmental analysis of fundamentalism - the structuring power of contents. 
 
 Social transmission: Durkheim and Giddens 
The sociological perspective is itself divided between functionalism and more 
recent structuration theories.  In the functionalism of Emile Durkheim, the 
content of any particular fundamentalist worldview would be the product of a 
group's interaction with archetypal social structures (Cuzzort and King, 1995:21).  
In the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens, a fundamentalist worldview 
would be the product of the reciprocated relationship between human agency 
and dynamic social structures (Bryant and Jary, 1991:7). 
 
Giddens, like Piaget, brings sociology and psychology closer together.  While 
Piaget affirms the importance of social transmission and the dynamics thereof, 
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 Giddens restore the importance of human agency in the constitution of social 
structures: 
Many sociologists picture these patterns as rather like the walls of a 
building...This is misleading because it implies too static or unchanging an 
image of what societies are like: because it does not indicate that the patterning 
of social systems only exists in so far as individuals repeat particular forms of 
conduct from one time and place to another. (Giddens, 1986:12)  
In its application to worldviews, ideology, and belief, structuration acknowledges 
the need to understand individual intentions, motivations, and psychology. 
 
In Gidden's New Rules of Sociological Method (1976) and Sociology: A Brief but 
Critical Introduction (1986) one finds not the oppressive yoke of society 
enslaving the individual but an attempt to: 
grasp how history is made through the active involvements and struggles of 
human beings, and yet at the same time both forms those human beings and 
produces outcomes which they neither intend nor foresee. (Giddens, 1986:156) 
This theoretical shift between Durkheim and Giddens reflects a reciprocating 
respect between sociology and psychology's treatment of the community and 
the individual respectively. 
 
Giddens's structuration theory attempts to reconcile the two within the study of 
sociology.  His sociology as outlined in his New Rules of Sociological Method 
(1976) examines the dynamism of abstract social structures while empathising 
with the intentions and perceptions of society's individuals (In Giddens and 
Pierson, 1998).  He curbs Durkheim's rigid empiricism of social facts arguing: 
We cannot treat human activities as though they were determined by causes in 
the same way as natural events are...because societies only exist in so far as 
they are created and recreated in our own actions as human beings. (1986:11)  
He takes further issue with Durkheim's sociological positivism by pointing out 
that humans unlike innate objects of scientific analysis “may change their 
behaviour in light of [such] knowledge” (12). 
 
Durkheim believed that social facts transcend the sum of individual actions, 
being external to them: 
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 [When] men think in common their thought is, in part, the work of the 
community.  The community acts upon them, weighs down upon them with all 
its authority, restrains their egoistic desires and directs their minds towards a 
collective end. (in Parkin, 1992:79) 
Durkheim argued that social facts could not be revealed by examining individual 
consciousness. 
 
In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim anticipated a structuralist 
answer to the question of religious authenticity: 
In reality, then, there are no religions which are false.  All are true in their own 
fashion; all answer, though in different ways, to the given conditions of human 
existence...The reasons with which the faithful justify them may be, and 
generally are, erroneous; but the true reasons do not cease to exist. (in 
Thompson, 1982:122) 
This is a view to which fundamentalism is greatly opposed.  Piagetian 
interactionism is able to absorb and value the sociological approach as a very 
significant factor in development.  It is a factor that is most applicable to 
fundamentalism.  However, it must be understood in the context of the other 
factors of development.  
 
Thus, a fundamentalist worldview in terms of Piagetian interactionism would be 
a product of the creative interplay between dynamic cognitive schemata and the 
social environment. Therefore, a fundamentalist worldview is subject to the 
social and biological distinctives operating within the unchanging functions of 
the intellect.  
 
 Protestant Fundamentalism and Piagetian Development 
It is possible to observe fundamentalism in light of the broader contentions of 
Piaget's developmental theory.  A more specific analysis will be undertaken in 
the next chapter.  The cognitive tenets of Protestant fundamentalism are often 
cited as forming a worldview (Sire, 1988:Ch.2).  In Piagetian terms, Protestant 
Fundamentalism and other fundamentalisms are culturally and cognitively 
organised content.  Piagetian theory would challenge the notion of Protestant 
Fundamentalism passing through developing schemes and structures as an 
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 objectively true and unchanging conviction.  The contents of belief are static or 
fundamental only as long as they exist in a particular stage.  The descriptive 
language of contents may stay the same throughout development but the 
qualitative perception of the contents may differ.   This is because of the 
Piagetian belief that interaction between accommodation and assimilation (the 
invariants that process the content of a fundamentalist worldview) changes the 
biological nature of the mind.   Any constancy in fundamentalism exists in a 
societal pool of contents.  Content constancy does not exist in the real 
development of an individual mind (though linguistic or attributive constancy 
may).   Herein, lies a core contention. 
 
Developmentally understood, a system of belief based on unchanging 
convictions, understandings, and doctrinal propositions must reflect a particular 
stage of development.  If an individual develops beyond such a stage then so 
must their understandings of the propositions of their system of belief.  The 
difficulty for Protestant Fundamentalism (and some other fundamentalisms) is 
that the convictions and understandings of the discourse are seen as salvific 
knowledge applicable to all ages and stages of life.  If the standard tenets 
(beliefs) of fundamentalist faith are the only access to salvation (John 3:18-19, 
Acts 16:31, Rom 10:4,9,10,14) then it would be expected that they be 
appreciable regardless of age or stage.   
 
At this point, the developmentalist takes issue.  Piaget argues, "...real religion, 
at any rate during the first years, is quite definitely anything but the over-
elaborated religion with which he [sic] is plied" (1973:399-400).  Consequently, 
fundamentalisms, as worldviews self-defined primarily by static contents must 
either: reject wholly the notion of structural development; arrest development 
(Shinn, 1984); represent the penultimate stage of development (and therefore 
be inaccessible to most); or value precocious utterances of over-elaborated 
belief as true signs of salvation.  
 
In Protestant Fundamentalism, this developmental issue often appears in the 
concrete dilemmas: do children who do not or cannot articulate the core 
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 propositions of the fundamentalist worldview go to heaven; do the intellectually 
disabled go to heaven; do those aged who have amnesia to the point of 
forgetting such propositions go to heaven?  Christian apologists have offered 
several explanations (some far from sympathetic to the dilemma) over the ages.   
 
Sacramentalists (including some Catholics, Lutherans, and Anglicans) hold that 
"no one ascends into the kingdom of heaven, except by means of the 
sacrament of Baptism...Moreover to this there is no exception, not the infant, 
nor he who is unavoidably prevented" (Ambrose in Geisler, 1999:360).  
Similarly, Augustine argued that "Born within the fall, infants inherit real 
depravity, so the wrath of God abides on unborn babies" (Geisler, 360).  
Electionists, in the tradition of Calvin argue that only elect infants go to heaven.  
The Westminster confession (1646) states that "elect infants, dying in infancy, 
are regenerated and saved by Christ" (Geisler, 361).  The foreknowledge theory 
argues that God only allows those he foreknew would accept him to grow out of 
infancy.  Others speak of universal salvation before "an age of accountability" 
and evangelisation after death.   
 
Such speculations reveal fundamentalism's characteristic identification with 
concrete, core propositional knowledge from a revelational source of authority.  
Piaget argues that such sources of authority and hence the propositions they 
generate, are themselves subject to natural developmental change.  The 
dilemma serves to highlight a major distinction between the epistemological 
approaches of fundamentalism and developmentalism. 
 
 Conceptions of the World and Fundamentalism 
Piaget offers some insight into the nature of the schemes and structures that 
receive the content of such a worldview throughout childhood and early 
adolescence.  In The Child's Conception of the World (1973) Piaget identifies 
four structural stages that determine (and according to interactionism, are 
determined by) the content of a worldview.  The first stage, realism, is an 
anthropocentric illusion wherein the child's perspective is seen as “immediately 
objective and absolute” (1973:46).  This stage of cognitive development would 
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 not allow for the assimilation of fundamentalisms' philosophical (abstract) 
salvific content.  
 
In the second stage, animism, the child attributes consciousness to other 
objects (195).  In this stage, fundamentalist concepts of God may be assimilated 
only as schemes of real objects i.e. God is an old man.  In the third stage, 
artificialism, the child attributes all things to the purposes of humans (human 
artificialism) or God (divine artificialism) (Ch 11).  In this stage theistic 
fundamentalist content may be assimilated as schemes of purpose i.e. the sun 
moves because God wants it to.   
 
An important aside is the transition between human and divine artificialism.  
Piaget, like Freud, believed that all religious systems (worldviews) were the 
result of transference of power from parents to god/s due to the perceived 
fallibility of parents during adolescence: 
The feelings experienced...up till now towards his parents must be directed 
elsewhere, and it is at this period that they are transferred to the God with which 
education has provided him [sic]. (Piaget, 1973:425)    
Freud's, The Future of an Illusion (1927) revealed his belief that God was a 
neurosis of childhood that adults had failed to outgrow.  He argued that religion 
"keeps people in a perpetual state of childhood and immaturity" (Geisler, 264). 
Conversely, Fowler (1981) argues that monotheisms, especially Christianity 
allow for a full appropriation of development. 
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In the fourth stage, atomism, the child begins to attribute actions to mechanical 
relationships between objects due to the recognition of constituent parts (429).  
In this stage, Piaget noted that theistic explanations are often replaced by 
mechanistic explanations. This transference may occur as the result of 
disillusionment with the power of God.  In this stage the content of theistic 
fundamentalism may be subjected to a causal crisis resolved only by its 
rejection, compartmentalisation, or movement into a different stage. In later 
adolescence and adulthood these explanations may be reconciled by a type of 
meta-atomism in which constituent parts of objects and processes act and react 
according to the mechanistic designs of God.  Fowler contends that atomistic 
 
 
 explanations may be reconciled with theistic explanations through a 
recapitulation of contents in stage four of his developmental model. 
 
 Summary 
These applications of Piaget's stages provide developmentalists with answers 
for the initial questions concerning fundamentalist worldviews.  These questions 
are: Is a fundamentalist worldview a valid concept? Are the stages proposed by 
Piaget progressive? And, do particular stages discriminate between particular 
belief contents?  In response, Piaget's empirical research and commentary in, 
The Child's Conception of the World would suggest by extrapolation: that a 
fundamentalist worldview is a valid concept insomuch as it reflects the 
structures of a single stage; that this stage must precede stages that account 
for divergence and dynamism; and that fundamentalism rejects contents that 
reflect a different stage.  
 
The value and order of progression of Piaget's identified stages is contestable.  
Piaget himself noted the ambiguity of transitional periods and observed that 
adults could retain early cognitive schemes in some areas.  The conviction with 
which a worldview may be held, and the reasoning used to defend it may upset 
the typical stage-age relationships of Piaget's developmental theory.  What 
Freud considers a neurosis and Piaget - arrested development, a theistic 
fundamentalist could consider to be absolute truth.  Adolescents and adults with 
formal operational abilities may reason and behave according to a worldview in 
ways that seem to indicate levels of realism, animism, and artificialism.   
 
The developmentalist position is that the mutual relationship between structure 
and content undermines the notion of a static worldview.  In stages of realism, 
animism, and human artificialism particular knowledge (content) of a creed may 
be incomprehensible or in Piagetian terms - unable to be assimilated.  To return 
to the fundamentalist worldview, some central tenets of the view are unable to 
be assimilated during certain stages of development.  Appreciation and 
application of concepts such as incarnation, atonement, vicarious suffering and 
the trinity are restricted in some stages of development.  Piaget's cognitive 
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 schemes are by way of interactionism, discriminating of the content that is 
assimilated into them. 
 
Summarily, a worldview defined in light of Freudian and Piagetian theory is 
primarily a regulatory structure for sexual survival and evolutionary adaptation 
respectively.  Freud provides the motivations and Piaget the structures for 
cognitive operations. Thus, worldviews are both dynamic and transient - subject 
to experiences of environment and yet regulating them at the same time.  The 
contents of fundamentalist worldviews interact with the structuring process.   
 
This relationship between content and structure is pivotal to this thesis's 
contention that fundamentalism, as a compartmentalised worldview, represents 
particular stage structures.  It is a relationship understandably (because of its 
complexity) but all too often neglected:  
...mental structures have content as well as form, and many psychologists, in 
search of the commanding and essential general principle, have been perilously 
inattentive to the distinction...the absence of a formal metapsychological 
account of mental structures will become increasingly painful. (Kessen in 
Mischel, 1971:291) 
Piaget's interactionism provides a powerful discourse for understanding the 
relationship between form and content.  His general developmental-
interactionist approach is focussed and applied through the later 
developmentalist studies of Lawrence Kohlberg and James Fowler. 
 
Piaget's contribution to the developmental discourse is significant.  His theory of 
the cognitive dynamics of development is the platform for many developmental 
applications.  His stage theory, the functions of interactionism, and factors of 
development, define the developmental discourse.  His observations in The 
Child's Conception of the World pose developmental challenges for the static 
propositional claims of many fundamentalisms. 
 
The remainder of this synthesis is an application of later extrapolations of 
Piagetian theory.  These applications of Piagetian theory provide a focussed 
synthesis between fundamentalism and development.  
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 2.1.3 Moral Development: Kohlberg 
 
Moral development is integral to the study of fundamentalism for two reasons.  
Firstly, Kohlberg’s research in moral development begins to apply Piagetian 
concepts to an essentially qualitative field.  The methodology and approach 
provide a necessary link in the transition between the logico-mathematical 
concerns of Piaget and the research into faith, religion and belief of later 
developmentalists.  Many developmental approaches share the legacy of Kant, 
Freud and Piaget.  Some of these have arisen through a stronger emphasis on 
social factors in development and others have arisen through application of 
Piagetian theory to more specific domains of cognition and socialisation i.e. 
morality, religion, and faith (see Table 1).  Secondly, moral development is 
posited as one of Fowler’s Aspects of Faith.  Morality is an essential part of any 
religious discourse and hence of fundamentalism.  Does fundamentalism as a 
tradition reflect the structuring tendencies of stages of moral development? 
 
Table 1. Comparative Developmental Stages 
 
Piaget 
(Cognitive 
Development) 
Kohlberg 
(Moral 
Development) 
Fowler 
(Faith) 
Erikson 
(Psychosocial 
Development) 
Oser & 
Gmünder 
(Religious Judgment) 
Sensorimotor 
Realism 
 Undifferentiated 
Faith 
Trust vs. Mistrust Pre-religious 
Preoperational 
Animism 
 Intuitive-Projective 
Faith 
Autonomy vs. Shame 
and Doubt 
Absolute heteronomy 
Orientation 
Artificialism 
Heteronomous 
Morality 
Mythic-Literal Faith Initiative vs. Guilt "Do ut Des" Orientation 
Concrete Operational 
Atomism 
Instrumental 
Exchange 
Synthetic-
Conventional Faith 
Industry vs. Inferiority 
Absolute Autonomy 
Orientation 
Formal Operational 
Mutual-Interpersonal 
Relations 
Individuative-
Reflective Faith 
Identity vs. Role 
Confusion 
Mediated Autonomy 
Orientation 
 Social System and 
Conscience 
Conjunctive Faith Intimacy vs. Isolation  
 Social Contract , 
Individual Rights 
Universalising Faith 
Generativity vs. 
Stagnation 
Intersubjective 
Religious Orientation 
 Universal Ethical 
Principles 
 Integrity vs. Despair  
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 Lawrence Kohlberg applied the Piagetian discourse to moral development. He 
claimed that moral judgment (and action by association) has a rational 
motivation as well as an affective motivation.  This rational motivation develops 
in accordance with base cognitive structures interacting with the social 
environment.  Kohlberg claimed that his stages were hierarchical, sequential, 
invariant, and universal.  Whereas Piaget focussed his later work on 
mathematical and scientific constructions of knowledge, Kohlberg sought to 
examine how structures affected the social world of individuals.   
 
In Moral Judgment Interview (1975), Kohlberg sets out his methodology of 
hypothetical dilemmas and his tools for analysis.  His nine dilemmas are based 
on principles of morality or justice that he claims are universals: 
Principles, of course are different from rules, customs or laws.  Principles, we 
might say, are the abstract, generalizable guidelines and tests by which 
particular actions, laws or social policies may be made or evaluated.  The 
golden rule in its various forms is such a principle.  Kant's categorical imperative 
in its three forms constitutes a universal moral principle. (In Fowler, 1981:83)   
Sub-questions for each dilemma are designed to probe the participant's 
judgment and reasoned response.  Participant responses are then categorised 
according to six basic stage structures.  Two stages occur at each of three 
distinct levels - preconventional, conventional, and post-conventional.   
 
The stages may be described (in order of developmental ascendance) as; 
Punishment and Obedience Orientation; Instrumental Relativist Orientation; 
Interpersonal Concordance Orientation; Law and Order Orientation; Social-
Contract Legalistic Orientation; Universal Ethical Principle Orientation (Duska et 
al, 1977:45-47).  The very nature of these stages has implications for 
fundamentalism.  The application of such stages to fundamentalism in the next 
chapter observes the sources of social authority that affect moral judgment.  It is 
posited that fundamentalism's unique loci of moral authority arrests typical 
development as defined by Kohlberg's framework.   
 
Before engaging this analysis it is necessary to locate Kohlberg's theory in the 
broader developmental tradition of Kant and Piaget.  This is necessary, in 
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 order to note some of the criticisms that may be leveled by association at its 
epistemological assumptions.  
   
Kohlberg' s developmental approach assumes Piaget's interactionism: 
The cognitive-developmental assumption is that basic mental structure is the 
result of an interaction between certain organismic structuring tendencies and 
the structure of the outside world, rather than a reflection of either one 
directly...This interaction leads to cognitive stages which represent the 
transformations of simple early cognitive structures as these are applied to the 
external world and as they are accommodated to or restricted by the external 
world in the course of being applied to it. (Kohlberg, 1984:13)  
Kohlberg's structuralism also reveals a Kantian legacy. 
  
His developmental theory is grounded (necessarily) in the Kantian tradition of  
universal principles: 
In summary, then, universal and regular age trends of development may be 
found in moral judgment, and these have a formal cognitive base.  Many 
aspects of moral judgment do not have such a cognitive base, but these 
aspects do not define universal and regular trends of moral development 
(Kohlberg, 1984:43). 
Kohlberg has suffered much criticism for his philosophical foundation.   
  
He notes that, "the psychologist cannot study cognition or morality in an 
epistemologically neutral way" (1981:104).  Kohlberg's critics attack his 
objectivism: 
The dominant theme in Kohlberg's essays is that what is moral is not a matter 
of taste or opinion.  Kohlberg abhors relativism...Kohlberg's project in these 
essays is to establish that there is an objective morality which reason can 
reveal (Schweder, 1982:226,293). 
Naturally, Kohlberg suffers the same criticisms for his universality as Kant did 
from his contemporary empiricists.  Alternatively, the fundamentalist critique of 
Kohlberg's structuralism finds fault with his very lack of moral prescription - 
reducing diverse religious contents to a common morality, similar to Kant's 
categorical imperative.  
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 There are a limited number of defensible positions one can take regarding 
rationalism and empiricism.  Almost all have adherents among modern 
theorists.  Kant, Kohlberg, Piaget, and Fowler exemplify similar positions.  
Perhaps the future of the debate will combine the primacy of particular contents 
with Piagetian / Kohlbergian interactionism: 
A knowledge structure theory must make a commitment to particular content 
schemas.  Recent research has pointed out that some processes depend upon 
the content of the knowledge. (Kiel in Galambos et al, 1986:7) 
New methodological considerations will perhaps re-ignite age-old philosophies 
in the perennial quest for a universal theory of knowledge (Goldman, 1993:xi-xiii).  
Kohlberg's work exemplifies the modern use of empirical data, though tentative, 
to explore moral epistemology.  At the same time, he draws from a Kantian 
tradition.  As such, his developmental discourse is always theoretically 
challenged from the two oppositional fronts of fundamentalism and 
poststructuralism.   
 
Structural development may rely on the empirical evidences provided by the 
likes of Piaget's clinical method, and Kohlberg and Fowler's latitudinal studies 
but will nonetheless remain philosophically moot at its deepest Kantian level.  It 
may be empirically demonstrable that fundamentalism is synonymous with 
particular mental behaviours and that these mental behaviours are normatively 
associated with particular stages of development, but it is impossible to answer 
the criticism that stages are an illusion of a socio-historical epoch to which the 
empirical research is inevitably confined: 
Like each of us, Kohlberg himself, his interest in cognitive development...his 
choice of a Kantian or Deweyian infrastructure for this theory are...in a sense, 
accidents of time, place and the interaction of his personality with a specifiable 
social environment and the norms of the subgroups within that environment 
(Simpson in Kohlberg, 1983:114-115). 
Nonetheless, Kohlberg reasons that such stages are empirically testable and 
universally applicable.  The universality of such cognitive structures and the 
processes of interaction that facilitate development have important implications 
for the cognitive framework of fundamentalism.   
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 The most obvious implication of interactionism as a general cognitive process is 
that fundamentalism cannot remain ontogenetically static.  This refers not only 
to the contents (which obviously change with learning) but to the organisation 
and utilisation of such contents. According to developmentalism, 
fundamentalism is at all times a product of assimilated content and 
accommodated structure.  Kohlberg and Piaget's interactionism, coupled with 
his recognition of common stages, is a form of guided dynamism.   Popular 
holistic labels (isms and ists) as applied to individuals may serve to describe 
static contents but fail to describe individual's dynamic and developing 
worldviews.   
 
In Kohlberg's theory, contents in and of themselves are poor reflections (to a 
casual observer) of actual perceptions.  Thus, Kohlberg's contribution to 
fundamentalism, by application, is that any study of such a worldview must 
search for dynamic processes rather than static contents.     
 
Kohlberg's stages describe ways of perceiving morality.  It may be argued that 
ways of perceiving morality will necessarily be related to fundamentalism 
inasmuch as morality is a sub-discourse of fundamentalism.  Such cognitive 
stages will influence a variety of metaphysical concerns. The common theme of 
most developmental theories seems to describe a movement in perspective 
from egoism through communalism to universalism.  If this shift is 
developmentally valid then it could be suggested that an individual's perspective 
on the metaphysical questions that constitute the meta-structure of 
fundamentalisms, is stage dependent.   
 
Kohlberg's studies in moral development reaffirm four principles concerning 
development through these six stages.  Firstly, stage development is invariant.  
Earlier stages are pre-requisites for later stages.  Secondly, subjects cannot 
comprehend reasoning more than one stage beyond their own.  Thirdly, 
subjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning one stage above their 
predominant stage of reasoning.  Fourthly, stage movement is motivated by 
cognitive disequilibrium (Kohlberg, 1981:47-49).   One may continue to apply 
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 these four underlying principles of cognitive development to the notion of 
fundamentalism. 
 
Firstly, the invariance of stage development as applied to fundamentalism 
assumes a chronological progression of perspective.  However, as already 
established (and to be further explored), fundamentalism is characterised, and 
often characterises itself, by adherence to concrete propositions (doctrines). 
Some forms of faith are prerequisite for the development of other forms of faith.  
 
Secondly, the inability to appreciate reasoning two stages above one's own has 
important implications for faith.  Inasmuch as a faith is a structured response to 
other faiths there will be potential for stage conflict.  Inasmuch as perceptions of 
content common to all stages differ between stages, there will be confusion.  
The complexity and diversity of the factors that construct the contents of a 
particular faith add to this confusion.    
 
Thirdly, cognitive attraction to a higher stage implies (falsely?) the evolutionary 
superiority of the same.  This assumption is contentious to lower stages 
because some of the contents that fill stages deliberately contradict (conflict 
with) the principles underlying later stages.  The characteristic provincialism of 
fundamentalism is maintained due its perception of enmity with the world.  
Separation and enmity between the elect and the lost in Calvinistic 
fundamentalism is instilled through doctrine.  In such divisive religious 
fundamentalisms there is no common human denominator that serves any 
binding function - the only unity to be had must be had through common belief.  
Outside of common belief, there can be no community.  This creates a dilemma 
of transition - the fourth application.  
 
Kohlberg's necessary disequilibrium can be confounded by contents that overtly 
restrict the accommodation of other contents.  The notion of stage progression 
implies a value judgment. It is inevitable that faith discourses specific to lower 
levels will form defence mechanisms to arrest transition.  These observations 
will be analysed and applied in more detail in the following chapter.   
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This brief review of Kohlberg's philosophical assumptions and the particulars of 
his theory solidifies the intended understanding of the developmental discourse 
as applicable to fundamentalism.  The remaining sections observe the 
application of Piagetian developmentalism with an increasingly social emphasis.  
The following brief review of Erik Erikson's psychosocial-developmental theory 
reveals dimensions and dynamics unique to developmentalism with a more 
social emphasis.  This review will lead into a similar review of Oser and 
Gmünder's work on the development of religious judgment and finally to 
Fowler's work on faith development. 
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 2.1.4   Psychosocial Development: Erikson 
 
Erik Erikson's psychosocial developmental approach may be reviewed as a 
bridge in the legacy linking Freudian theory with Fowler's developmental 
analysis of faith. Erikson's approach reveals a shift away from the biological 
approach of Freud and the logico-mathematical approach of Piaget, to more 
social concerns (Miller, 1993:154). Herein lies its relevance to religious 
fundamentalism, for the developmental study of fundamentalism demands a 
socially sensitive approach.  To reduce a developmental application to 
Piagetian logico-mathematical concerns would be to ignore the structuring 
power of contents and culture integral to fundamentalism.  The contents 
operating with culture according to social dynamics represent the phylogenetic 
structures posited by Oser and Gmünder (1991).   Erikson's approach expands 
the developmental discourse, creating a precedent for Fowler's treatment of 
faith and this thesis's treatment of fundamentalism.  
 
Born in 1902, Erik Erikson was trained in psychoanalysis by Sigmund and Anna 
Freud.  He embraced the core of Freudian theory including, "psychological 
structures, the unconscious and the conscious, drives, psychosexual stages, 
the normal-abnormal continuum, and psychoanalytic methodology" (Miller, 155).  
He is perhaps best known for his theory of eight psychosocial stages of identity.  
Erikson described identity as, "an unconscious striving for a continuity of 
personal character...a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis...a 
maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity" (In Miller, 
159).   
 
In order of emergence, Erikson's stages are: Trust vs. Mistrust, Autonomy vs. 
Shame and Doubt, Initiative vs. Guilt, Industry vs. Inferiority, Identity vs. Role 
Confusion, Intimacy vs. Isolation, Generativity vs. Self-Absorption, and Integrity 
vs. Despair.  The stages are actually crises to be resolved relative to culture in 
order to facilitate healthy development.  Erikson's understanding of the social 
impact on crisis resolution underlied his deep-seated social concerns with 
American society: 
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 At birth the baby leaves the chemical exchange of the womb for the social 
exchange system of his [sic] society, where his gradually increasing capabilities 
meet the opportunities and limitations of his [sic] culture. (Erikson, 1968:92)  
His work explored this social impact in several cultures including Sioux 
communities in South Dakota, Yurok communities on the Pacific Coast and 
communities in mainland India. 
 
The utilisation of the developmental discourse for an exploration of social 
phenomena presents some unique problems.  Erikson's psychosocial theory 
heavily influenced Fowler's (Fowler, 1981) and as such, offers an insight into 
Fowler's more qualitative social domain.  Piaget began his own research with an 
interest in the domains of religion and morality.  However, he assumed such 
domains under the broader concept of faith, which in the tradition of Kant he 
believed could sustain little direct empirical analysis.  Fowler counters: 
This latter domain - the domain of faith and of logic of conviction - involves 
recognizing the role played in faith of the modes of knowing we call ecstatic and 
imaginative.  As is becoming generally recognized, the mind employs the more 
aesthetically orientated right hemisphere of the brain in these kinds of knowing.  
To my knowledge none of the Piagetian cognitive-constructivists...have given 
any significant attention to the bihemispheric, bimodal forms of thought involved 
in the constitutive-knowing that is faith. (Fowler, 1980:63)   
Piaget's reticence to pursue development in the domain of faith was well 
founded given the absence of cognitive logico-mathematical models to 
extrapolate.  Fowler's confidence in the empirical demonstration of such a 
domain is no doubt enabled by the foundation laid by Piaget and the 
experimental methodologies of Erikson's psychosociology.  It is the theoretical 
and empirical legacy of both, that make a developmental application to 
fundamentalism, a possibility. 
 
Having noted Erikson's contribution to the broadening of developmental theory 
which made Fowler's application more feasible, the focus of the review narrows 
to examine developmental approaches to religious judgment.  Oser and 
Gmünder's developmental theory of religious judgment leads a step closer to 
the final discourse applied directly to fundamentalism - Fowler's stages of faith. 
60
 
 
 2.1.5  Religious Development: Oser and Gmünder 
 
Oser and Gmünder's Religious Judgement: A Developmental Approach (1991) 
focusses the developmental discourse to the domain of religious perception.  As 
such, it offers developmental insights applicable to the structures and contents 
of fundamentalism.  The thesis of Oser and Gmünder's work is best 
summarised using their own words: 
Different chronological ages lead people to make different religious judgments.  
Their relationship to the Ultimate obtains different qualities as well.  Based on 
these qualities, religious judgments can be ordered developmentally, i.e., in 
stages. (1991:9) 
They define this Ultimate interchangeably as, "God, the Absolute, and the 
Transcendent" (14).  In so doing, they adopt a theory of relativity similar to 
Fowler's, while affirming the existence of a centre to which relationships are 
relative: 
A relational dimension is always implicit in our explanations of God's presence, 
support, and sustaining power in our lives.  Thus, we are dealing here with 
subjective perspectives.  By examining individual instances we shall abstract 
the structural commonalties of these individual perspectives. (14) 
For this abstraction, they receive the inevitable criticism of being objectivist.  In 
response, they uphold somewhat paradoxically, a Kantian and empirical 
apologetic (5). 
 
Religious judgement is demonstrated through the systemisation and processes 
of relationship with the Ultimate.  This occurs when people: 
(a) process their life experiences in a religious mode (e.g., in interpretations, 
conversation, prayer), (b) assimilate narrative texts (doctrine, proclamation, 
Bible) in a religious mode, or (c) participate in the life of religious communities 
(cultus, liturgy). (19)   
A primary interest of this thesis is how these social factors affect and represent 
development in instances of fundamentalism. Oser and Gmünder postulate five 
developmental stages of religious judgment as a result of their empirical and 
theoretical research. 
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 They are quick to point out that each stage title is but a "metaphor for the 
complexities at hand" (68).  The stages are, in order of development; (Stage 1) 
Absolute Heteronomy Orientation (Deus Ex Machina), (Stage 2) "Do Ut Des" 
Orientation, (Stage 3) Absolute Autonomy Orientation (Deism), (Stage 4) 
Mediated Autonomy and Salvation-Plan Orientation, (Stage 5) Intersubjective 
Religious Orientation.  Each stage is described in Table 2 which is reproduced 
from Oser and Gmünder's core work (1991:68). 
 
Table 2. Stages of Religious Judgement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage 5: Intersubjective Religious Orientation 
Complete mediation of being and world. Universality. Unconditional religiousity. 
Subject occupies a totally religious standpoint, feels no need to be grounded in a 
plan of salvation or a religious community, etc. Rather subjects experience 
unconditional and proleptic acceptance.  Various forms: unconditional 
intersubjectivity, unio mystica, boddhi, divine illumination, etc. 
Stage 4: Mediated Autonomy and Salvation-Plan Orientation 
The Ultimate is mediated again via immanence, either as constitutive ground of 
possibility or as a cypher for the "self".  Manifold forms of religiousity, always 
presuming and no longer questioning ego-autonomy: nature worship, 
contemplation, social activism to make God real.  However, subjects reject the 
claim of being able to accomplish all things on their own, they surrender again to 
an Ultimate. "Images of God" exist, if at all, as symbols only, otherwise as 
universal principles. 
Stage 3: Absolute Autonomy Orientation (Deism) 
The Ultimate is being pushed out of the world, transcendence and immanence 
are separated.  Persons are solipsistically autonomous, responsible for the world 
and their own lives.  Frequent rejection of religious and ecclesial authority: "Here 
I stand, I can do no other!" Formulation of ego-identity, distancing from parental 
and educational forces. 
Stage 2: "Do Ut Des" Orientation  
The Ultimate is still viewed as external and omnipotent, capable of punishing or 
rewarding.  However, now the Ultimate can be influenced.  Humans can 
undertake preventative actions.  Limited autonomy.  First form of rationalization. 
Stage 1: Absolute Heteronomy Orientation (Deus Ex Machina) 
The Ultimate interferes actively and unmediated in the world.  Persons merely 
react.  Pressure of expectation.  Artificialism.  Punctiliousness. 
What are the implications of such stages for the characteristics of 
fundamentalisms?  How might fundamentalisms respond?  Firstly, analysis 
begins with the assumption that fundamentalisms represent socially and 
doctrinally cohesive communities and that such communities generate and 
perpetuate contents and structures, "formed by and dependent on historical-
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 social formation" (Oser and Gmünder, 1991:63).  Secondly, analysis is motivated 
by the belief that: 
A system of religious development must always be viewed against the 
background of those processes which facilitate or hamper the development of 
the personality so that, among other things, it becomes possible to decide 
"whether a religion contributes to the resolution of the identity-crisis by means of 
transformation of consciousness onto a new stage, or whether it fosters 
regression to behavioural patterns which were already considered obsolete". 
(63) [emphasis added]. 
Similarly: 
Cultural development can hamper or sponsor the construction of individual 
stages while, simultaneously, shaping the content of the stages.  A certain 
content may be inappropriate at a certain time and may therefore fail to yield 
religious reasoning...the social praxis of meaning-making either sponsors or 
hampers the religious structures...This means that structures take shape 
differently in different cultures or civilizations. (94) [emphasis added] 
Finally, "Depending on their structures, different economic, political, or 
ideological systems can sponsor either progressive or regressive 
developments" (152).  Exploratory studies into socio-cultural manifestations of 
stage structures such as the one at hand already exist.   
 
Oser and Gmünder refer to Murray's, Five Stages of Greek Religion and 
Radding's, Evolution of Medieval Mentalities: A Cognitive-Structural Approach 
(141).   These studies reveal a form of ontogenetic stage structure influence on 
phylogenetic behaviours and beliefs through institutionalisation.  Herein lies a 
structural developmental assessment of some of the historical religious conflicts 
of which fundamentalism is an example: 
Many inconsistencies in the history of religion are perhaps often related to the 
stage of religious development of the persons responsible for shaping that 
history. (146)  
Oser and Gmünder then anticipate the nature of this thesis as an exploration 
into the assumption that socio-cultural and historical movements (such as 
fundamentalism) may be manifestations of developmental structures: "this 
assumption would have to be tested hermeneutically by means of intensive 
literary analysis" (142).  Assuming the developmental discourse, the question 
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 becomes, how does fundamentalism meet the stage crises of religious identity 
and is its character compatible with later stages of religious judgment?  What 
follows is a brief analysis of fundamentalism in light of a review of Oser and 
Gmünder's structural developmental contentions.  These contentions are 
italicised. 
 
 Fundamentalism and Oser and Gmünder's structural development 
(a) Social representations (stories, legends, myths, theological models etc.) 
cannot fully relieve individuals of interpreting their own situations themselves. 
This is decreasingly possible with ascending development (62).  
 
The externalisation, deification, and absolute power of authority distinctive to 
fundamentalism is intended to "relieve individuals of interpreting their own 
situations themselves".  In many fundamentalisms there is an inherent suspicion 
of the subjectivity of self.  In Protestant Fundamentalism, this is often expressed 
as fallen nature, the utter sinfulness of self and, the corruption of the worldly 
mind.   
 
Princeton theologian and fundamentalist, J. Gresham Machen expresses clearly 
and defensively this archetypal view of human nature; "Christianity is founded 
on the Bible, Liberalism on the other hand is founded upon the shifting emotions 
of sinful men" (in Boone, 1989:23).  Hence, the developing autonomy of 
individual interpretation conflicts with the Protestant Fundamentalist concept of 
a fallen nature and corrupt mind.  This stand against autonomy is characteristic 
of other fundamentalisms. 
 
Almost all observers of fundamentalisms note their characteristic placement of 
authority in text and the literal hermeneutic they most readily defend: 
In the most general sense, however, any particular fundamentalism legitimates 
its existence and world-view by reference, among other things, to a corpus of 
sacred writings, the belief in whose veracity constitutes a prime test of faith. 
(Caplan, 1987:14)     
The Christian Bible, the Jewish rabbinical law as authoritative interpretation of 
the Torah, the Sikh Guru Granth Sahib, the Tamil Agamic canons, and the 
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 Muslim Quran and the Sunna, are but a few examples of texts at the centre of  
faiths with fundamentalist expressions.  While the texts vary, the fundamentalist 
hermeneutic is characteristically literal and text-based.  The hermeneutic 
autonomy of the individual is discouraged in fundamentalism.  Its concern with 
coherence and uniformity coupled with the primacy of text censures multiple 
readings - at least in principle.   
 
In Protestant Fundamentalism this authority is evident in the formal statements 
of discourse such as inerrancy and infallibility.  These doctrines are possibly 
more familiar in the popular cliches of the fundamentalist discourse: God said it, 
I believe it, that settles it, taking the Bible literally, and references to the Bible 
as, The Word of God, The Living Word, and The Holy Bible.  The text centred 
approach of fundamentalism creates a problem that is manifest, though largely 
unadmitted in fundamentalist circles.  The problem concerns the obvious 
divisions within fundamentalism all claiming to base their true belief on a literal 
Biblical foundation.  The authority and text centredness at once given to the 
Bible, results in bitter accounts for such divisions.  Within such division it does 
not suffice to admit that the differences result from the relative stages, 
emphases, or experiences of the readers – for this would seemingly deny the 
authoritative power of text.     
 
Instead, fellow fundamentalists with different interpretations are ostracised as at 
least wrong, incorrect in their understanding of Scripture, or prooftexting, and at 
worst, deceived by the false teachers of Satan (a phrase familiar to the author's 
own experience).   
 
The cumulative effect of such a hermeneutic and perception of division is that 
fundamentalisms have a tendency to invest the authority of Scripture in the 
interpreters of that Scripture - so long as those interpreters claim, not to be 
interpreting, but telling it like it is.  The uncritical following (through trust in the 
claims to divine authority) of guru-like televangelists and fundamentalist 
apologists evidences this dynamic.  The more this culture of vicarious 
interpretation is reinforced, the more the lay fundamentalist is relieved from the 
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 use of critical interpretive epistemologies that would test or triangulate the 
claims of such authorities.   
 
As Oser and Gmünder note, uncritical, reliant, and externalised interpretation "is 
decreasingly possible with ascending development" (62).  By extension, 
fundamentalisms characterised by the above hermeneutic arrest development 
into more autonomously verified interpretations.   
 
(b) In Stage 1 children assume that everything is guided, led, and steered by 
external forces (69).   
 
While this assumption is partly recapitulated at later stages, it is identified in 
Stage 1 as the non-comprehension of human agency or natural mechanism in 
cause and effect relationships.  Protestant Fundamentalism tends to reinforce 
this view of a transcendent God as the ultimate cause of everything.  This again 
is evidenced in several levels of popular discourse.  The first, is the popularity of 
fundamentalist literature interpreting current world events in light of a divine 
plan.  Boone (1989) offers insight by examining fundamentalist's literal 
interpretations of Rev. 9.13-19.  Hal Lindsey, author of, The Late Great Planet 
Earth (1970) writes: 
The phenomena by which this destruction of life will take place is given: it will 
be by fire, smoke (or air pollution), and brimstone (or melted earth).  The 
thought may have occurred to you that this is strikingly similar to the 
phenomena associated with thermonuclear war.  In fact, many Bible expositors 
believe that this is an accurate first-century description of a twentieth century 
thermonuclear war. (In Boone, 43)    
Boone quotes populist evangelist Leon Bates on the same passage: 
[Those destroyed] will be killed by the FIRE, SMOKE and PROJECTILES 
(missiles?) being issued out of the vehicles upon which the army is riding (Rev. 
9:17,18). Could John have been trying to describe modern, missile launching 
TANKS? (In Boone, 34) 
The developmentalist concern is not with the content of interpretation, or even 
the accuracy or correctness of interpretation of these particular passages - 
rather, the concern is with the hermeneutic tendency toward literalisation and 
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 the translation of events in terms of an external divine cause as a structural 
indicator. 
 
The latter is evidenced in the discourse of Protestant Fundamentalism in 
relation to more mundane non-biblical events.  Fundamentalists regularly 
interpret the minutiae of life in terms of external cause.  The word, 
Godincidence is a common part of some Protestant Fundamentalist discourses.  
Such examples, sourced from the author’s observations of Protestant 
Fundamentalist churches in North Queensland include the attributions of: 
• The economic and property devastation caused by Cyclone Winifred in the late 
1980s in North Queensland to "a judgment of the Lord on the sinfulness of the 
people of Cairns".  Similarly, the likening of "God's judgment through Winifred" to 
"The Almighty's judgment on Darwin on his birthday [Christmas Day]...using 
Cyclone Tracy as punishment for the sinfulness of the people of Darwin who 
secularised his holy day". 
• The deviation from a course of contact with Townsville of Cyclone Joy to "a wall of 
prayer erected by Townsville's Christians". 
• A flat tyre caused by an "angel of the Lord" in order to create an opportunity for the 
evangelism of a passing motorist. 
• Traffic lights being green at an unlikely intersection as indication that a dating 
relationship was the "will of the Lord". 
Again, it is empirically impossible to validate or deny such attributions.  What is 
significant, is the selectivity with which they are applied and the dominance of 
the structure that inspires them.   
 
Whenever an event seems incongruous with an act of God, various protective 
mechanisms intervene.  These mechanisms include deliberate silence about 
the incongruous event, a refusal to process the event in religious terms 
(compartmentalised hermeneutic), and the appeal to cliches that critically 
bypass the event such as, "the Lord works in mysterious ways", "His ways are 
higher than ours", "like Job, who are we to question the Lord?" and "the Lord 
makes all things work together for good".  The hermeneutic is reinforced by 
Scriptural (especially Old Testament) accounts of God working in human 
affairs.  From the Israelite’s victories and losses in battle to the dew around 
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 Gideon's fleece, God is perceived as the immediate cause.   
 
There are deep epistemological issues underlying such claims, and as Oser 
and Gmünder argue, the causal effect of God may be recapitulated at later 
stages.  What distinguishes the early stage from the late stage is the 
understanding of the God-cause as exclusively transcendent; the uncritical 
application of the God-cause; the compartmentalised application of the God 
cause; and the provincial application of the God cause - i.e. while the 
fundamentalist's good fortune is the work of God, the secularist's good fortune 
is the worldly rewards of evil.  Conversely, the fundamentalist's misfortune is 
the oppression of the Devil while the secularist's misfortune is the righteous 
judgment of the Lord.  Such externalised and compartmentalised attribution for 
situations reveals a lack of reversibility, a punishment-obedience orientation, 
and a mythic-literal hermeneutic characteristic of early developmental 
structures.  
 
(c) In Stage 1-2 children believe that there is a simple, direct, absolute formulaic 
connection between human action and Ultimate action or reaction (71).  
 
This point warrants an expansion of the previous observations concerning the 
attribution of life events to moral behaviour and correctness of belief.  Consider 
the relative stage responses offered by Oser and Gmünder to their Paul 
Dilemma.  The significant content of the dilemma is self-evident (interviewer's 
remarks italicised): 
Stage 1. Is this accident related to the fact that Paul did not keep his promise to 
God?  Why or why not? Answer: "Yes". Why? "God simply punished him." Why 
does God punish people? "He punishes them when they don't obey him." Why 
must we obey God? "If we don't obey him, he punishes us." What is God telling 
us with his punishment? "That he doesn't like what we have done." (girl, age 7) 
Stage 4. Is this accident related to the fact that Paul did not keep his promise to 
God?  Why or why not? Answer: "I don't think so.  I can't quite resolve the 
problem of the accident, but personally I do not believe that those who are bad 
or evil are being punished by God.  That is so much like the Old Testament; but 
the Old Testament also knows of many who were bad or evil and yet are doing 
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 well.  It shows that often precisely those who keep God's commandments have 
no success while those who disobey are successful." (male, aged 32) (Oser 
and Gmünder, 70,76)  
It is the Stage 4 respondent's reversibility (a mark of Piagetian development), 
that makes him reticent to ascribe to the punishment-reward attribution of the 
Stage 1 respondent.  Interestingly, his response reveals some dissonance in his 
understanding of the God of the Old Testament.  As noted previously, the 
Protestant Fundamentalist hermeneutic seems to be encouraged by the 
prevalent punishment-reward attributions in the Old Testament.  Perhaps this is 
an example of a phylogenetic tradition affecting ontogenetic judgment. 
 
(d) In Stage 2 incidents of bad luck are viewed as actions by the Ultimate in 
direct correspondence with the quality of sacrifices, renunciations, and prayers, 
etc. (71).  
(e) In Stage 2 persons can talk, bargain, interact with the Ultimate and even 
placate it (71).  
(f) In Stage 3 persons begin to negate that they might be able to influence the 
Ultimate (73).  
 
Observations (d) to (f) continue to reflect characteristics of fundamentalism.  
The perception of the “actions of the Ultimate in correspondence with the quality 
of sacrifices, renunciations, and prayers” reflects a distinctively Old Testament 
hermeneutic.  Understood as such, the quality of the Priest's sacrifices (indeed 
the very need to sacrifice at all) brings God's wrath, "When you bring blind 
animals for sacrifice, is that not wrong?  When you sacrifice crippled or 
diseased animals, is that not wrong?" (Mal 1:8).  A Stage 1 interpretation of 
Malachi understands God's wrath as directly related to the state of the sacrifice.  
A later stage interpretation perceives the sacrifice as representing the intentions 
and desires of the priests.  Does fundamentalism reflect either stage? 
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Fundamentalism has been accused of embracing the symbol without 
acknowledging the symbolised.  Liberalism has been accused of trying to 
embrace the symbolised without the necessary symbols.  Perhaps both, where 
true, represent stage structures before the transcendent-immanent, concrete-
 
 
 abstract reconciliations of Oser and Gmünder's final stages.  Fundamentalism's 
characterisation as an early stage manifestation is evidenced by its lack of 
tolerance for, and consideration of, synonymous symbols.  Hence, there are 
significant divisions between Protestant Fundamentalists as to which 
instruments should be used in worship, whether hymns or choruses are truer 
worship, what clothing, haircuts, headwear, or language is acceptable. 
 
There is great truth in the recognition of the power of such symbols and it would 
be foolish to think that the symbolic power is unfounded.  However, what 
distinguishes fundamentalism is a lack of perceptive ability to realise that 
symbolic power is often dynamic - symbols lose their power; what they 
symbolise may change.  There is also the inability to recognise that what may 
appear as a symbol to one, is not perceived as such or intended, by another.  
For example; to enforce Paul's hair regulations, instructions on head coverings, 
or arguably his instructions on women teaching, and to apply these standards 
as desirable standards for all peoples in the present day, is to reveal a very 
early stage perception of symbolic function.  It is a perception unfortunately 
reinforced in Protestant Fundamentalism, by lay conceptions of inerrancy and 
infallibility, and the belief that only a single interpretation of a text is possible or 
desirable.   Such understandings are congruent with Oser and Gmünder's early 
stages of development.  The authority of text and interpreter and the coercion to 
conformity in fundamentalisms tend to maintain the equilibrium of these stage 
structures.   
    
(g) Stage 3-4 results in a denial of the Stage 3 concept of human self-
determination and autonomy and a consciousness of the simultaneity of 
transcendent and immanent forces. (75) 
(h) In Stage 4 the Ultimate becomes immanent in the sense that it is identified 
as the condition for all decision making and actions. (76) 
(i) In Stage 4 the Ultimate appears symbolically in nature, culture, and human 
capacities for love. (76) 
(j) In Stage 4 God does not actively intervene in history; rather, as the ground of 
the world and of human existence God constitutes the condition for human 
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 action (76).  
 
Oser and Gmünder's Stage 3 equilibrium and Stage 3-4 transition offer 
invaluable insight into a distinctive of religious fundamentalism - aggressive 
opposition to, and demonisation of secular modernity.  The fear of the secular, 
its demonisation, and the resultant extremism and separatism of 
fundamentalism may be understood in terms of Oser and Gmünder's Stage 3-4 
descriptions.  Similarly, the antagonism and dismissiveness of secularism 
toward fundamentalism is understandable in terms of the Stage 2-3 transition. 
 
To recall, Stage 2 perceives the Ultimate as external, omnipotent and 
intervening in human affairs.  It is a stage of "limited autonomy” (Oser and 
Gmünder, 68). Stage 3 rejects the intervention of the Ultimate, becoming more 
autonomous, or in a religious sense - deistic.  It becomes possible in this stage 
to, "postulate consciously an atheistic worldview" (73).  It could be contended 
that the fundamentalism enacted in Stage 2, the atheism or deism enacted in 
Stage 3, and the recapitulated sense of Ultimate in Stage 4 are mutually 
definitive and reactionary in the social arena because they are understood 
exclusively rather than developmentally.   
 
The atheism or deism of Stage 3 is marked by a tendency to characterise 
fundamentalists as foolish and ignorant.  The rejection of previously held 
fundamentalisms may be vehement and total after transition (Babinski, 1991). 
Perhaps this arises from a feeling of having moved on from “religious myths and 
fairytales” into the truer epistemology of science and reason.  Conversely, 
fundamentalists perceive the new autonomous understandings of Stage 3 as 
arrogant, relying on human wisdom, and godless (Schaeffer, 1968).   
 
The security of identity or equilibrium of Stage 2 is grounded in transcendent 
authority - it knows no other.  The autonomy of a Stage 3 participant presents a 
crisis for the participant of Stage 2.  The crisis is expressed in the incredulity 
that identity can exist in self alone.  This is partly because there is no 
understanding of God within self or through self, beyond the symbols of the 
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 immediate community - the classic Us vs. Them distinction.  Hence, the 
fundamentalist fear of "whirling in a vortex of nihilism" or "swimming in a sea of 
subjectivity" should they venture beyond a transcendent God-dependency 
(Boone, 1989:23).      
 
The recapitulated sense of the Ultimate in Stage 4 is quite different to the sense 
of the Ultimate in Stage 2.  Because of the discernment between symbol and 
symbolised enabled in Stage 3, the remythologising of the Ultimate in symbolic 
form may take on new symbols.  This could account for a diversity and 
hybridisation of religious expressions evident in Stage 4.  The fundamentalist, 
unable to appreciate the integrity within diversity, attributes alternative 
discourses of belief to natural sin and Satanic delusion using such prooftexts as 
1 Timothy 4:1-2:   
The Spirit clearly says that in later times some will abandon the faith and follow 
deceiving spirits and things taught by demons.  Such teachings come through 
hypocritical liars, whose consciences have been seared as with a hot iron.     
The late Princeton fundamentalist, Dr. Machen is criticised on this point by 
Horace Bridges, in The God of Fundamentalism (1925):  
And he [Machen] never hesitates about the sensibilites of his opponents where 
anything that he regards as truth is involved.  He sneers at what he considers 
the falsity and ineffectuality of their teaching, and, when they are ministers of 
the traditional churches, does not scruple to impugn their honesty and accuse 
them of holding their positions by means of false pretences. (33)  
The fundamentalist’s demonisation of articulated atheism and recapitulated 
theisms is by no means restricted to a Protestant version.  It is a definitive 
characteristic of all fundamentalisms. 
 
Marty and Appleby make this observation in the first volume of their 
comparative project, Fundamentalisms Observed (1991): 
Fundamentalists name, dramatize, and even mythologize their enemies...The 
West [for Muslim fundamentalists] is "the Great Satan"; the American 
Occupation caused many Japanese to be possessed by "evil spirits"; secular 
Zionism is a cosmic precursor to revolutionary messianic Judaism. (820) 
The fundamentalist recognises heresy but rarely seeks to understand it or 
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 engage it with any dialectical intention or empathy.  Even the most unlearned 
fundamentalist may disrespect with the appearance of absolute certainty, 
teachings of a discourse, any part of which has been demonised.   
 
In the author's own experience, the primary school child may readily write off 
Darwin, Huxley, or Dawkins as a liar.  At a national conference for Christian 
teachers the author presented a paper on The Implications of Developmental 
Theory for Christian Education (Unpublished, 1999).  While some were 
prepared to discuss the notion that children of different ages might perceive the 
fundamental truths of Christianity differently, others immediately associated the 
paper with psychology and would not entertain discussion.  Rather, they said 
that such discussion could be dangerous.  Psychology is a demonised word in 
fundamentalist circles. Words and labels are triggers that close the gates of 
conversation.  Peter Cameron, somewhat unflatteringly, labels this tendency 
protective stupidity and quotes from Orwell's 1984: 
The first and simplest stage...which can be taught even to young children, is 
called...crimestop. Crimestop means the faculty of stopping short, as though by 
instinct, at the threshold of any dangerous thought.  It includes the power of not 
grasping analogies, of failing to perceive logical errors, of misunderstanding the 
simplest arguments if they are inimical to [the system], and of being bored or 
repelled by any train of thought which is capable of heading in a heretical 
direction.  Crimestop, in short, means protective stupidity. (1995:18)  
It is important to note that this is not a tendency unique to fundamentalism.  It 
may be reversed in application.  It is however, a characteristic of a system of 
thought; a total ideology, that admits no other and accommodates no other (at 
least consciously).  Such a characteristic prevents the autonomy and unity in 
diversity structured at later stages of Oser and Gmünder's model of 
development of religious judgment.  These structured behaviours are further 
restricted by fundamentalism's characteristic separatism. 
 
The fundamentalist child learns very quickly who are friends and who are 
enemies.  The distinction is made using belief, not practice.  Hence, the ease 
with which hatred is perpetuated - it requires no understanding, only 
identification at the level of belief.  In some situations this may mean that a 
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 Catholic hates a Protestant, a Jew hates and Arab, a Sunni hates a Shiite.  
Hate is not a very academic word but few others can serve to express the 
enmity which fundamentalisms are able to generate.  The fundamentalist 
maintains a total ideology; there is no need for an exchange of learning or 
perspective.  There is also little need for growth or development, except in the 
accumulation (which does not constitute development in the structural sense) of 
propositional knowledge.   Development is arrested where it is not sought.  
Fundamentalism's over-emphasis on propositional knowledge tends to neglect 
the developmental process that structures this knowledge.  This is both cause 
and effect of the structures underlying Oser and Gmünder's early stages of 
religious judgment. 
 
(k) Different developmental states need to be taken into account in the case of 
texts and their analyses. (146) 
(l) Theology needs to contain a developmental theory of religious 
consciousness, thus enabling the analysis of historical manifestations of 
religious consciousness according to their respective structure and level. (148) 
(m) The issues with which theology is concerned cannot be transmitted as 
factual information. (149) 
(n) Moral theology must learn to interpret the stages of religious judgment from 
the perspective of morality. (150) 
(o) Fundamental theological statements should be constituted so that they are 
structurally plausible and reproducible. (150) 
(p) Events in the personal life history of great theologians must be included from 
the ontogenetic perspective whenever attempts are made to understand and 
interpret the development of a certain approach. (150) 
(q) Biblical exegesis should examine individual text-formations as to their 
inherent structure of judgment, since it may be assumed that the levels of the 
structure of the religious judgments in the biblical texts may vary substantially 
due to the differences in context, audience, and social forms (151).   
 
These statements concern developmental sensitivity in the three situations most 
significant to religious community; reading of Scripture, authoritative exposition 
74
 
 
 of Scripture (teaching and sermons), and the construction of theological 
concepts.  Developmental sensitivity is the recognition that: 
Whatever is said can no longer be treated without taking into account the 
presupposition of the structural developmental approach.  Even in the simplest 
situations, where, for example, people view biblical scenes in the stained glass 
windows of a cathedral, listen to a devotional or sermon on TV, observe or 
participate in a baptism, listen to the interpretation of a text, discuss the 
question of theodicy in religious education - the same particular content is 
always assimilated differently, according to the various stages. (Oser and 
Gmünder, 1991:149) 
What assumptions and practices of fundamentalism restrict developmental 
sensitivity?  
 
Fundamentalism is observed as having four significant characteristics that serve 
to undermine developmental sensitivity; (1) a selectively literal hermeneutic 
(Boone, 1991; Barr, 1981; Strozier, 1994), (2) a closed and absolute system of 
logic (Marty and Appleby, 1991; Cameron, 1995), (3) a tendency to attribute a 
divine mandate-like authority to its leaders (Boone, 1991; Cohen, 1988; and 
Babinski, 1995; Vogt, 1995), and (4) a content based education of the young.   
 
 Development, fundamentalism and hermeneutics 
The literal hermeneutic has already been discussed to an extent and will be 
subject to further discussion later.  For now, it will suffice to draw some 
implications for development.  The fundamentalist defence of the literal sense is 
a difficult issue because its application is selective.  Barr argues that 
fundamentalists, though claiming "to take the Bible literally" actually change 
their hermeneutic to preserve inerrancy: "In order to avoid imputing error to the 
Bible, [fundamentalists] twist and turn back and forward between literal and 
non-literal interpretation" (1981:40).   
 
Boone argues that Barr's comments are more applicable to the academic 
fundamentalism he studied and not the popular hermeneutic that maintains 
literal readings in spite of apparent contradictions.  For example, Barr asserted 
that only extreme fundamentalists believe in a literal six-day interpretation of 
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 Genesis, implying that this was a minority view.  In a foreword to the second 
edition of Fundamentalism (1983) Barr notes: 
I remarked on p. 92 and elsewhere that this [opposition to evolution or non-
literal interpretations] has now receded from the scene.  I now think this is not 
so certain.  Anti-evolutionary theories, maintaining that the variety of species 
was directly so created by God, a view sometimes known as 'creationism', are 
more prevalent and influential than I then realized. (xii)  
To define literal, Boone recalls phrases from the fundamentalist discourse 
including, "common sense, plain, obvious, natural meaning" (1989:39-40).  The 
notion of common sense is problematised in light of the multitude of competing 
Bible-based fundamentalisms.   
 
Summarily, the developmental concern is one of literary criticism between the 
certainty and security of absolute (literal) readings and the uncertainty and 
insecurity of multiple (symbolic) readings.  The opposition between these two is 
problematised further by the concept of inerrancy.  As long as fundamentalism 
characterises itself as interpreting the Bible literally it will restrict exploration 
with, and thus development of other interpretative models.  It will be forced to 
use such models only as a reaction to Biblical criticism to defend inerrancy.  
The characteristic absolute certainty of the fundamentalist hermeneutic does 
unnecessary damage to its own cause when it is irrefutably challenged by 
scientific discovery.  Time reveals that the fundamentalists of today were the 
liberals of yesterday (Babinski, 1995).  Maintaining an absolutely closed system 
of logic with absolute certainty (blind faith) will either stunt development or make 
it unnecessarily difficult in the process. 
 
 Development, fundamentalism and authority 
The third point concerns the authority of interpretation.  Herein lies an 
interesting point of distinction between Protestant, Catholic and Islamic 
fundamentalism.  While lay Protestant Fundamentalists are more likely to apply 
a common sense, or obvious interpretation to Scripture, Catholic and Muslim 
fundamentalists give more direct authority to the mandated interpreters of 
Scripture.  In some forms of Islamic Fundamentalism, interpretation of the 
Quran is considered the sole responsibility of scholars.  It was argued earlier 
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 that Protestant Fundamentalism reflects such allegiance to authority for 
interpretation - though it is certainly not such an overt or formal part of the 
belief.  It would be far too simplistic to associate fundamentalism with 
externalised authority on this basis.  The fundamentalisms of Catholicism and 
Protestantism and Sunni and Shiite Islam reflect a more complex dynamic in 
relation to structural perceptions of authority. 
 
Piaget (1926) and Oser and Gmünder (1991) both associate early stage 
structures with the tendency to unrealistically project authority and power onto 
parents, and later - God.  This deification of authority is often rejected when 
development challenges previously held notions (Oser and Gmünder, 1991:71).  It 
may manifest as an adolescent challenge to parental authority or rebellion 
against the God images of childhood.  However, the need for authority is 
perhaps never lost according to structural development.  Its epistemological 
sources develop from the external to the internal, from the other to the self, and 
eventually to a unity of both (Fowler, 1981).   
 
Possibly, there is a historical cycle that reflects this ontogenetic process.  
Protestantism began as a rejection of Catholic papal authority in favour of a 
purely Scriptural authority (sola Scriptura).  Sunni and Shiite Islam are similarly 
divided, "The Sunnis consider the Koran infallible, while the Shiites place 
infallibility in a man, the Imam who is sinless and has been considered as man-
God" (Dicks, Mennill, and Santor, 1973:281).  Protestant and Muslim revivals alike, 
are often identified by the rejection of complacent submission to positions and 
structures of authority and return to basic principles of the past.  Over time, the 
leaders and structures of revival may outlive their context and the cycle repeats.  
Is this a result of the interaction between the ontogenetic development of new 
generations under the phylogenetic structures of the past?   
 
 Development and authority:  Wahhabism 
The identification of fundamentalist models of authority in diverse religious 
traditions reveals problems of definition.  John Voll (in Marty & Appleby 
1991:350) examines the Sunni revivalist movement of Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
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 Wahhab (1703-92).  Wahhabism provides an interesting example for an 
analysis of the dimension of authority in fundamentalism.  Voll writes of Idn 'Abd 
al-Wahhab's socio-religious context: 
However, the religious life of local tribes and townspeople had become involved 
with non-Islamic practices, including the worship of the tombs of Muslim saints, 
magic, and divination.  Despite the Hanbali reputation for strictness, the Muslim 
learned establishment tended to tolerate the superstitions of the masses rather 
than cause social tension and conflict...Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab also attacked the 
religio-intellectual establishment of his time.  He opposed the blind acceptance 
of authority in religious matters and criticized the ulama (learned men) who had 
taken the medieval systems of Islam as the final word and had thus eliminated 
any role for the independent rethinking of the religious tradition.  Islamic 
fundamentalists have, like Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, advocated ijtihad, the use of 
informed independent judgment in interpreting and applying the basic sources 
of Islam, rather than simply adhering to the inherited interpretations of the great 
medieval scholars. (349-350) 
Wahhabism, as the movement was named, challenges the definition of 
fundamentalism.  Before examining this definition it is worth clarifying the 
characteristics of Muslim revivalism defined as fundamentalist.  Youssef 
Choueiri (1990) identifies such revivalism as: 
1. The return to original Islam as the religion of the oneness of God (tawhid).  
This led to the insistence on purifying Islam of pagan customs and foreign 
accretions.  A pronounced hostility was thus displayed towards innovations and 
traditions, particularly the excessive veneration of saints, the practice of magic 
and association with unbelievers.  
2. The advocacy of independent reasoning in matters of legal judgments 
(ijtihad), coupled with an adhorrence of blind imitation (taqlid).  
3.  The necessity of fleeing (hijra) the territories dominated by polytheists and 
heathens...Hence, the world was divided into two mutually exclusive 
geographical units: the abode of unbelief (dar al-kuhr) and the House of Islam 
(dar al-Islam).  
4. The fervent belief in one single leader as either the embodiment of the 
'renewer' and just imam or as the Expected Mahdi. (23-24)  
Wahhabism is in some ways the archetypal fundamentalist revival and in 
others, quite atypical.    
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There is a very significant body of literature that defines fundamentalism in 
terms of the very things Wahhabism sought to reject.  Cameron (1995), Vogt 
(1995), Cohen (1988), Winell (1993), Babinski (1995), and Boone (1989) all 
characterise fundamentalism as institutional, repressive of independent thought, 
and reliant on unquestionable authority.  On the one hand Wahhabism claims to 
reject such things - on the other, it necessitates them by promoting original 
Islam as a total ideology, by repressing contaminating beliefs, by separation 
from unbelievers (physical and mental) and militant struggle against them, and 
by the fervent belief in one single leader (Choueiri, 1990:23-24).  The 
contradistinction reveals subtle differences in the emphases used to define 
fundamentalism.  Emphases vary between militancy and extremism, authority 
dependency, and contents of faith.      
 
 Summary 
It is possible to summarise this final section in light of Oser and Gmünder's 
development assertions. Fundamentalism is defined herein by its tendency to 
insist that the ideal is revealed exclusively in a particular.  The particular (by 
definition) is only accessible through particular language and tradition.  As such, 
the particular is deemed to be static [(m) The issues with which theology is 
concerned cannot be transmitted as factual information. (149)].  This is a mark 
of fundamentalism; that because the truth is held as static propositional 
knowledge predicating action it is accessible to all who would seek the truth i.e. 
be willing to accept the knowledge.  A developmental approach problematises 
the notion of static salvific propositional knowledge [(o) Fundamental theological 
statements should be constituted so that they are structurally plausible and 
reproducible. (150)].  For this very reason, developmentalism itself, cannot 
claim to be a readily accessible truth - nor does it need to.  The stakes for 
accepting or rejecting it are not measured by any fundamentalist criteria: eternal 
destination, earthly happiness, and social rejection of unbelievers.  
 
Thus ends the review of Oser and Gmünder's developmental theory of religious 
judgment.  However, a final word is appropriate to justify a transition to Fowler 
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 as a continuing focus of structural development.  Oser and Gmünder criticise 
Fowler's theory on the grounds that: 
Instead of emphasising the specifically religious, he presents a conglomerate of 
stage conceptions of different sources (logic, role-taking, moral judgment, form 
of world coherence, locus of authority, symbolic interaction, etc) which only in 
combination make it possible to experience the ways of the world based on 
faith. (1991:44) 
This is a weakness because the combination of so many areas makes faith very 
difficult to identify in practice and very difficult to examine in theory.  However, 
Fowler recognises that something is lost if the phenomenon he seeks to explore 
is overly compartmentalized and artificially organised.  For this reason, Fowler's 
Seven Aspects of Faith provides a powerful model for an analysis of a holistic 
fundamentalism.  Fundamentalism is a total ideology.  It permeates all aspects 
of life.  It is intimately concerned with each of the Seven Aspects and yet it 
defines itself holistically as a faith.  As such, Fowler's Aspects reflect the self-
claimed nature and scope of fundamentalism. 
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 2.1.6 Faith Development: James Fowler  
 
James Fowler outlines his theory of faith development in Stages of Faith: The 
Psychology of Human Development and the Quest for Meaning (1981).  He 
postulates six developmental stages of human faith following the 
Undifferentiated Faith of infancy: Intuitive-Projective Faith, Mythic-Literal Faith, 
Synthetic-Conventional Faith, Individuative-Reflective Faith, Conjunctive Faith, 
and Universalising Faith. Stage determination is dependent upon seven 
aspects: Form of Logic, Perspective Taking, Form of Moral Judgment, Bounds 
of Social Awareness, Locus of Authority, Form of World Coherence, and 
Symbolic Function (see Table 3). 
 
James Fowler's Seven Aspects of Faith provide a useful starting point for an 
application of developmental structuring tendencies to fundamentalism. These 
aspects offer a synthesis of observed structuring tendencies across the life-
span.  In effect, they describe the cumulative interpretations of empirical and 
conceptual research in psychosocial human development.  Fowler draws 
specifically on the developmental research and theory of Jean Piaget, Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Erik Erikson, Jane Lovinger, Robert Selman, and Daniel Levinson. 
The following discussion of fundamentalism is structured according to the 
aspects as described in Table 3 (Table reproduced from Fowler, 1981:244-5).  No 
doubt, these aspects will be redefined and reconceptualised by further empirical 
research.  For the purposes of this paper, Fowler's aspects provide a 
conceptual link between existing developmental structures and observed 
fundamentalist beliefs and behaviours.  
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Table 3.  Fowler's Seven Aspects of Faith 
 
 
Aspect A. Form of 
Logic 
B. 
Perspective  
Taking 
C. Moral 
Judgement 
  
D.Social 
Awareness 
E. Locus of 
Authority 
F. World 
Coherence 
G. 
Symbolic 
Function 
Stage 
I 
Preoperational Rudimentary 
empathy 
(egocentric) 
Punishment-
reward 
Family, 
primal, others 
Attachment/ 
dependence 
relationships. Size, 
power, visible symbols 
of authority 
Episodic Magical- 
numinous 
 
II Concrete 
Operational  
Simple 
Perspective 
taking 
Instrumental 
hedonism 
(reciprocal 
fairness) 
"Those like 
us" (in 
familial, ethic, 
racial,  class 
and religious 
terms) 
Incumbents of 
authority roles, 
salience increased by 
personal relatedness 
Narrative-
dramatic 
One- 
dimensional; 
literal 
III Early Formal 
Operations 
Mutual 
interpersonal 
Interpersonal 
expectations and 
concordance 
Composite of 
groups in 
which one has 
interpersonal 
relationships 
Consensus of valued 
groups and in 
personally worthy 
representatives of 
belief- value traditions 
Tacit system, 
felt meanings 
symbolically 
mediated, 
globally held 
Symbols 
multi-
dimensional: 
evocative 
power inheres 
in symbol 
IV Formal Operations 
(Dichotomizing) 
Mutual, with self- 
selected group 
or class 
(societal) 
Societal 
perspective, 
Reflective 
relativism or 
class-biased 
Universalism 
 
Ideologically 
compatible 
communities 
with 
congruence to 
self-chosen 
norms and 
insights 
One's own judgement 
as informed by a self-
ratified ideological 
perspective. 
Authorities and norms 
must be congruent 
with this. 
Explicit 
system, 
conceptually 
mediated, 
clarity about 
boundaries 
and inner 
connections of 
system 
Symbols 
separated 
from 
symbolised. 
Translated 
(reduced) to 
Ideations. 
Evocative 
power inheres 
in meaning 
conveyed by 
symbols 
V Formal Operations 
(Dialectical) 
Mutual with 
groups, classes 
and traditions 
"other" than 
one's own 
Prior to society, 
principled higher 
law (universal 
and critical) 
 
Extends 
beyond class 
norms and 
interests. 
Disciplined 
ideological 
vulnerability to 
"truths" and 
"claims" of 
outgroups and 
other 
traditions 
Dialectical joining of 
judgement- 
experience processes 
with reflective claims 
of others and of 
various expressions of 
cumulative human 
wisdom 
Multisystemic 
symbolic and 
conceptual 
mediation 
Postcritical 
rejoining of 
irreducible 
symbolic 
power and 
ideational 
meaning. 
Evocative 
power 
inherent in the 
reality in and 
beyond 
symbol and in 
the power of 
unconscious 
processes in 
the self 
VI Formal Operations 
(Synthetic) 
Mutual, with the 
commonwealth 
of being 
Loyalty to being Identification 
with the 
species. 
Transnarcissis
tic love of 
being 
In a personal 
judgement informed 
by the experiences 
and truths of previous 
stages, purified of 
egoic striving, and 
linked by disciplined 
intuition to the 
principle of being 
Unitive 
actuality felt 
and 
participated 
unity of "One 
beyond many" 
Evocative 
power of 
symbols 
actualized 
through 
unification of 
reality 
mediated by 
symbols and 
the self 
 
 
The general poles of developmental transition are ego-centric and universal, 
literal and symbolic, concrete and formal.  Each stage represents a period of 
equilibrium along such continuums.  The movement to each new stage is 
characterised by: 
- a new degree of reflective liberation with respect to the use of reason in faith 
(form of logic). 
 - an augmented capacity for accuracy in taking the perspective of others and in  
balancing their perspectives with a newly decentrated grasp of one's own 
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 outlook (role taking). 
 - as in Kohlberg's theory, a qualitatively new, more complex and comprehensive  
logic for moral reasoning (form of moral judgment). 
 - a widened, more inclusive accounting for the interests, stories and visions of  
others in the course of composing and maintaining one's own normative 
perspectives (bounds of social awareness). 
 - a more self-reliant and increasingly objective accounting for the warrants and  
justifications of one's faith outlook and for its consequences in life structure and 
patterns of commitment (locus of authority). 
 - a qualitatively new degree of self-responsibility for the forming system of  
images, values and stories that constitute the unity and coherence of one's 
meaning world (form of world coherence). 
 - a qualitative increase in choice, awareness and commitment regarding the  
symbols and representations, which express, evoke and renew one's faith 
(symbolic functioning). (Fowler: 1981:300) 
While Fowler uses the Aspects as dimensions of convenience he summarises 
each stage of faith holistically. The following italicised summaries of each of the 
faith stages are reproduced from Fowler's (1981) Stages of Faith.  The primary 
intention of this thesis is to apply Fowler's descriptive structures to the concept 
of fundamentalism. 
 
Stage I Intuitive-Projective faith (Fowler, 1981:133-134) is the fantasy-filled, 
imitative phase in which the child can be powerfully and permanently influenced 
by examples, moods, actions and stories of the visible faith of primally related 
adults. 
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The stage most typical of the child of three to seven, it is marked by a relative 
fluidity of thought patterns. The child is continually encountering novelties for 
which no stable operations of knowing have been formed. The imaginative 
processes underlying fantasy are unrestrained and uninhibited by logical 
thought. In league with forms of knowing dominated by perception, imagination 
in this stage is extremely productive of long-lasting images and feelings 
(positive and negative) that later, more stable and self-reflective valuing and 
thinking will have to order and sort out. This is the stage of first self-awareness. 
The self-aware child is egocentric as regards the perspectives of others. Here 
 
 
 we find first awarenesses of death and sex and of the strong taboos by which 
cultures and families insulate those powerful areas. 
 
The gift or emergent strength of this stage is the birth of imagination, the ability 
to unify and grasp the experience-world in powerful images and as presented in 
stories that register the child's intuitive understandings and feelings toward the 
ultimate conditions of existence. 
 
The dangers in this stage arise from the possible possession of the child's 
imagination by unrestrained images of terror and destructiveness, or from the 
witting or unwitting exploitation of her or his imagination in the reinforcement of 
taboos and moral or doctrinal expectations. 
 
The main factor precipitating transition to the next stage is the emergence of 
concrete operational thinking. Affectively, the resolution of Oedipal issues or 
their submersion in latency are important accompanying factors. At the heart of 
the transition is the child's growing concern to know how things are and to 
clarify for him- or herself the bases of distinctions between what is real and what 
only seems to be. 
 
Stage 2 Mythic-Literal faith (Fowler, 1981:149-150) is the stage in which the 
person begins to take on for him- or herself the stories, beliefs and observances 
that symbolize belonging to his or her community. Beliefs are appropriated with 
literal interpretations, as are moral rules and attitudes. Symbols are taken as 
one-dimensional and literal in meaning. In this stage the rise of concrete 
operations leads to the curbing and ordering of the previous stage's imaginative 
composing of the world. The episodic quality of Intuitive-Projective faith gives 
way to a more linear, narrative construction of coherence and meaning. Story 
becomes the major way of giving unity and value to experience. This is the faith 
stage of the school child (though we sometimes find the structures dominant in 
adolescents and in adults). Marked by increased accuracy in taking the 
perspective of other persons, those in Stage 2 compose a world based on 
reciprocal fairness and an immanent justice based on reciprocity. The actors in 
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 their cosmic stories are anthropomorphic. They can be affected deeply and 
powerfully by symbolic and dramatic materials and can describe in endlessly 
detailed narrative what has occurred. They do not, however, step back from the 
flow of stories to formulate reflective, conceptual meanings. For this stage the 
meaning is both carried and trapped in the narrative. 
 
The new capacity or strength in this stage is the rise of narrative and the 
emergence of story, drama and myth as ways of finding and giving coherence 
to experience. 
 
The limitations of literalness and an excessive reliance upon reciprocity as a 
principle for constructing an ultimate environment can result either in an 
overcontrolling, stilted perfectionism or "works righteousness" or in their 
opposite, an abasing sense of badness embraced because of mistreatment, 
neglect or the apparent disfavor of significant others. 
 
A factor initiating transition to Stage 3 is the implicit clash or contradictions in 
stories that leads to reflection on meanings. The transition to formal operational 
thought makes such reflection possible and necessary. Previous literalism 
breaks down; new "cognitive conceit" (Elkind) leads to disillusionment with 
previous teachers and teachings. Conflicts between authoritative stories 
(Genesis on creation versus evolutionary theory) must be faced. The 
emergence of mutual interpersonal perspective taking ("I see you seeing me; I 
see me as you see me; I see you seeing me seeing you.") creates the need for 
a more personal relationship with the unifying power of the ultimate 
environment. 
 
In Stage 3 Synthetic-Conventional faith, (Fowler, 1981:172-173) a person's 
experience of the world now extends beyond the family. A number of spheres 
demand attention: family, school or work, peers, street society and media, and 
perhaps religion. Faith must provide a coherent orientation in the midst of that 
more complex and diverse range of involvements. Faith must synthesize values 
and information; it must provide a basis for identity and outlook. 
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Stage 3 typically has its rise and ascendancy in adolescence, but for many 
adults it becomes a permanent place of equilibrium.  It structures the ultimate 
environment in interpersonal terms.  Its images of unifying value and power 
derive from the extension of qualities experienced in personal relationships.  It 
is a "conformist" stage in the sense that it is acutely tuned to the expectations 
and judgments of significant others and yet does not have a sure enough grasp 
on its own identity and autonomous judgment to construct and maintain an 
independent perspective.  While beliefs and values are deeply felt, they typically 
are tacitly held - the person "dwells" in them and in the meaning world they 
mediate.  But there has not been occasion to step outside them to reflect on or 
examine them explicitly or systematically.  At Stage 3 a person has an 
"ideology," a more or less consistent clustering of values and beliefs, but he or 
she has not objectified it for examination and in a sense is unaware of having it.  
Differences of outlook with others are experienced as differences in "kind" of 
person.  Authority is located in the incumbents of traditional authority role (if 
perceived as personally worthy) or in the consensus of a valued, face-to-face 
group. 
 
The emergent capacity of this stage is the forming of a personal myth-the myth 
of one's own becoming in identity and faith, incorporating one's past and 
anticipated future in an image of the ultimate environment unified by 
characteristics of personality. 
 
The dangers or deficiencies in this stage are twofold. The expectations and 
evaluations of others can be so compellingly internalized (and sacralized) that 
later autonomy of judgment and action can be jeopardized; or interpersonal 
betrayals can give rise either to nihilistic despair about a personal principle of 
ultimate being or to a compensatory intimacy with God unrelated to mundane 
relations.  Factors contributing to the breakdown of Stage 3 and to readiness for 
transition may include: serious clashes or contradictions between valued 
authority sources; marked changes, by officially sanctioned leaders, or policies 
or practices previously deemed sacred and unbreachable (for example, in the 
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 Catholic church changing the mass from Latin to the vernacular, or no longer 
requiring abstinence from meat on Friday); the encounter with experiences or 
perspectives that lead to critical reflection on how one's beliefs and values have 
formed and changed, and on how "relative" they are to one's particular group or 
background. Frequently the experience of "leaving home"--emotionally or 
physically, or both--precipitates the kind of examination of self, background, and 
lifeguiding values that gives rise to stage transition at this point. 
 
The movement from Stage 3 to Stage 4 Individuative-Reflective faith (Fowler, 
1981:182-183) is particularly critical for it is in this transition that the late 
adolescent or adult must begin to take seriously the burden of responsibility for 
his or her own commitments, lifestyle, beliefs and attitudes. Where genuine 
movement toward stage 4 is underway the person must face certain 
unavoidable tensions: individuality versus being defined by a group or group 
membership; subjectivity and the power of one's strongly felt but unexamined 
feelings versus objectivity and the requirement of critical reflection; self-
fulfillment or self-actualization as a primary concern versus service to and being 
for others; the question of being committed to the relative versus struggle with 
the possibility of an absolute. 
 
Stage 4 most appropriately takes form in young adulthood (but let us remember 
that many adults do not construct it and that for a significant group it emerges 
only in the mid-thirties or forties). This stage is marked by a double 
development. The self, previously sustained in its identity and faith 
compositions by an interpersonal circle of significant others, now claims an 
identity no longer defined by the composite of one's roles or meanings to 
others. To sustain that new identity it composes a meaning frame conscious of 
its own boundaries and inner connections and aware of itself as a "world view." 
Self (identity) and outlook (world view) are differentiated from those of others 
and become acknowledged factors in the reactions, interpretations and 
judgments one makes on the actions of the self and others. It expresses its 
intuitions of coherence in an ultimate environment in terms of an explicit system 
of meanings. Stage 4 typically translates symbols into conceptual meanings. 
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 This is a "demythologizing" stage. It is likely to attend minimally to unconscious 
factors influencing its judgments and behavior. 
 
Stage 4's ascendant strength has to do with its capacity for critical reflection on 
identity (self) and outlook (ideology). Its dangers inhere in its strengths: an 
excessive confidence in the conscious mind and in critical thought and a kind of 
second narcissism in which the now clearly bounded, reflective self 
overassimilates "reality" and the perspectives of others into its own world view. 
 
Restless with the self-images and outlook maintained by Stage 4, the person 
ready for transition finds him- or herself attending to what may feel like anarchic 
and disturbing inner voices. Elements from a childish past, images and energies 
from a deeper self, a gnawing sense of the sterility and flatness of the meanings 
one serves any or all of these may signal readiness for something new. Stories, 
symbols, myths and paradoxes from one's own or other traditions may insist on 
breaking in upon the neatness of the previous faith. Disillusionment with one's 
compromises and recognition that life is more complex than Stage 4's logic of 
clear distinctions and abstract concepts can comprehend, press one toward a 
more dialectical and multileveled approach to life truth. 
 
Stage 5 Conjunctive faith (Fowler, 1981:197-198) involves the integration into 
self and outlook of much that was suppressed or unrecognized in the interest of 
Stage 4's self-certainty and conscious cognitive and affective adaptation to 
reality. This stage develops a second naivete (Ricoeur) in which symbolic power 
is reunited with conceptual meanings. Here there must also be a new reclaiming 
and reworking of one's past. There must be an opening to the voices of one's 
deeper self. Importantly, this involves a critical recognition of one's social 
unconscious-the myths, ideal images and prejudices built deeply into the self-
system by virtue of one's nurture within a particular social class, religious 
tradition, ethnic group or the like. 
 
Unusual before mid-life, Stage 5 knows the sacrament of defeat and the reality 
of irrevocable commitments and acts. What the previous stage struggled to 
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 clarify, in terms of the boundaries of self and outlook, this stage now makes 
porous and permeable. Alive to paradox and the truth in apparent 
contradictions, this stage strives to unify opposites in mind and experience. It 
generates and maintains vulnerability to the strange truths of those who are 
"other." Ready for closeness to that which is different and threatening to self 
and outlook (including new depths of experience in spirituality and religious 
revelation), this stage's commitment to justice is freed from the confines of tribe, 
class, religious community or nation. And with the seriousness that can arise 
when life is more than half over, this stage is ready to spend and be spent for 
the cause of conserving and cultivating the possibility of others' generating 
identity and meaning. 
 
The new strength of this stage comes in the rise of the ironic imagination-a 
capacity to see and be in one's or one's group's most powerful meanings, while 
simultaneously recognizing that they are relative, partial and inevitably distorting 
apprehensions of transcendent reality. Its danger lies in the direction of a 
paralyzing passivity or inaction, giving rise to complacency or cynical 
withdrawal, due to its paradoxical understanding of truth. 
 
Stage 5 can appreciate symbols, myths and rituals (its own and others') 
because it has been grasped, in some measure, by the depth of reality to which 
they refer. It also sees the divisions of the human family vividly because it has 
been apprehended by the possibility (and imperative) of an inclusive community 
of being. But this stage remains divided. It lives and acts between an 
untransformed world and a transforming vision and loyalties. In some few cases 
this division yields to the call of the radical actualization that we call Stage 6. 
 
Stage 6 (Fowler, 1981:200-201) is exceedingly rare. The persons best 
described by it have generated faith compositions in which their felt sense of an 
ultimate environment is inclusive of all being. They have become incarnators 
and actualizers of the spirit of an inclusive and fulfilled human community. 
 
They are "contagious" in the sense that they create zones of liberation from the 
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 social, political, economic and ideological shackles we place and endure on 
human futurity. Living with felt participation in a power that unifies and 
transforms the world, Universalizers are often experienced as subversive of the 
structures (including religious structures) by which we sustain our individual and 
corporate survival, security and significance. Many persons in this stage die at 
the hands of those whom they hope to change. Universalizers are often more 
honored and revered after death than during their lives. The rare persons who 
may be described by this stage have a special grace that makes them seem 
more lucid, more simple, and yet somehow more fully human than the rest of 
us. Their community is universal in extent. Particularities are cherished because 
they are vessels of the universal, and thereby valuable apart from any utilitarian 
considerations. Life is both loved and held to loosely. Such persons are ready 
for fellowship with persons at any of the other stages and from any other faith 
tradition. 
  
 Fowler's concept of faith 
Before critiquing Fowler's theory as a reflection of the broader developmental 
discourse, it is necessary to understand the tradition in which his concept of 
faith is located.  It is important to understand before assuming its applicability to 
fundamentalism.   
 
Perhaps the most frequent criticism that Fowler has endured is his use of this 
term in place of religion, worldview, or belief.  Indeed, I have often referred to 
fundamentalism as a worldview rather than a faith.  The reason for adopting 
worldview is that it is a truer term for the application of Piagetian theory.  As 
noted previously, Kohlberg, Erikson, Oser and Gmünder, and Fowler engage in 
qualitative, affective extrapolations of the logico-mathematical Piagetian theory.  
As our focus takes a more holistic approach to the notion of development, it is 
important to adopt a more holistic and encompassing term.  While Oser and 
Gmünder criticise the indeterminacy of Fowler's faith, their use of religion, like 
worldview fails to encompass the dimensions in which fundamentalism 
manifests or claims authority.  Religion is too compartmentalised for our 
purposes, too exclusive in connotation.  For this reason, the term faith is used to 
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 encompass fundamentalism for the continuing analysis.  It is necessary to 
explore the definition and dimensions of faith in order to make its application to 
fundamentalism more explicit. 
 
Defining Faith: The Problem of Definition 
Faith means many things to many people.  The explicit purpose of this section 
is to define it in Fowler's terms while examining the context in which he 
produced this same definition.  The purpose is also to provide a term adequate 
to bring the discourses of fundamentalism and development together.    
 
In Stages of Faith (1981), Fowler recalls criticism of his choice of the word faith: 
They suggest the use of some more secular term for our focal concern.  They 
have proposed "world view development," "belief system formation," or, on 
occasion, the "development of consciousness" as categories that would help us 
avoid confusion. (p.91) 
His later response, a response shared within the broader definitive context of 
this thesis is that: 
There simply is no other concept that holds together those various interrelated 
dimensions of human knowing, valuing, committing and acting that must be 
considered together if we want to understand the making and maintaining of 
human meaning. (p.92) 
The difficulty of the process of choosing words to describe this phenomenon of 
which I am assuming fundamentalism to be a part, reflects perhaps the 
extremes of its understanding between the secular and religious.  The more 
secular world view and belief system perhaps fail to encompass fully the 
affective dimensions of religion and its understanding of the existence of an 
Objective within, between, and beyond the subjective self.  Conversely, the 
more religious faith carries a stigma concerning the nature of this Objective and 
its relationship to the subjective.  
 
Twentieth-century Protestant theologian Paul Tillich to whom Fowler is 
theoretically indebted, introduces his Dynamics of Faith with the problem of 
definition: 
THERE is hardly a word in the religious language, both theological and 
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 popular, which is subject to more misunderstandings, distortions and 
questionable definitions than the word "faith." ... there is as yet no substitute 
expressing the reality to which the term "faith" points.  So for the time being the 
only way of dealing with the problem is to try to reinterpret the word and remove 
the confusing and distorting connotations, some of which are the heritage of 
centuries. (1957, Introductory Remarks) 
What is this heritage of centuries?  It is perhaps possible to reflect on Fowler's 
definition of faith by examining the choices that are of importance when defining 
faith.    
 
Faith and intellect 
Past definitions of faith have tended to move between illuminist and 
intellectualist emphases (to use Groome's [1980] terminology).  Too much 
emphasis on the latter and faith becomes over-intellectualised and thus 
interchangeable with modern notions of belief.  Too much emphasis on the 
former and faith becomes so nebulous a concept as to be rendered practically 
impotent.  A brief etymology of the word faith may serve to define this issue.  
This is not as James Barr warns in The Semantics of Biblical Language, to 
confuse "word derivation with word meaning.  Word meaning, modern linguistics 
stresses, is properly understood synchronically" (In Solskice, 1985:81).  Rather it 
is to provide an example of how the word meaning of faith has changed and to 
present a clearer working definition for its application to fundamentalism in this 
thesis.   
 
The English word faith as found in the forms faithe, feyth, and fayth between the 
15th and 17th centuries comes from the Latin credo, credere and fidere, 
meaning to "give one's heart to" and "to trust" respectively (Groome, 1980, p.61 & 
Fowler, 1981, p.11).   The Greek equivalent of the word faith, (pistuo, pistis, 
πιστις) refers to trust, "through the whole corporeality of life" (Buber, 1951, p.26).  
Comparative religionist Wilfred Cantwell Smith (to whom Fowler was indebted) 
notes that the Hebrew equivalent (aman he' min, 'munah) refers to faith in a 
holistic sense common to Hindu and Buddhist understandings of faith (1977, 
p.71).   Hebrew, Greek, and Latin etymologies of faith tend to indicate a trust 
that is encompassing of the whole person - Buber's "whole corporeality of life".    
92
 
 
  
This holistic understanding of faith is often reduced to the intellectual assent of 
belief.  W.C. Smith engages the historical causes of such a linguistic shift in 
Belief and History (1977) and Faith and Belief (1979).  He identifies three 
linguistic shifts in the understanding of belief; a shift from the personal object of 
belief to an impersonal object; a shift from the first person subject of belief to 
third person subjects; and a shift from the popular association of belief with truth 
to the association of belief with falsehood (In Fowler, 1981, p.13).   The definitive 
significance of these shifts is that faith as associated with belief has been so 
intellectualised and narrowly defined as to lose its holism and universal 
applicability.  The applied significance of these shifts, as discussed later, is that 
fundamentalism fails to make the distinction between faith and intellectualised 
belief. 
 
Faith understood in this way is used in Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing 
as early as 1599, "He wears his faith but as the fashion of his hat" (In The Oxford 
English Dictionary Vol. 5 [OED], 1989, pp.678-679). The notions of particular faith, 
true faith, false faith and no faith are found in earlier texts as in Maundev c1400, 
"Thei varien from oure Feithe"; and Eden's 1553 Treatise Newe India, "They 
have no law written and are of no faith". Thomas More in his Dyaloge of 1529 
argues that, "The churche...muste...haue all one fayth" (OED, 1989). Such 
instances of particular usage are parent to the fundamentalist insistence that 
true faith is eqivocal with true belief.  Popular usage often fails to make the 
same distinction. 
 
As an example of such understandings, the Macquarie Dictionary (1991) 
includes among its definitions of faith: 
2. belief which is not based on proof. 3. belief in the doctrines or teachings of 
religion.  4. the doctrines which are or should be believed. 5. a system of 
religious belief.  (p.624) 
Such definitions take as total, the intellectual emphases of faith.  Faith is 
equated with believing and believing with intellectual assent to doctrine or 
systematised religion.  Doctrine, teaching, proof, and system connote such 
intellectualism in a scientific age.   
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Is there a golden mean between illuminist and intellectualist definitions of faith? 
The illuminist definition of faith is that which defines it exclusively in terms of the 
affective.  Thus defined, faith is totally devoid of propositional content and there 
is no relationship between its articulation and its nature. W.C Smith in Faith and 
Belief (1979) prefers to relate illuminist and intellectualist definition.  Belief 
rather than being an intellectual dimension of faith is seen as a product of faith. 
Faith is inseparable from its contents - from belief as intellectual assent.  It is 
this relationship that rationalises the extension of the definition of faith to 
incorporate intellectual belief as a dimension of the same.  
 
Faith and Action 
There seems to be a need for consonance between faith as action and faith as 
intellect, as the practised and the preached.  Fowler's faith is not exchangeable 
with purely intellectual belief.  Rather belief is an articulated expression of faith.  
Belief may be a poor expression of faith inasmuch as what is said and what is 
done are dissimilar.  In this sense, belief without action (works) is dead and faith 
without action is impossible.  And so action may be included in the scope of true 
faith.  Though, action like belief, does not total faith, for similar actions may be 
undertaken with different intentions and good works may be known but not 
done. 
 
Popular interpretation of the Reformation dialogue on faith and works has 
perhaps created a false dichotomy between the two. In this context, works and 
actions are being used interchangeably.  For the scope of this thesis I would 
echo Luther's understanding of faith and works (without the immediate context 
of salvation) that, "it is just as impossible to separate faith and works as it is to 
separate heat and light from fire!" (Online in Smith, 1994).  Groome (1980) offers 
similar sentiments in his definition of faith, "the faith and the doing belong 
together simultaneously.  Or to state it another way, the faith is in the doing" 
(63).    
 
Human actions and experience of other's actions form a cumulative experience.  
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 Faith both guides and is guided by, such experience.  Here enters the notion of 
will - the ability to consider, choose, and then act selectively between desirable 
courses of action.  Will is not to be confused with intellectual assent - this would 
be to falsely escape the act of will.  Nor can the will be said to total faith.  Tillich 
calls this the "voluntaristic distortion" of the meaning of faith; "our oscillating will 
cannot produce the certainty which belongs to faith" (1957:38). The intent of 
action assumes the existence of a will.  In a corporeal faith action is the 
experiential orientation of life.  Faith produces such actions and faith is a 
product of such actions.  For Fowler, faith is a corporeal reality that centres and 
coordinates belief and action.  Such faith is the state of ultimate concern and 
ultimate concern invokes belief and incites action and emotion. 
 
Faith and Emotion 
Faith is able to control some emotion and be controlled by some emotion.  Faith 
is emotive but emotion does not total faith.  Faith elicits emotional responses 
that may change the very same faith. As such emotion is a dimension of faith.  It 
is inseparable from its intellectual attributions and motivations.  It is inseparable 
from the actions it inspires.  Such is the understanding of corporeal faith in an 
interactionist context.  Emotion is the passional dimension of Groome's 
understanding of faith and the affective dimension of Fowler's understanding of 
faith. 
 
Tillich warns of the emotionalistic distortion of faith in Dynamics of Faith.  His 
caution is that a false equivocation of faith with feeling: 
has induced many people to believe that faith is a matter of merely subjective 
emotions, without a content to be known and a demand to be obeyed...Faith as 
the state of ultimate concern claims the whole...and cannot be restricted to the 
subjectivity of mere feeling. (1957:39) 
In concurrence with this view, emotion is qualitatively directed or misdirected in 
the broader context of faith.  Emotions bear witness to the act of centring faith. 
This directing or orientation of emotion suggests a centre of faith. 
 
Fowler's notion of a centred faith is grounded in the tradition of theologians 
Richard Niebuhr and Paul Tillich.  For Niebuhr faith is seen "in the search for 
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 an overarching, integrating, and grounding trust in a centre of value and power 
sufficiently worthy to give our lives unity and meaning" (In Fowler, 1981:5).  For 
Tillich (1957) faith is both an ultimate concern and a centred act.   The intellect, 
the act, and its attached emotions are dimensions of faith. The centring of these 
dimensions as a holistic faith begs the perennial question concerning the 
existence of a universal centre. 
 
Faith and the Ultimate 
One cannot centre (verb) without a centre (noun).  As such, Fowler's faith has 
an objective but emerging quality.  This objective and emerging quality is the 
common denominator of many names.  Some call it God, the Holy, the Divine 
Milieu, the Ground of all Being, the Ultimate Concern, or in Fowler's case - the 
X-factor or the Kingdom of God as ultimate environment.  Some understandably 
shrink from such loaded metaphors and call it Nature, Survival, or Life or refuse 
to name it at all.  Some deny its existence, largely as a reaction to other terms 
but according to Fowler (1981) and Oser and Gmünder (1991) relate to it 
nonetheless. The question remains - what is the nature of this centre postulated 
by Fowler?  Is it recognisable enough that one might discriminate between the 
contents and dynamics of faith that lead to or away from it?   
  
For Tillich the content of belief is inseparable from the fulfillment of faith itself - 
though they are by no means interchangeable.  In Dynamics of Faith (1957) he 
poses the question of faith and its contents: 
We have pointed to the limitless variety of symbols and to the many contrasting 
types of faith.  This seems to imply a complete denial of the claim these 
symbols and types have to truth.  Therefore, we must now discuss the question 
whether, and in what sense, faith can be judged in terms of truth. (74) 
Tillich's most extensive answer to this question is that the contents of faith are 
as effective as they are able to lead the bearer of faith to the Ultimate Concern 
(in Brown, 1965).  Contents that lead to false ultimate concerns are therefore 
idolatrous.  Tillich uses the words profanization and demonization when 
speaking of such concerns: 
Thus we are faced by two opposing dangers: on the one hand, what we may 
call secularization (although I still prefer "profanization") - a process of 
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 becoming more and more empty or materialistic without any ultimate concern; 
and on the other hand, demonization, which makes one particular religious 
symbol, group, usage, worldview - or whatever - absolute. (In Brown 1965:5) 
Tillich is reticent to equate the Ultimate Concern with God or a god because of 
the idolatrous uses of these terms and their failure to encompass non-theistic 
concerns.  He remains somewhat enigmatic about the nature and source of the 
Ultimate Concern. 
 
In Stages of Faith  (1981) Fowler speaks of an "ultimate environment" and the 
example of the Judeo-Christian "Kingdom of God".  The ultimate environment is 
an image of the broadest framework of reality within which one creates and 
centres value.  It is the ultimate framework of reference for the process of 
meaning making in life. It is the "transcendent backdrop of meaning and power 
in relation to which we make sense of our lives" (1981:33-34). In Life-Maps 
(1978) Fowler reveals that his "ecological metaphor ultimate environment, if 
translated into Jewish or Christian terms, would be called Kingdom of God "(45).   
He borrows from the Christian and Kantian (as described previously) traditions 
in postulating such a centre.    
 
According to Fowler, this ultimate environment develops structurally and 
qualitatively to a final stage of faith - Stage 6.  The developmental journey leads 
from the self to the ultimate, from the selfish to the selfless, from the polytheistic 
to the radically monotheistic, from the symbol to the symbolised, and from the 
particular to the universal.  Hence the stage is described as - Universalising 
Faith.  Fowler's monotheism is "loyalty to the principle of being and to the 
source and center of all value and power" (1981:23).   A brief examination of 
Stage 6 examples reveals the nature of this source as assumed in Fowler's 
thesis.  It is: 
A more inclusive justice and the realisation of love...heedless of the threats to 
self...of the imperatives of absolute love and justice...devotion to universalizing 
compassion...involving strategies of non-violent suffering and ultimate respect 
for being...inclusive of all being...liberation from the social, political, economic 
and ideological shackles...a special grace...ready for fellowship...a ministry of 
presence, service and care.  (200-203)      
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 In Fowler's view this very real centre of being exerts a gravitational pull on a 
developing faith.  The centre's essence is best described and understood the 
closer one gets.  Therefore, Fowler's Stage 6 purports to offer a qualitatively 
better description of the Ultimate than do lower stages.  Though exceedingly 
rare, Fowler claims to find Stage 6 characteristics embodied in the life and 
works of Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and Martin Luther King Jr. (1981:203). 
 
It is a step boldly taken to first postulate and then describe a benevolent centre 
of being.  To do so is to assume an epistemological position.  It is to assume life 
purpose beyond the time-space containment of one's own physical existence.  It 
also assumes a single essence for the centre while maintaining that other 
essences ascribed to the centre are accommodated in the necessary and 
inescapable progression toward it.  Such a purpose is universal - necessarily 
opposed to nihilism and pure relativism.  Such a universal permeates the 
particular.  The postulation of such a centre makes faith qualitative.  It is to say 
that faith becomes progressively truer to an ultimate centre as it matures.  The 
truth of Fowler's claim relies on the evidence of stage structures, the 
descriptions he derives from this evidence, and the order in which he supposes 
these descriptions should be placed.   
 
 Figure 2. The centred dimensions and dynamics of faith 
 
 
Dynamics of Faith 
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Faith as whole 
In Fowler's understanding of faith, isolated dimensions are mere distortions of a 
corporeal, holistically experienced faith.  They have been isolated thus far in an 
attempt to make faith a more manageable concept.  It is important to reaffirm 
Fowler's corporeal dynamic of faith as a combined orientation of intellect, action 
and emotion.  This is not to attribute a measure of strength to each or to say 
that all are equal.  It is merely to say that they coexist.   
 
Paul Tillich cautions against distortion of the dimensions of faith in Biblical 
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality: 
[Faith] is an act of the whole personality.  Will, knowledge, and emotion 
participate in it.  It is an act of self-surrender, of obedience, of assent.  Each of 
these elements must be present.  Emotional surrender without assent and 
obedience would by-pass the personal center.  It would be a compulsion and 
not a decision.  Intellectual assent without emotional participation distorts 
religious existence into a nonpersonal cognitive act.  Obedience of the will 
without assent and emotion leads into depersonalizing slavery. (1955:53) 
Tillich's "will, knowledge, and emotion" are synonymous with the dimensions of 
"action, intellect, and emotion" used here.   
 
The holism of faith may be understood as a dynamic of faith because of the 
infinite variety and constant change of dimensional strengths and combinations 
that form faith in different situations and between different people.  Fowler uses 
the phrase "dynamic triad of faith" to describe this dynamism.  In a chapter 
entitled The Dynamic Triad of Faith he states summarily: 
Whenever we properly speak of faith it involves people's shaping or testing their 
lives' defining directions and relationships with others in accordance with 
coordinates of value and power recognized as ultimate.  (1981:93) 
The dynamic triad of faith thus explained is synonymous with Buber's "whole 
corporeality of life" (1951:26).   
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 Faith and Relationship 
Fowler's concept of faith is formed and expressed through relationships.  These 
relationships include self, other, and centres of value. Such relationships are 
dynamic.  Humans may share different centres of value with different others.   
Centres of value may change as development occurs or as new relationships 
are formed with others.  Centres of value may dominate relationship with others 
and self.  Fowler describes these relationships as a triadic covenantal pattern 
between self (s), others (o) and shared centres of value and power (scvp). 
       scvp 
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         (Fowler, 1981:17) 
The "centres of value and power" previously discussed as "ultimate concerns".  
The "other" may be discussed as communities of faith.  But first it is necessary 
to define the dynamics between faith and self. 
 
The notion of self is a broad and difficult topic.  I shall necessarily confine my 
definitive attempts to compatibility with Fowler's model as a primary concern.  
Fowler sees faith as an "integral part of one's character or personality" 
(1981:92).  Remembering that faith is "a way of knowing and seeing the 
conditions of our lives in relation to more or less conscious images of an 
ultimate environment" (92) it is possible to explore the dynamics of self that 
construct such images.  
 
The imaginative ability is essential to the construction of an ultimate 
environment.  Much of this relationship with the centres of value and power is 
formed, tested, and strengthened in the hypothetical.  Imagination enables living 
through the hypothetical.  The faith of fantasy and the faith of reality are 
interrelated.  In a sense, both are lived.  The two are inseparable.  Some argue 
that they are one and the same.  Fowler maintains a distinction between the 
two, arguing that reality inevitably invades fantasy and, "in the interplay between 
 
 
 such invasions of normality and the symbolic representations of the 
transcendent that have grasped us, we compose images (and perhaps beliefs 
about and concepts of) the ultimate conditions of our existence" (97).   The 
subjective self is the site of this interplay though the "rules of interplay" are 
largely affected by the community of one's faith. 
 
The community of faith (i.e. fundamentalist communities) is perhaps the most 
significant type of relationship for the expression of a developing faith.  Herein 
lies our rationale for examining fundamentalism as a community expression of a 
faith in the context of development.  A community of faith identifies itself with 
particular centres of value and the symbols and stories that access these 
centres.  To anticipate the later analysis, fundamentalist communities tend to 
identify themselves with symbols and stories without a developing appreciation 
of how the centres of the same may be shared by other symbols and stories.  
Symbols and stories thus become the centres of faith rather than the entries 
into faith.   
 
The vitality of a community's faith exists through its symbols.  Symbols 
themselves are necessarily vital and dynamic less they lose the power to 
symbolise the ultimate concern. Membership in community is through 
participation in these symbols and stories.  Participation is achieved primarily 
through immersion in the community discourse.  The discourses of communities 
of faith are canonised through myth and ritual. "Cult and myth keep faith alive.  
No one is completely without them; for no one is completely without an ultimate 
concern" (Tillich, 121). Myth and ritual are extremely powerful in orientating the 
faith of the participant.  They provide attributions and value assessments for all 
kinds of behaviours associated with the centring of faith.  Such is the power of 
fundamentalist communities that produce and protect the contents of faith.  
 
Faith and Content 
The dynamic relationship between faith and its contents is complex and 
contentious.  It is especially significant in the examinations of fundamentalisms 
which define themselves exclusively by the contents they profess. The contents 
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 of Fowler's concept of faith are as diverse as the meta-narratives of religions 
and as mundane as the minutiae of everyday living.  The contents of faith are 
also the impassioned stuff of national identity and individual esteem.  The 
contents of faith bind the individual to community and thus rescue the individual 
from anomie.  
 
Can one speak qualitatively of the contents of faith in any objective sense?  To 
answer this question immediately reveals the dominant discourse of one's 
research.  Not to answer it or to say that it cannot be answered reveals much 
the same.  Fowler follows in the tradition of Kant and Tillich in that the contents 
of faith may be valued inasmuch as they lead into a more definitive relationship 
with the aforementioned centre.  Fowler's research suggests the existence of a 
developmental progression towards this source.  The contents of faith are part 
of this progression.  They change and are changed by the broader cognitive 
structures of faith.  In a developmental context Fowler acknowledges this as 
"the dynamic interplay of formal structures and the structuring power of 
particular contents in faith" (1981:273). Only according to this criterion can 
Fowler's structural developmental approach offer a value statement about 
fundamentalism - if indeed fundamentalism represents and perpetuates 
particular stages.   
 
Critical Reflection of Fowler 
There are many starting points on the epistemological continuum.  Initial 
epistemological bias causes great difference in later causal connections and 
conclusions - a sort of epistemological butterfly effect.  Developmental 
psychology cannot escape criticism for its epistemological bias.  The review 
thus far has traced the evolution of developmental psychology from Kant to 
Freud to Piaget to Erikson to Oser and Gmünder and then Fowler.  The 
broadest criticisms of Fowler applicable to this application concern the starting 
points or assumptions of developmental psychology.  A brief recap of these 
assumptions is necessary. 
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 Developmental psychology assumes a sort of universality in cognitive 
structures.  It assumes a universal genetic predisposition to sequential and 
predictable change in these structures. It assumes a type of teleological 
development. It is essentially a structuralist approach - knowledge as content 
organised according to innate cognitive rules of structure.   The evidence, put 
simply is in the strong correlation between age and ways of perceiving contents 
and dealing with cognitive problems.  Children generally perceive the world 
differently to adolescents and adolescents differently to adults.  Children 
generally approach cognitive problems differently to adolescents and 
adolescents approach problems differently to adults.  Is this a true effect and 
can it be explained differently? 
 
Piaget, Kohlberg, and Fowler all acknowledge that adults while generally more 
structurally mature than children, may vary greatly in their development.  In 
other words, not all old age adults reach full developmental maturity.  Many 
adults maintain equilibrium throughout life at a relatively low stage of 
development.  To account for this in a developmental framework one must 
postulate reasons for restricted development.  It is impossible at present to 
verify purely neurological causes because of experimental inaccessibility.  It is 
impossible to observe space-time thoughts in a physical brain.  This is a mind-
brain problem.  However, one can verify sociological or environmental factors 
influencing development.  The accessibility of the latter has led to its defence in 
the form of pure sociology or behaviourism within a postmodern discourse.  In 
this context development is an unnecessary and unverifiable concept.  Piaget 
(who referred to himself as a developmental epistemologist) tried to avoid the 
extremes of preformation (innate ideas) and environmental determinism 
(Campbell, 2000:1).  Fowler's theory as located in the broader developmental 
discourse reflects such theory and is criticised over the same epistemological 
assumptions. 
 
Further criticism of Fowler is grounded in some of his own results that dispute 
the predicted stage-age pattern.  Fowler notes in his chapter on interview 
analysis that, "the 31-40 age group, interestingly, has a larger number (37.5%) 
103
 
 
 of Stage 3 respondents than the previous group".  He goes on to postulate that, 
"while this may be due to a sampling bias, it may also be a result of different 
generational cohort experiences.  This intriguing fact, and the questions it 
suggests, cannot be explained without further research and more sophisticated 
analysis of our present data" (1981, 317).  Why is this fact intriguing?  What are 
the questions it suggests? 
 
Fowler is committed to his developmental discourse.  Such conflicting data is at 
first an exception to the rule.  It must be assimilated into his developmental 
discourse.  This section of analysis gives us a broader glimpse at the criticism 
of developmental psychology's initial epistemological assumptions.   Such 
criticism would possibly argue that all of his data should be viewed as (to use 
his own words) “a result of different generational cohort experiences”.  Within 
such a discourse Fowler's stages become “patterns of enculturated contents”.  
The notion of development becomes an illusion created by a particular 
enculturated group to validate its own power - a cognitive elitism.  It is implicit 
that Stage 6 is more desirable than Stage 1.  Adults who plateau at Stage 2 or 3 
are stunted or underdeveloped.  It is difficult to escape the value connotations of 
such terms.   
 
The developmentalist's reply to such criticism is twofold.  The first is 
philosophical, the second is empirical.  Fowler positions himself as having a 
theory of relativity.  He has:  
A theory of relativity in faith in which forms of religious life are considered as 
relative representations or modes of response to that determinative center of 
power and value that is the sovereign reality with which we humans have to 
deal in life, whether we know it or acknowledge it or not. (1981, pp.295) 
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This philosophical stance invokes a Kantian response to the charge of 
objectivism.  Kant reasoned that the very existence of a faculty of thinking that 
allowed criticism in the first place, the very existence of value sense (morality) 
necessitated two presuppositions - the existence of a first cause and the moral 
nature of that cause.  In theological terms this is the basis of the cosmological 
and the axiological arguments for the existence of God.  It argues that relativist 
criticism of objectivist theories has (by its own admission) no foundation and 
 
 
 yet the very act of criticism implies a foundation of meaningful differentiation.  If 
this foundation is empirical then Kantians respond that the laws and faculties 
that enable empirical observation are themselves empirical evidence of 
something objective that brought them into being. 
 
The second level of response concerns the use of the empirical to test a theory 
of development.  If a theory of development is true then it should be 
consolidated by empirical observation.  If Fowler believes that the Mythic -Literal 
Stage precedes the Conjunctive and Universalist Stage then theoretically one 
would not find a child with Conjunctive and Universalist structuring tendencies.  
However, to test this one would have to avoid questions or tasks that would 
enable the rote repetition of socialised Conjunctive Stage responses.  The 
difficulty at the other end of the chronological spectrum is that seemingly 
Conjunctive/Universalist responses could be the product of specific cultural 
socialisation.  In order to empirically test the universality of the developmental 
theory it must include both cross-cultural and longitudinal data. 
 
So what is the empirical evidence for the developmentalist suppositions on 
which Fowler rests his theory?  Piaget’s empirical observations were collected 
using the clinical method involving verbal interaction between experimenter and 
participant.  The experimenter tries to identify a line of reasoning inherent in the 
participant's responses.  The predictability of such responses is seen to support 
the theory, while deviations require theoretical adjustment or alternative 
explanation.  Commentator on developmentalism, Patricia Miller notes, "The 
thousands of observations by Piaget himself, combined with the thousands of 
studies inspired by him, constitute a remarkable body of information" (1993:85).  
Similarly, while examining Fowler's theoretical assumptions Nelson and Aleshire 
(In Dykstra and Parks, 1986:199) write: 
Critics could plead the case for plausible alternative hypotheses that explain 
some of Fowler's data more precisely and systematically than the hypotheses 
forwarded in this study.  But Fowler has an interesting advantage for his case 
which the critics do not yet possess - ten to twelve thousand pages of 
transcribed data.  The best evaluation of empirical research - even tentative, 
heuristic research - is more empirical research. 
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 Fowler describes his initial empirical research in Stages of Faith (1981): "The 
empirical foundations of the theory of faith development rest upon 359 
interviews that my associates and I have conducted in the years from 1972 to 
1981" (313).  
 
Fellow developmentalists Oser and Gmünder claim of their theory of religious 
judgment: 
The stages of religious development postulated by us can be validated 
empirically.  This chapter introduces a cross-sectional research project which 
we conducted with 112 persons of different ages in the clock and watch 
manufacturing town, Grenchen, Switzerland. (1991:170) 
More recently, phenomenological approaches to epistemology have verified 
developmental hierarchies.  Dawson (Unpublished dissertation, 1998) identifies 
broad coherence between phenomenological studies (Giorgi, 1986; Marton, 
1994a; Salgo, 1979; van Rossom et al., 1985) and cognitive-developmental 
studies (17-25).   
 
Inevitably, there are differences between developmental theories.  As previously 
noted, Oser and Gmünder criticise the broadness of Fowler's theory and the 
vagueness of the concept of faith (1991:44).  This brings us to a final orientation 
and qualification of the theoretical application at hand.  While the adoption of a 
developmental theory for application to fundamentalism assumes that theory's 
value, our analysis of fundamentalism raises some important ideological 
questions.  A significant question that fundamentalism raises is: if a stage-
transition is reached and consciously rejected or retreated from (as in 
reconversion to fundamentalism) what does this mean for the assumed 
qualitative desirability of stage progression? Just as significant is the question; if 
phylogenetic ideologies can affect ontogenetic development so profoundly, how 
can one assume that the current developmental model itself is not a 
phylogenetic representation of our current epoch?  This question is perhaps 
best answered in light of an exploration of the contents of religious 
fundamentalism.   
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2.1.7   Conclusion 
 
The review, synthesis, and analysis presented in Part One has revealed the 
epistemological assumptions, the methodology, and findings of the 
developmental discourse.  It identified an interactionist epistemology 
constructed empirically by Piaget assuming the philosophical legacy of Kant.  It 
questioned the findings and assumptions of developmentalism in light of 
fundamentalist epistemologies.  The synthesis continues with a more direct 
application to fundamentalist contents and structures within the Christian 
tradition. 
 
The historical-chronological approach adopted throughout this part of Chapter 
Two has served to reveal the historical context of the epistemological conflict 
between fundamentalism, postmodernism and developmentalism.  Similarly, it 
helps the reader to examine the developmental tradition for epistemological and 
religious bias that could affect the qualitative extrapolation of Piaget’s 
essentially logico-mathematical stages by Fowler (1981), Oser and Gmünder 
(1991) and Kohlberg (1975).  This first part of Chapter Two has firmly 
acknowledged the historical dimension of the synthesis between 
fundamentalism and developmentalism. 
 
The review and analysis of religious fundamentalism in Part Two continues with 
a justification and a qualification.  The justification is that the empirical and 
philosophical rationale for developmental theory is strong enough to warrant it 
serious application.  The qualification is that "History makes every theory look 
deficient in some way" (Beilin in Miller, 1992:440).  Nonetheless, such history 
evolves dialectically with new research. 
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2.2 Approaches to Fundamentalism: The value and   
            application of a structuralist approach 
 
2.2.1   Defining Fundamentalism 
 
Introduction 
This section of synthesis and analysis examines alternative approaches to 
fundamentalism.  The purpose of this section is twofold: Firstly, it reveals the 
descriptive power of the developmental discourse to accommodate the insights 
of sociological, psychological and historical-content based approaches to 
fundamentalism.  Secondly, it provides the opportunity to define and focus 
fundamentalism through further examination of its contents, dimensions and 
dynamics.   
 
Before embarking on the process of definition it is important to reiterate the 
problems of definition.  One can never define a worldview or faith with 
exactitude.  It will always be subject to the infinite peculiarities and affectations 
of the individual bearer.   Individuals frequently use labels that do not best 
describe them and frequently apply labels that poorly describe others.  These 
are the limitations of both the temporality and inaccessibility of language.  The 
best one can do to define is to move from the clear to the abstract, the familiar 
to the unfamiliar, the core to the periphery.  In identifying the centres of a 
worldview or faith one can appreciate the relative centripetal force exerted by 
the same on its outward manifestations.  It is important to note that the further 
one extends analysis from the centres of a worldview or faith the more tentative 
this analytical grasp must be and the decreasing number of adherents it will 
represent.  
 
To step inside a particular faith along the fundamentalist - liberal religious 
continuum is usually to view all others along the continuum as essentially and 
epistemologically flawed.  This is an inevitable consequence of relative 
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 definition as encountered by Kirk Hadaway in his studies of fundamentalist and 
liberal affiliation in American denominations.   
Several denominations have gained reputations as being liberal or 
fundamentalist from being compared to their sister denominations when in fact 
on an absolute scale they may not be either particularly "liberal" of 
"fundamentalist". (Hadaway in Smith, 1987:4) 
Much of the definition of fundamentalism is determined by its response to other 
isms along the religious continuum.   
 
A second difficulty with the act of defining is its inseparability from valuation.  
The language of definition is rarely neutral.  Even the most innocuous 
definitions attract undesirable connotations in some contexts.  As author on 
fundamentalism James Barr observes, the term fundamentalism suggests 
"narrowness, bigotry, obscurantism, and sectarianism" (1977:2).  Such 
connotations are unintended in the definitive scope of this thesis.  Any truth 
behind such connotations is to be subsumed under the structural developmental 
context. 
 
A related problem of definition is the inevitability that some groups claim sole 
ownership of a label while others seek to actively disassociate from the labels 
given them (Bruce, 1984:2). Boone (1989) observes that, "many conservatives 
reject the label fundamentalist, preferring to call themselves evangelicals” (8). 
Such examples necessitate an exercise of caution.  As author, I can only 
describe the contents of any labels I use and leave the reader to determine its 
accuracy for themselves.  
 
Epistemological Definitions 
It was noted at the fore of this thesis that the fundamentalist - liberal divide 
reflected in theory - perennially different epistemological approaches.  It is from 
these epistemological centres that the particulars of each faith develop.  The 
contention of this thesis is that these epistemologies are developmentally 
significant. What then are the epistemological sign posts along this continuum? 
 
Steve Bruce in his popularised thesis, Firm in the Faith (1984) defines 
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 Christian groups according to their relative emphases on four epistemological 
sources of salvational knowledge.  These four sources are reason and culture, 
the Bible, the Church, and the Spirit.  Bruce attributes the proximate emphases 
of these sources to liberal Protestants, conservative Protestants, Catholics and 
Orthodox, Charismatics and Pentecostalists respectively (1984,5). The difficulty 
with this typology as Bruce himself notes is that some Christian groups have an 
eclectic approach to salvational knowledge. 
  
Bruce's terminology presents another dilemma of definition - whether to use 
fundamentalist as a subcategory of conservatism or, as an umbrella term 
synonymous with conservatism?  Bruce distinguishes fundamentalist from 
reformed, and evangelical, both of which he places under the umbrella of 
conservative Protestantism.  He leaves charismatics and pentecostals outside 
of this umbrella.   Before borrowing from and changing Bruce's typology it is 
perhaps useful to emphasise the dilemma by noting some other typological 
schemes.  
 
In Classifying Protestant Denominations, Smith (1987) refers to fundamentalism 
as, "a movement of conservative or traditionalist Protestant denominations that 
grew largely out of the Holiness and Pentecostal movements (and later 
denominations) of the nineteenth century" (2).  The General Social Survey 
(GSS) used by Smith draws on previous systems of denominational 
classification (see Table 4). 
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Table 4.  Denominational Classifications 
 
Study Denominational Classifications 
Wood (1970) Fundamentalist, Conservative, Moderate, Liberal 
Chi & Houseknecht 
(1985) 
Fundamentalist, Non-fundamentalist 
Johnson (1962) Fundamentalist, Liberal 
Houghland & 
Christenson (1983) 
Conservative, Liberal/Moderate 
Backman (1983) Orthodox, Orthodox with large liberal minority, Moderate, Moderate 
with large liberal minority, Liberal 
Glock & Stark (1965) Fundamentalist, Conservative, Moderate, Liberal 
McCutcheon (1985) Conservative, Not-Conservative 
Roof & McKinney 
(1985) 
Conservative, Liberal 
Roof & Hadaway 
(1979) 
Conservative, Moderate, Liberal 
Elifson & Hadaway 
(1985) 
Conservative, Moderate, Liberal 
     
Herein, it is possible to see the interchange of the term fundamentalist with the 
term conservative.  Bruce, Roof, and Hadaway use conservative while Smith, 
Glock, Wood, Chi, and Johnson use fundamentalist.  For the purposes of this 
thesis I have chosen to use fundamentalist in the tradition of Smith to 
encompass a phenomenon existent in a range of denominations including 
Pentecostal, evangelical, charismatic, and orthodox denominations.  The term 
fundamentalism also enables the insight gained through analysis of such 
movements in other religions.  A review of Marty and Appleby (1991) will 
examine fundamentalism in other religions.  This choice is made largely with the 
benefit of hindsight of its compatibility with the field of primary research 
analysed in this thesis.  
 
Review Outline 
The following conceptual synthesis examines previous descriptions and 
analyses of fundamentalism in light of the structural developmental approach 
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 of this thesis.  The purpose of such a synthesis is to provide a detailed 
description of fundamentalism, to synthesise approaches within the structural 
developmental discourse, and to clarify the definition of development as a 
criterion for value judgment of fundamentalism. 
 
The review is organised into the distinctives of approaches to fundamentalism.  
The approaches are reviewed in the following order: apologetic, ex-apologetic, 
Protestant socio-historical, multi-religious socio-historical, epistemological, 
hermeneutic, psychological (including psychopathological and 
psychoapocalyptic approaches), and developmental.  These approaches are by 
no means mutually exclusive. Herein lies the power of a structural 
developmental approach to fundamentalism.  A developmental approach 
provides a model of interaction between the psychological and socio-historical 
dimensions of fundamentalism. 
 
Figure 3.  Approaches to fundamentalism 
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Developmental psychology allows for an inclusive definition of fundamentalism.  
It is interactionist; seeking to understand the dynamic interaction between the 
psychological and the social elements of fundamentalism. Herein, 
fundamentalism is a manifestation of the interaction between socio-historical 
conditions and universal stage structures. The social and psychological 
dimensions of fundamentalism interact through the processes of 
accommodation and assimilation.  As such, fundamentalism is most inclusively 
defined in the context of psychosocial development. 
 
 
  
2.2.2 Apologetic Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
Perhaps the most enlightening approaches to fundamentalism come from those 
who embrace it and those who have left it.  The first part of this review observes 
fundamentalism from within.  What do its own apologists say that it is and how 
do they defend it?  How might a fundamentalist respond to the structural 
developmental approach to their faith?  For answers to these questions, the 
review turns to some of the most prominent advocates of the fundamentalist 
faith.  Collectively they provide a comprehensive overview of fundamentalism 
from its presuppositional apologetics to its political involvement.  They are 
quoted extensively, though often unknowingly, in popular fundamentalist and 
evangelical discourses.   Some of these advocates embrace the term 
fundamentalist while others would perhaps prefer the less stigmatised 
conservative-evangelical.   
 
Before reviewing the definitions of such apologists it is important to ask the 
question; do apologists represent the discourse of fundamentalism or do they 
represent a discourse within fundamentalism? The detail and expansiveness of 
fundamentalism is inevitably reduced to an individual's expression of it.  Such 
expression as Boone observes in The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of 
Protestant Fundamentalism (1989) is often ignorant of its own ideological 
heritage: 
Most rank-and-file fundamentalists are dimly aware, at best of J.N. Darby's 
dispensationalism, the Princeton Theology, Common Sense philosophy, or 
even what has become known as the Fundamentalist-Modernist controversy of 
the 1920s, epitomized by the Scopes Trial. (3) 
In many cases the individuals are children or adults who have never even heard 
the term fundamentalist.  Other authors encountered in this review actually 
characterise fundamentalism as the precocious repetition and unapologetic 
acceptance of creed.  As such, there are two dimensions to fundamentalism 
that must be faced in this review - a content dimension, and a psychological 
dimension.   
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Jerry Falwell, in a foreword to an edited collection of short essays (mostly 
finding fault with fundamentalism) writes:   
Yet while these critics try to be objective and seem to understand us relatively 
well, they still improperly represent some of our characteristics...Unfortunately, 
very few authors have personally interviewed fundamentalist leaders or 
travelled to do on-site research of our movement and its institutions.  Too much 
of the published material has been written from "ivory towers" and is therefore 
somewhat uninformed and distorted. (In Selvidge, 1984:7). 
What are these characteristics?  Protestant fundamentalism is a broad and 
eclectic discourse.  It is also an acutely divided movement in some of its 
practices and doctrines. 
 
A review of these authors reveals many beliefs characteristic of 
fundamentalism.  To move from the clear to abstract, a Protestant 
Fundamentalist is self-characterised by: 
• A belief in God 
• A love for Jesus and belief that he is God 
• The belief that the Bible is the Word of God 
• The belief that the Bible is inerrant and infallible 
• The belief that the world is divided into the saved and unsaved 
• The belief that people are saved by believing in Jesus 
• The belief that the saved go to heaven and the unsaved go to hell 
• The belief that human nature is essentially 'fallen' and 'depraved' 
• The belief that we cannot save ourselves 
• The belief that salvation is a gift that we obtain by believing in Jesus 
• The belief that those who do not believe in Jesus are evil, lost in sin, deceived, and 
condemned to eternal punishment 
• The belief that God is going to bring judgment on the world 
• The belief that God will save his own from the worst of his judgment 
• The belief that Jesus talks to believers 
• The belief that God answers prayer 
• The belief that evolution is a Satanic conspiracy and a lie 
• The belief in six-day creationism 
• The belief that the world is a battleground for literal demons and angels 
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 • (Evangelical and Pentecostal Fundamentalism) The belief that one must be born 
again to be truly saved 
• (Pentecostal) The belief that speaking in tongues is a sign of being born again 
• An intense suspicion and dislike of Mormons, Free-Masons, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
New Age, self-help movements, Psychology, Evolutionary Biology, Secular 
Scholarship, Secular Humanitarian organisations, The United Nations, The Catholic 
Church, Homosexuals, and Liberal Christians.  
• The belief that Jesus is going to return very soon and that current events are the 
signs of the End Times 
• The belief that moral standards are disintegrating and that the world is becoming 
more evil and chaotic as a result 
• The belief that abortion, homosexuality, prostitution, premarital sex, drug-use, 
witchcraft, and adultery are inherently evil 
• The belief that the aids epidemic and natural disasters are judgments of God 
• The belief that the authority of a husband over a wife is a divine law 
• The belief that women should not preach in Church 
These characteristics represent typical content of the Protestant fundamentalist 
discourse.  There are however, deviations in the more abstract of beliefs. They 
are beliefs derived from Scripture and its authorities of interpretation.  These 
beliefs are embraced, abstracted, and applied in ways that create characteristic 
dynamics and attitudes.  In light of the developmental approach what is more 
important than the beliefs alone, is the relationship between belief and ways of 
believing.  Fundamentalism must be understood as a discourse that admits no 
other.  It does not share insights or partial truth with other discourses, rather it 
defines itself in totality against them.   
  
  Doctrine and True Belief 
It is important to continue to pursue the fundamentalist notion of belief 
differentiated from other notions of belief.  The primary difference as fore-
mentioned is the limited scope of fundamentalist tolerance for other beliefs.  
The defining factor is that fundamentalism views the consequences for wrong 
belief in terms of a literal eternal punishment - hell.  Few other systems of belief 
are so expressively concerned with different beliefs as a matter affecting 
eternity in heaven or hell.  LaHaye (1980), Schaeffer (1968), and Rushdoony 
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 (1971) represent the world as a battleground of beliefs.  Humanism, secular 
science, and alternative religions are literally demonised.  The fundamentalist 
must fight to maintain true belief against the onslaught of a deceptive, 
manipulative and immoral society. 
 
The full title of LaHaye's book You are Engaged in the Battle for the Mind; A 
Subtle Warfare (1980) represents this sense of ideological warfare.  LaHaye 
identifies the enemy in no uncertain terms in the preface: 
An invisible enemy threatens our society.  Its name? Humanism. Its target? 
Your mind...Whether most people are aware of it or not, secular humanism - the 
philosophy that declares, "no deity will save us; we must save ourselves" - has 
been quietly woven into the fabric of our daily lives.  Yet the danger signs are 
quite evident: 
• Legislation on the national level reflects widespread acceptance of easy 
divorce, abortion-on-demand, gay rights, militant feminism, unisex facilities, and 
leniency towards pornography, prostitution and crime. 
• The public school system has demonstrated hostility toward prayer, moral and 
religious values, creation as an alternative to evolution, and the teaching of sex 
education within a moral context 
• A sexually permissive, self-indulgent approach to life has become the norm for 
movies, books, and even prime time television 
In short, many religious leaders believe that America may well follow in the 
footsteps of Sodom and Gomorrah. 
LaHaye attributes the evils of society to Humanism.  His fears reflect those of  
his mentor Francis Schaeffer.   
 
Schaeffer traces the philosophical origins of humanism in The God Who is 
There (1968).  He draws a philosophical lineage from Kant to Hegel to 
Kierkegaard and labels Kierkegaard "the first man below the line of 
despair"(21).  Schaeffer's line of despair refers to what he believes is a change 
in the concept of truth.  He begins his book with the observation; "The present 
chasm between the generations has been brought about almost entirely by a 
change in the concept of truth" (13).  Like LaHaye, he identifies the modern 
enemy of humanism as bearing the legacy of philosophical despair.  He defines 
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 humanism as, "the system whereby man, beginning absolutely by himself, tries 
rationally to build out from himself, having only man as his integration point, to 
find all knowledge, meaning and value" (17).  He sees the philosophical shift in 
the concept of truth as a battle of forces - principalities and powers: 
The Christian is to resist the spirit of the world.  But when we say this we must 
understand that the world spirit does not always take the same form.  So the 
Christian must resist the spirit of the world in the form it takes in his own 
generation...this is especially so for our generation, as the forces at work 
against us are of such a total nature...[he must become] a living warrior for 
Jesus Christ. (18-19). 
Fundamentalists perceive themselves as living in a hostile world separated in 
whole by the truth of which they are a part. 
 
Californian pastor and evangelist, Rousas Rushdoony represents the Calvinist 
challenge to modern secularism.  His writings reflect the same totality of 
association between truth and fundamentalism and falsehood and secularism 
as his contemporaries Schaeffer and LaHaye, and his predecessors J. 
Gresham Machen and Cornelius Van Til.   
 
In The One and the Many (1971) Rushdoony defines the classic fundamentalist 
epistemological dilemma of the one truth against the many: 
The differences between Christianity and atheism are basic, as are the 
differences between Buddhism and Christianity.  Russian Orthodoxy, Roman 
Catholicism, Anglicanism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism each has its 
characteristic culture or consequence in the social and political action of its own 
presupposition.  Failure to recognize that all routes to God are not equally 
valid...has extensively clouded the possibility of an intelligible answer.  The plea 
that this is a pluralistic culture is merely recognition of the problem - not an 
answer. (1) 
Rushdoony, using what has become a common fundamentalist analogy, likens 
the plight of the secular society to that of a crumbling Rome, “it is dying, but it 
continues to laugh” (365-366).  He ends The One and the Many with a call to 
reconstruct true Christianity and usher in the millennial kingdom before the 
return of Christ. 
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The fundamentalist concept of truth, and its accompanying doctrinal 
protectionism is perceived negatively by those outside the discourse as 
dogmatism.  However, the insider is constantly aware of heresy and apostasy in 
a way few believers in other systems are.   Such an acute awareness of the 
tenets of one's belief comes from the notion that belief itself determines eternal 
existence.  There is an innate suspicion of other systems of belief or 
worldviews.  Schaeffer and LaHaye believe that the “lies of secular humanism” 
keep people from heaven in a very real way.  Their assumption reflects the 
distinctive fundamentalist fear that to die without a professed belief in Christ is 
to condemn oneself to eternal hellfire.  This is a very real fear.  It 
understandably motivates the seriousness of the fundamentalist's task, the 
extremism required to carry it out, the fanaticism required to hold true in a 
hostile world, and the intolerance for relativist tolerance. 
 
Development and Fundamentalist Truth 
Developmentalism contends that there can be a strong relationship between 
contents of belief and corporeal faith in Fowler's sense.  However, as Fowler 
maintains, belief does not equal faith, it is a part thereof.  Developmentally, 
fundamentalism reflects a compartmentalised structural inability to differentiate 
between propositional beliefs and a life of faith.  Fowler asserts: 
In faith, both the 'forms' and the 'contents' exert power in shaping a person's life 
sustaining, life-guiding meanings.  Changes or blocks in either one or the other 
can have transforming (or deforming) effects on a person's faith (1981:273). 
Fundamentalism ignores the forms and exclusively embraces the contents.  
This is a tendency indicative of stages of Mythic-Literal (Stage 2) and Synthetic-
Conventional (Stage 3) faith. 
 
In Stage 2:  
Beliefs are appropriated with literal interpretations...They do not, however, step 
back from the flow of stories to formulate reflective, conceptual meanings.  For 
this stage the meaning is both carried and "trapped" in the narrative. (149) 
Because meaning is "trapped in the narrative" fundamentalists necessarily 
consider their narrative (contents) and equitable faith as the One between the 
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 many.  Similarly, at Stage 3: 
While beliefs and values are tacitly held - the person "dwells" in them and in the 
meaning world they mediate.  But there has not been occasion to step outside 
them to reflect on or examine them explicitly or systematically. (173) 
Developmentalists, Oser and Gmünder contend that the ability to step outside, 
reflects an increasing cognitive ability of reversibility, "Higher reversibility refers 
also to the increasingly more flexible capacity for processing concrete religious 
content.  So how can developmentalism explain the considerable knowledge 
and understanding of worldviews that Schaeffer, LaHaye, and Rushdoony 
demonstrate while maintaining that they are fundamentalists? 
 
The developmentalist's answer to this question is that knowledge and 
examination of other systems does not necessitate a stepping outside or 
dwelling within them.  So long as one dwells on other systems while dwelling 
within one's own, nothing has been stepped outside of.  To step outside of a 
system does not mean that one has to reject it and dwell within the other.  
Developmentally, to step outside is to appreciate that parts of the universal are 
revealed in the particulars of the other.  Fundamentalism, as represented by 
LaHaye, Schaeffer, and Rushdoony is a refusal or failure to look for the 
universal in the particular of the other.  This failure is manifest in the total 
demonisation of the other, and the metaphor of warfare, in the context of the 
belief that belief (content) on earth, alone determines eternal existence.  This 
analysis provides a point of departure to study some of these contents and their 
penultimate source - the Protestant Bible. 
 
 Fundamentalism and the Fundamentals: The Bible 
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The Bible, like the Scriptures of many other religious fundamentalisms, is a 
source of fundamentalist belief.  The Bible fills the fundamentalist form with 
content.  The notion that the Bible is in its entirety the very Word of God lends 
immeasurable intensity and activating power to the discourse.  There is no more 
behaviourally motivating belief than one assumed to have been given directly by 
an omniscient, omnipresent, and omnipotent deity.  The Bible is the bedrock of 
Christianity and the range of its interpretations is the cause of a fundamentalist-
liberal divide.  So central is the interpretation of Scripture and its nature to the 
 
 
 understanding of fundamentalism that some commentators (Boone, 1989) have 
sought to examine fundamentalism as a primarily literary phenomenon.   It is 
important then to understand the authority given to the source from which the 
doctrinal dimension of fundamentalism emerges. 
 
One may examine the fundamentalist attitude to the Bible according to its 
perceived nature and authority, as well as its method of interpretation.  The 
Bible is commonly referred to as the Word of God.  It is perceived to be the final 
authority on all matters of life and living.  It is perceived by some 
fundamentalists to be the only authority in all matters.  As such, it is necessarily 
perceived to be without error and infallible.  Most fundamentalists claim this to 
be true of the original manuscripts while some think the King James Version to 
be an equally inerrant and inspired translation.   As previously mentioned, the 
doctrine of inerrancy is largely a philosophical necessity for the fundamentalist, 
for if one part is to be found errant who may put trust in any part of the whole?  
If the Bible is penned by mortal men in fallen states of mind, how can it be 
trusted to speak the truth? 
 
Two of the most quoted advocates of the authority of the Bible in modern 
fundamentalist discourse are Josh McDowell and Norman Geisler.  McDowell, a 
former lawyer, is author of Evidence that Demands a Verdict (1979).  As the title 
suggests the book is an apologetic offering historical evidence to support the 
historicity of the Protestant canon, the literal space-time event of the 
resurrection and the Gospel miracles.  The book is prefaced with the revealing 
questions, "Is the Bible a reliable record of history?  Is Jesus of Nazareth a liar, 
lunatic or Lord?  Is the Christian faith based on a mere hoax or historical fact?". 
In a chapter titled, The Uniqueness of the Bible, McDowell expresses the 
foundational sentiments of Protestant Fundamentalism: 
The Bible should be on the top shelf all by itself.  The Bible is 
"unique"...Webster [dictionary] must have had this "Book of books" in mind 
when he wrote the definition for "unique"...Professor M. Montiero-
Williams...spent 42 years studying Eastern books and said this in comparing 
them with the Bible: "Pile them, if you will, on the left side of your study table; 
but place your own Holy Bible on the right side - all by itself, all alone - and 
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 with a wide gap between them.  For, ...there is a gulf between it and the so-
called sacred books of the East which severs the one from the other utterly, 
hopelessly, and forever...a veritable gulf which cannot be bridged over by any 
science of religious thought". (1979:15)     
Norman Geisler assumes this "uniqueness" in his scrutinous defence of the 
Bible in the Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (1999). He offers an 
unrelenting defense of Biblical inerrancy.  In an earlier work Inerrancy (1979) 
Geisler writes: 
To stray from the Scripture in faith or conduct is disloyalty to our Master.  
Recognition of the total truth and trustworthiness of Holy Scripture is essential 
to a full grasp and adequate confession of its authority. (493)    
Similarly, prominent apologist, Gleason Archer, writes in Alleged Errors and 
Discrepancies in the Original Manuscripts of the Bible: 
We must therefore conclude that any event or fact related in Scripture - whether 
it pertains to doctrine, science, or history - is to be accepted by the Christian as 
totally reliable and trustworthy, no matter what modern scientists or 
philosophers may think of it. (in Boone, 1989:25) 
The power of any text so viewed to control thinking and behaviour is profound. 
 
Geisler goes to great lengths to defend the notion of an inerrant Bible.  
 God cannot err. 
 The Bible is the Word of God 
 Therefore, the Bible cannot err. (1999:74)   
Inerrancy and the mutual concept of infallibility are essential assumptions for 
the fundamentalist who reasons; if the Bible is subject to a single error of fact - 
scientific, historical or geographical then it becomes equally subject to error in 
theology.  Geisler expresses this, "if the Bible does not speak truthfully about 
the physical world, it cannot be trusted when it speaks about the spiritual world" 
(75).  Of apparent errors, he responds with the words of Augustine, "it is not 
allowable to say "The author of this book is mistaken; but either the manuscript 
is faulty, or the translation is wrong, or you have not understood" (Augustine in 
Geisler, 74).   
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Development and Inerrancy 
Can inerrancy be understood within a developmental model?  Inerrancy and 
errancy theories tend to be reciprocally reactionary.  In developmental terms, 
the debate perhaps reflects a transitional crisis between Stage 2 and Stage 3 of 
Oser and Gmünder's developmental theory of religious judgment and a Stage 
3-4 transition in Fowler's model. 
 
Oser and Gmünder describe Stage 3 as deistic and autonomous.  It is the stage 
most likely to manifest an atheistic humanism because it may define itself as a 
rejection of the previous religious authority of Stage 2.  It also lacks the 
structural means for recapitulating the religious symbols of childhood (as in 
Fowler's Stage 4).  Arguably Oser and Gmünder's Stage 3 and Fowler's Stage 3 
and 4 are attempts to describe the same phenomenon - an emerging 
consciousness of individual identity.  In terms of religious authority of the past 
Oser and Gmünder's stage describes the capacity for its rejection due to its 
association with external authority which is now questioned.  They accept the 
equally possible tendency to "express an extreme religious conviction" (73). 
Fowler seems to describe the capacity for further engagement of religious 
authority as a means of finding identity in a group that defines itself largely on 
the rejection of other groups and therefore fulfils the emerging sense of 
autonomy.  Throughout these stages, truth is perceived as belonging 
exclusively to a particular group.  This is because truth is tied exclusively to a 
particular narrative.  As such, religious discourses are seen as "all or nothing" in 
relation to truth.   
 
Inerrancy and errancy assume such a structural view of truth.  Both assume that 
a single error destroys the validity of the whole because both view the whole 
that they possess as exclusive, in total and in part, from the other.  In Protestant 
Fundamentalism this exclusivist, dichotomous approach is reinforced by the 
view that content belief equals salvation from real suffering.  There is utmost 
trust in the human ability to clearly recognise the truth of their discourse if 
confronted with it in human terms.  This is because they do not differentiate 
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 between text and real hermeneutic difficulties of contextual interpretation.    
 
Geisler reveals the simplicity of the fundamentalist hermeneutic (and its 
congruence to developmental descriptions) when addressing the salvation of 
the heathen.  He writes: 
 God has many ways at his disposal through which he can get the truth 
of the Gospel to lost souls.  The normative way is through preachers of the 
Gospel, whether in person or on radio, TV, or some recording...Many people 
have been given a Bible, read it, and been saved.  Others have been saved 
through Gospel literature...People have free choice, and free choice is 
exercised freely.  Some will believe and some will not. (306-7)  
The assumption is that the Gospel is clearly definable, readily recognisable, 
understandable, and easy to articulate.   
 
McDowell's assumption that his evidence demands his verdict reveals likewise.  
It is difficult for a fundamentalist to accept that a person may struggle to accept 
their truth on intellectual grounds.  McDowell writes of intellectual excuses: 
The rejection of Christ is often not so much of the "mind," but of the "will"; not so 
much "I can't," but "I won't"...I have found that most people reject Christ for one 
or more of the following reasons: 
1. Ignorance...2. Pride...3. Moral Problem. (1979:10-11) 
Geisler's 841 page apologetic that seeks to defend the pure Gospel against a 
thousand erroneous versions seems testament to a problem of hermeneutic 
complexity unperceived in the errancy debate.  The defence and centrality of 
the inerrancy debate reflects a battle within stage structures bound to the 
conclusion that all truth is bound exclusively to a particular discourse. 
   
The extra burden for the Protestant Fundamentalist is that salvation from hell 
rests on the very acceptance of the whole discourse - the articulated 
acceptance of the verdict.  McDowell recounts: 
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A Moslem fellow approached me and, during our most edifying conversation, he 
said very sincerely, "I know many Moslems who have more faith in Mohammed 
than some Christians have in Christ." I said, "That may well be true, but the 
Christian is 'saved.'...Often I hear students say, "Some Buddhists are more 
dedicated and have more faith in Buddha (shows a misunderstanding of 
 
 
 Buddhism) than Christians have in Christ." I can only reply, "Maybe so, but the 
Christian is saved." (1979:4) 
Such equating of the total state of a person with their professed religious label 
(whatever partial relationship this has to their humanity) reveals a perception of 
truth limited to language and propositional knowledge alone.  Such perception is 
indicative of structuring tendencies of Stage 2 and 3 in both Oser and Gmünder, 
and Fowler's theories of development.   
 
Consider McDowell's response in light of Fowler's Stage 5 (conjunctive faith) 
and Stage 6 (universal faith) descriptions:  
[stage 5] This involves a critical recognition of one's social unconscious - the 
myths, ideal images, and prejudices built deeply into the self-system by virtue of 
one's nurture with a particular social class, religious tradition, ethnic group, or 
the like...Alive to paradox and the truth in apparent contradictions, this stage 
strives to unify opposites in mind and experience.  It generates and maintains 
vulnerability to the strange truths of those who are "other." Ready for closeness 
to that which is different and threatening to self and outlook (including new 
depths of experience in spirituality and religious revelation), this stage's 
commitment to justice is freed from the confines of tribe, class, religious 
community, or nation...[stage 6] create zones of liberation from the social, 
political, economic, and ideological shackles we place and endure on human 
futurity...Such persons are ready for fellowship with persons at any other stage 
and from any other faith tradition. 
 The provincialism of fundamentalism's propositional criteria for salvation 
disqualifies the universality and broadness of community described in these 
stages. 
 
A final word on the application of development in this section must be given to 
the fundamentalists because fundamentalism necessarily excludes Fowler and 
Oser and Gmünder's theories.  While these theorists make no mention of 
fundamentalism they are nonetheless formulated in environments where the 
fundamentalist discourse is tangible and overt.  The fundamentalist may 
legitimately claim this environment as producing bias.  Does Fowler reveal this 
bias against fundamentalism in saying: 
 in the case of Christianity, I believe that a full appropriation of the 
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 normative structuring tendencies contained in its content (the centres of value, 
the images of power and the master stories that constitute its normativity) 
moves toward the development of Universalizing faith. (1981:301-302). 
 Are Fowler, Gmünder and Oser using development as a justification of their 
own theological positions i.e. making their own commitments the penultimate 
stages and classifying those who disagree at lower stages?  Is developmental 
theory simply liberalism or relativism masquerading as science?  Or, from a 
relativist point of view, is developmentalism another claim to an objective reality 
- the Ultimate? 
 
These are legitimate questions.  It is difficult to doubt the good-intentions of 
Fowler (himself a minister) and Oser and Gmünder in formulating a theory that 
embraces all beliefs while encouraging development toward a benevolent 
centre.  However, intention has little to do with fact.  The point is raised in light 
of McDowell's contention that people reject his understanding of Christ because 
they are ignorant, proud, or have a moral problem (1979:11).  Fowler and Oser 
and Gmünder must contend that people reject their theory (a) from within a 
structure (fundamentalism) that cannot comprehend the tolerance of later 
structures, (b) because they find no evidence for an Ultimate Environment or 
centre or, (c) because they believe the empirical evidence to be insubstantial or 
misinterpreted. 
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The proof a developmentalist must offer must derive from studies, cross-cultural 
and longitudinal that reveal fundamental differences in the ways in which people 
perceive the world throughout their lifetime.  These differences then need to 
reveal a familiar and invariable sequence between participants.  There must 
then be a final leap of faith inevitable with all empirical interpretation that the 
empirical evidence is not a deception of a divine conspiracy to subvert the 
exclusiveness of fundamentalist Christianity.  This is the unanswerable 
accusation.   These questions will remain at the end of this thesis because it 
does not purport to add significant empirical evidence to the developmental 
discourse.  Its primary intention is to examine fundamentalism in light of existing 
theory.  The fit or congruency between developmental stages and 
fundamentalism could possibly be ascribed to the veiled intentions and hidden 
 
 
 agendas of Fowler in formulating his theory.   
 
The assumptions of this thesis, thus exposed are that the stage descriptions are 
supported by empirical evidence; that the descriptions were not driven or 
conceived with the intention of subordinating fundamentalism; that Fowler and 
his fellow researchers did not formulate their theory out of ignorance, pride, or 
immorality; and that no divine conspiracy is fabricating empirical data.  The 
latter is included in all seriousness in light of very real fundamentalist beliefs 
throughout history that such a conspiracy has provided other false evidences for 
theories including evolution, old earth theory, a heliocentric solar system, a 
round earth, and an expanding universe.   
 
Having reviewed the Fundamentalist approach to the Bible we may return to the 
content therein that is structured and arranged in mutual relationship with the 
stages of development. 
     
Protestant Fundamentalism: Hermeneutics and Salvation  
The fundamentalist (and others) believes that Scripture is a whole dedicated to 
the proclamation of a single Gospel: 
 Biblical authors spoke on hundreds of controversial subjects with 
harmony and continuity from Genesis to Revelation.  There is one unfolding 
story: "God's redemption of man."..."For all that, the Bible is not simply an 
anthology; there is a unity which binds the whole together.  An anthology is 
compiled by an anthologist, but no anthologist compiled the Bible." (McDowell, 
1979:16-17)   
The gospel to a fundamentalist is that Jesus Christ who was fully God and fully 
man died on a cross as an atonement for sins of which every human is guilty.  
This act of atonement is accessed only by believing in Christ.  Without 
atonement the destiny of the individual is hell.  With atonement the destiny of 
the individual is heaven.  For many fundamentalists this interpretation is 
irreducible - if you confess with your lips and believe in your heart that Christ is 
Lord, you will be saved (Rom 10:9).   Without Christ, all are lost.  The intricacies 
of this gospel lead inevitably to the familiar debates of Christian theology 
(Christology, Soteriology, Calvinism and Arminianism) and ultimately to the 
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 existence of a fundamentalist - liberal divide.      
  
For a fundamentalist, belief in Christ is evidenced primarily and sometimes 
exclusively by its articulation.  Hence the commonality of the question - "do you 
believe in Jesus" as a test of social membership.   To ask "in what sense?" or 
"what do you mean by belief?" or "in what image of Jesus" would generally be 
considered an answer in the negative.  However, this criterion of belief by no 
means guarantees recognition by a fundamentalist.  There are equally weighted 
questions, the answers to which are used to judge ultimately one's eternal 
membership in the residence of heaven or hell.  "Are you born again?", "do you 
speak in tongues?", "have you been baptised?", "do you believe that Jesus is 
coming soon?" and "have you been baptised in the Spirit" are common 
questions of Protestant Fundamentalist membership.  These questions in turn 
give rise to more, such that the hell at stake inspired passion for correct 
Christianity permeates all levels of the discourse. 
 
It is from this passion that the label of fanaticism arises.  This permeating 
fanaticism has led some commentators to use it as the primary definitive of 
fundamentalism.  Church historian Martin Marty (1987) refers to 
fundamentalism as "a worldwide reaction against many of the mixed offering of 
modernity" (299) believing that it "appeals to a rather definite class and 
personality type" (300).  Similarly, Boone (1989) discusses fundamentalism as a 
type of mindset: 
By viewing fundamentalism as a tendency, a habit of mind rather than a 
discrete movement or phenomenon, it is possible to discern a unified body of 
discourse, a body of discourse arising from belief in the sole authority of an 
inerrant Bible" (10).   
This habit of mind is marked understandably so, by the sort of doctrinal 
fanaticism that comes from the belief that one has access to the literal words of 
an omnipotent God with the foreclosed power to create, save, or damn.   
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It is the permeation of this doctrinal fanaticism that leads inevitably to divisions 
within fundamentalism.  With such a range of criteria and the passion to protect 
the manifestations of the same, differences between fundamentalists arise.  
 
 
 Churches split - each claiming an exclusive interpretation of Christianity that will 
inevitably determine eternal existence.  In America alone there are over 1200 
registered Christian denominations and Christian affiliated sects (Smith, 1987).  
A number of these consider themselves to be the only true church. 
 
The interpretive framework of fundamentalism is a powerful indicator of 
developmental structures.  This central notion will be expounded later.  For now 
it is important to establish the connection between interpretation and doctrine.  
The fundamentalist hermeneutic is perhaps best described as literalist.  The text 
is taken at face value.  The simple reading is usually the correct reading.  There 
is an inherently natural meaning in the text plain to common sense. Such a 
hermeneutic is popularised in the fundamentalist cliché, "God said it, I believe it, 
that settles it!".  Such interpretive simplicity is the point of departure for many 
groups along the fundamentalist-liberal continuum.  Many evangelicals shun the 
literalist approach to Scripture opting for a contextualist, systematic or 
intentionalist interpretation.  They share with the fundamentalist an insistence 
on the infallibility of Scripture while disassociating themselves from the 
problems of literal interpretation.   
 
Results from the National Church Life Survey reveal such denominational 
affiliations with interpretive approaches.  The Survey presented in Views From 
the Pews: Australian Church Attenders Speak Out (Kaldor & Powell: 1995) 
describes three attitudes to the Bible:  
Literalists: people who believe the Bible is the word of God to be taken literally 
word for word. 
Contextualists: people who believe the Bible is the word of God which needs to 
be read in the context of the times to understand its implications for us today. 
Valuists: people who believe the Bible is a valuable book, parts of which reveal 
God's word to us or that it is a valuable book with much to teach us. (xiv) 
There is a consistent correlation on almost all issues throughout the survey 
between participant attitudes to the Bible, their denomination, and their 
response to the question.  Almost invariably a high number of similar literalist 
responses corresponds with a high number of Assemblies of God, Churches of 
Christ and Baptist responses while a high number of contextualist and valuist 
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 responses to a similar issue corresponds with a high number of Anglican, and 
Uniting Church responses.   The interpretation dilemma plagues all textual 
criticism but as Boone (1989) notes, the stakes are higher for fundamentalists, 
"because even English students need not worry about the salvation of their 
souls" (39). 
 
Before engaging the specific content of the fundamentalist discourse as derived 
from Scripture the nature of this process of derivation must be observed.  One 
must acknowledge the paradoxes and problems that literalists face. It is one 
contention that Scripture is inerrant, it is another that interpretation (even 
literalist) is inerrant.  The content of Scripture presents many problems for literal 
interpretation.  To avoid these problems the process of literal interpretation is 
necessarily selective and a matter of emphasis (Barr, 1981).  Because 
fundamentalism can admit no error or contradiction in Scripture it must resort to 
selective emphasis or holistic interpretation.  It is a tendency and necessity of 
literalist interpretation never to admit contradiction but always to argue due 
emphasis.  However, such emphases often seem to be affected by external 
socio-cultural variables. 
 
The inevitable socio-cultural differences between fundamentalist churches 
cause divisions of Scriptural emphasis between such churches.  These divisive 
Scriptural issues include the wearing of head-coverings, the type of music 
played, the role of women in leadership, the consumption of alcohol, tithing, 
speaking in tongues, words of prophecy, interpretation of prophecy, 
millennialism, demonology, sexuality, baptism, and the use of the Sabbath - to 
name but a few.   The sheer range and diversity of fundamentalist churches and 
practices is testament to the problem of simple and literal interpretation.  
Literalists often disagree over exactly what the simple literal interpretation of a 
scripture is.   
 
James Barr author of Fundamentalism (1981) rejects the literalist label for 
fundamentalists on the grounds that fundamentalists constantly change their 
hermeneutic to protect the inerrancy of Scripture.  This is no doubt true as both 
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 Barr and Boone provide ample evidence.  The term literalist used herein refers 
to a mindset which insists that, objective absolute truth is revealed in detail 
through language in a way that it perceivable by commonsense, requiring little 
interpretation. 
 
This mindset often manifests itself in the authoritarian leadership of 
fundamentalist churches.  The pastor or preacher may be seen to have a 
mandate for the commonsense interpretation of Scripture.  If Scripture is 
inerrant then the interpretative ability of the fundamentalist's preacher must be 
able to be inerrant in order for the first supposition to be of any significance.   
This necessity has perhaps led to the fundamentalist tendency to attribute an 
almost divine sense of authority to particular preachers and teachers.  In 
popular discourse such preachers and teachers are said to be, "anointed" or 
"inspired" alluding to the status of Old Testament prophets who claimed to 
proclaim the very words of God. 
 
The empires and audiences of fundamentalists such as Pat Robertson, Jimmy 
Swaggart, Jim Baker, Oral Roberts, Jerry Falwell, and Kenneth Copeland are 
testament to the fundamentalist need for authoritative interpretation of Scripture.  
Similarly the success of Hal Lindsey's The Late Great Planet Earth which sold 
over 18 million copies, outselling all books except the Bible in the decade of the 
1970s reveals a public hunger for authoritative Scriptural interpretation.  
Lindsey's book interprets Revelation as a literal portrayal of current affairs 
signaling a literal apocalyptic end to civilisation.   
 
 Protestant Fundamentalism: The Bible and the Fundamentals 
Having recognised both the notion of divine authorship and literal 
(commonsense) interpretation of Scripture common to fundamentalism one may 
begin to examine specific Scriptural contents permeating the discourse.  
Perhaps the most common contents are found in The Fundamentals written 
between 1910 and 1915.  These volumes expounded essential fundamentalist 
beliefs including the virgin birth, atoning death, bodily resurrection, miracles, the 
second coming of Christ, and Scriptural inerrancy (Marsden, 1980:118-123).   
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 While these basic beliefs are shared by many Christians, it is the nature of 
believing that distinguishes fundamentalists.  There is a difference between 
perceiving the beliefs in a static creedal sense as a basic prerequisite for 
individual salvation and seeing the beliefs as powerful explanations for powerful 
experiences and traditions.  It is the difference between trivialised knowledge 
and empowered understanding. 
 
The virgin birth, the bodily resurrection, hellfire, the second coming, Scriptural 
inerrancy, atonement, the Trinity, and miracles have become the cliches of 
fundamentalism.  Cliches may be powerful explanations of experiences or 
principles in action.  Presumably cliches come into being because they resonate 
with a popular psyche.  However constant repetition becomes habit and habits 
tend to become over familiar and lose their original meaning or intent.   
Metaphorically, the cliché becomes empty.  This principle points to an initial 
epistemological assumption of this thesis - that language is the ultimate symbol.  
To protect the language of belief for its own sake is to idolise it.  It is also a point 
of departure to engage some other distinctive biblical literalisations of the 
fundamentalist worldview - original sin, heaven and hell, the work of Christ, and 
the nature of God.  Before embarking on such a venture it is important to state 
and focus intentions for doing so.  The purpose of this thesis is not to enter 
theological debate, rather it is to understand in developmental terms the 
psychology which may lead to theological debate.   
   
Understanding of Sin 
Original Sin with all its implications is a deeply entrenched part of the 
fundamentalist worldview.  It is a notion carried throughout the Old and New 
Testaments.  The most familiar text creating this concept is Genesis Chapter 3 - 
known popularly as, The Fall of Man.  In the Genesis story of The Fall, man and 
woman are deceived into rebellion against God.  They are expelled from full 
communion with God and sin and death enter the world.  The literal 
interpretation of the preceding Genesis creation stories are seen as absolutely 
necessary to this understanding of sin. 
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 The fundamentalist believes that any watering down or symbolic understanding 
of the creation account(s) undermines the notion of Original Sin and thus of the 
unfolding of the Gospel.  It is a moot point as to whether there is a relationship 
between the literal understandings of early stage structures and the inability to 
recognise symbolic interpretations of creation accounts.  There are too many 
variables in this debate to discuss it adequately here.  Needless to say the total 
permeation of a literal understanding of the Genesis accounts are advocated for 
the identification with a fundamentalist worldview (Deckard & Sobko, 1998).  
 
The references of Paul most familiar to the fundamentalist discourse expand 
this notion of sin and death.  In Romans 5:12 Paul links sin to death, "Therefore, 
just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in 
this way death came to all men, because all sinned". Similarly in Romans 6:23, 
"For the wages of sin is death".  Paul emphasises the sinfulness of all people in 
Romans 3:10, "There is no one righteous, not even one" and Romans 3:23, "for 
all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God".   The fundamentalist 
canonisation and understanding of these passages forms a foundation for later 
theological constructs.  They are quoted frequently to defend what is known in 
Calvinistic terms as the total depravity of man.  At the base of the 
fundamentalist worldview is a humanity that is at its core - fallen, depraved, 
sinful, and rebellious.   The said consequences of such a human state reveal 
the fundamentalist doctrine of heaven and hell. 
 
Understanding of Heaven and Hell 
Heaven and hell are the quintessential examples of fundamentalist literalisation.  
All action, all inaction, all living and dying are reduced in the fundamentalist 
worldview to an exclusive, individual and eternal experience of heaven or hell.  
The rift between the two is impassable beyond death, hence the fundamentalist 
antagonism to the notion of purgatory.  There is no room for exception in the 
fundamentalist vision of judgment.  Christian apologist and prolific writer 
Norman Geisler makes the fundamentalist position clear in his Baker 
Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (1999).  He argues for the existence, 
necessity, horror, and eternity of hell, evidencing his arguments under the 
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 following headings: 
Jesus Taught the Existence of Hell...The Bible Teaches That There Is a 
Hell...God's Justice Demands a Hell...God's Love Demands a Hell...Human 
Dignity Demands a Hell...God's Sovereignty Demands a Hell...The Cross of 
Christ Implies a Hell...Hell Will Last as Long as Does God...Hell Will Last as 
Long as Heaven Does...Reasonableness of hell. (310-315) 
Geisler's work is widely quoted in fundamentalist circles.  He represents the 
academia of latter twentieth century fundamentalist theology along with authors 
such as Josh McDowell, Francis Schaeffer, C.S. Lewis, R.C. Sproul, Frank 
Morris, and Tim LaHaye.   
 
It is necessary and important to make the distinction between fundamentalist 
doctrine and fundamentalism as defined here. This point will be explored later 
but it is suffice to state here that the definition of fundamentalism contained 
herein is as much concerned with the how of believing as with what is believed.  
There is inevitably a connection but it is a connection explored in this broader 
context.  While not all of these authors would self apply the label of 
fundamentalist or perhaps even like to be listed in the company of each other, 
their writings contribute strongly to the rhetoric and maintenance of the 
fundamentalist discourse. 
 
The conventional passages used to reinforce the rhetoric of heaven and hell 
include Matthew 25:41, "Then he will say to those on his left, 'Depart from me, 
you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels.'"; 
Revelation 20:15, "If anyone's name was not found written in the book of life, he 
was thrown into the lake of fire."; Luke 16:23-24, "In hell where he was in 
torment he looked up and saw Abraham far away, with Lazarus by his side.  So 
he called to him, 'Father Abraham, have pity on me and send Lazarus to dip the 
tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, because I am in agony in this 
fire.'"; Matthew 10:28, "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill 
the soul.  Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body in 
hell." In Protestant Fundamentalism, those who 'accept Christ as Lord and 
Saviour', while on Earth go to Heaven for eternal communion with God, those 
who do not, go to Hell for eternal punishment.   
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Acceptance of Christ is understood as most evidenced by its verbal 
proclamation using specific words. As previously noted, perceived acceptance 
is often subject to a variety of other criteria including speaking in tongues, and 
Baptism.  The essential criteria rarely focus on morality or behaviour because 
this would amount to the heresy of salvation by works.  The result is that the 
fundamentalist understanding of saving faith becomes far more knowledge 
based and creedal than behavioural or ethical.  Salvation to a fundamentalist is 
individual, instant, measurable, and final.  It is a rescuing from the 
deservedness of eternal punishment.  Salvation to a liberal is contextual, 
evolutionary, immeasurable, and dynamic. It is a centering of life, progressively 
leaving behind the hellish consequences of living detached and removed from 
the nature of God. Each core view is implied in a periphery of popular 
expressions. 
 
The expressions capturing the core of the fundamentalist worldview include 
such lines as, "where would you go if you died tonight - heaven or hell?", the 
popular fundamentalist T-shirt captions - turn or burn, and hell ain't cool, the 
labelling of fundamentalist preachers as fire and brimstone, the familiar phrase, 
burden for the lost, popular fundamentalist media such as the Australian play, 
Hells flames and Heaven's Gates, the evangelical film Burning Hell, and 
testimonies of instant and dramatic conversion.  These are a tiny representative 
example of core belief in popular expression.  It is a contention of this thesis to 
be later explored that such fundamentalist expression is self-perpetuated at the 
level of popular expression and seldom critically examined at the core.     
 
Understanding of God 
The God of the fundamentalist is anthropomorphic.  He (the first 
anthropomorphic instance) is understood literally in human terms.  At its 
simplest, such a view is of a God as a large physical person with the qualities 
and attributes of the same, extended to include some more supernatural 
abilities.  There are many points of entry for a Christian along the development 
continuum from literal anthropomorphism to symbolic representation.  The 
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 definition of fundamentalism herein is concerned with the former end of the 
continuum as more descriptive of fundamentalist thinking.  
 
Describing the God of fundamentalism is a difficult if not impossible task.  This 
is because (as is the principle contention of this thesis) the language used for 
such descriptions may be understood in different ways. The fundamentalist and 
the liberal both may characterise the deity with love but what is meant, evoked, 
and felt by the term love may be different to both.  Similarly, one may malign the 
fundamentalist's God as hateful while neglecting the response that such hatred 
is of hate itself and a necessary element of love.  To seek to define the 
fundamentalist's concept of God with any accuracy one must place a tentative 
faith in the commonness of sense evoked by the terms of definition. This 
assumes a particular audience.  With this caution in mind a brief definition may 
be attempted.  
 
The God of the fundamentalist is male and masculine, authoritarian and 
judgmental, fearsome and protective.  He is a God of love but also of a 
righteous hate extending to the fallen nature of the humans he created, "Yet I 
have loved Jacob, but Esau I have hated" (Mal.1:2-3). He is a God who in his 
perfect knowledge has chosen some and not others.  He is a God who in his 
justice and by necessity of pure character sends people to heaven and to hell.  
The fundamentalist's God is a God of paradox.  He teaches humans to love 
enemies and not to resist an evil man while vanquishing the enemies of his 
chosen and threatening the wicked with hell.  He offers salvation from sin to all 
knowing that sin itself will prevent many from being able to hear or respond to 
the offer.  These, he has not chosen.  He is the author of all things but not the 
author of evil.  He is a righteous God but righteousness is that which is God.  
Fundamentalism has a voluntaristic view of God - something is good because 
God wills it. God's will is known only through Scripture.  If God sees fit to 
punish, to hate, to love, to show mercy as revealed in Scripture then these 
things are good.   
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 As such, fundamentalism defends its aggression against all that it is not.  All 
other belief is deception.  All other notions of God are false.  All who are not 
saved are eternally lost.  As previously mentioned a necessity of any belief held 
to be true is that that which contradicts it cannot be so.  The price of heresy in 
the fundamentalist mind is eternal and irrevocable punishment.   
 
Understanding of Christ 
For the fundamentalist Christ is the rescuer.  He alone, through a necessary 
death and vicarious suffering paid the price of sin which had previously 
separated God from humanity.  Not by example, but by a single act of death on 
a cross in space and time, Christ bridged the otherwise impassable chasm of 
original sin, thus reconciling God and man.  Reform theologian R.C Sproul cites 
as the inspiration for his apologetic Grace Unknown (1997) a popular hymn by 
Isaac Watts (1707): 
Alas! And did my Savior bleed? 
 And did my Sovereign die? 
 Would he devote that sacred head 
 For such a worm as I? 
 
 Was it for crimes that I have done 
 He groaned upon the tree? 
 Amazing pity grace unknown! 
 And love beyond decree! (Watts In Sproul: 217) 
It is one example of a multitude of texts embracing this understanding of Christ 
and reinforcing the fundamentalist discourse: 
 
The culmination of fundamentalist and orthodox theology is expressed in these 
lines - that believing Christ (who is God) died to save sinful humans from the 
wrath of God makes this true for the believer.  The non-believer's ignorance or 
rejection of the same leaves them to live out the deserved and eternal 
consequences of their fallen state.  The inerrancy and infallibility of Scripture, 
the doctrine of sin and of heaven and hell, and the concept of God coordinate in 
the construction, defence, implications, and outworking of Protestant 
Fundamentalism.   
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Fundamentalism is a real, coherent, and cohesive worldview.  It affects the 
affective and experiential dimensions of faith in powerful ways.  Does 
development result in a restructuring of the contents of this faith? Those most 
qualified to answer are perhaps those who have experienced both ways of 
perceiving (structuring) the content of Christianity.  They offer a glimpse of 
fundamentalism with the benefit (and bias) of hindsight.    
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 2.2.3  Ex-apologetic Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
If developmental theory is valid then it is impossible to circumvent the 
structuring tendencies underlying fundamentalism.  Nor is it desirable, for these 
structures are not discarded, they are absorbed.  An individual's expression of 
faith beyond the structures synonymous with fundamentalism will reflect a 
period of transition from the same to some extent.  This is most pronounced in 
individuals who have lived in environments where faith is clearly articulated in 
religious forms and the community is defined by its form and content of faith.  If 
fundamentalism represents a socially self-perpetuating stage/s of faith then the 
few individuals who leave fundamentalism while remaining in the broader 
religious discourse may offer insights into the process of change.  The task of 
the developmentalist is to see if such attributions for change correspond to 
stage descriptions formulated beyond the particular fundamentalist context. 
There is a significant body of literature representing such changes.  Australian 
author, Marlene Winell explores the after-effects of psychological conditioning 
experienced by ex-fundamentalists in Leaving the Fold: A Guide for Former 
Fundamentalists and Others Leaving their Religion (1993).  Edward Babinski 
compiles accounts of ex-fundamentalists in Leaving the Fold: Testimonies of 
Former Fundamentalists (1995). Exiled Episcopalian Bishop, John Shelby 
Spong, and official Presbyterian heretic Peter Cameron offer their own insights 
in Here I Stand (2000) and Fundamentalism and Freedom (1995) respectively.  
While these authors represent a variety of discourses on the religious spectrum 
most have exited Protestant Fundamentalism through a liberalisation of their 
Christianity.  When referring to the Christian faith beyond fundamentalism I 
have used the term Christian liberalism.   
 
The term Christian liberalism is fraught with difficulties because of its range of 
expression and the stigma attached to liberalism.  I use the term relative to 
fundamentalism in order to examine the characteristics of those who have left 
fundamentalism and chosen to remain in the broader Christian discourse.  
Similarly I have chosen not to use evangelicalism because of its attachment to 
fundamentalism in some literature (Barr, 1981; Bruce, 1984; Winell, 1991). 
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Christian liberalism is by nature more difficult to define than Christian 
Fundamentalism.  Its nebulousness is often seen as a lack of cohesion and 
hence as a weakness in the world of creedal, organised and proactively 
evangelistic Christianity. Bernard Reardon notes, in his introduction to the 
historically definitive Liberal Protestantism: 
The word "liberal" is notoriously vague; it can mean more or less, as the case 
may be, and when applied to Christianity covers a wide variety of opinion as to 
the truth and value of traditional teachings. (1968:9) 
At the outset it must be recognised that there are many who passively apply the 
label liberal with an understanding excluded by the definition expounded herein.  
The structural developmental context of this thesis warrants a more 
psychological approach to a definition of liberalism than an historical approach.  
However, before engaging this approach it is worth noting some of historical 
archetypes of liberalism. 
Viewed as an historical movement, liberalism began in Europe after the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.  Roland Stromberg's account of liberalism in 
Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth Century England (1954) recognises the 
period from 1690 to 1740 as one of critical tension between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy (1).  The ensuing Age of Reason perhaps created an environment 
for a more organised and institutional liberal movement: 
Men (sic) could write boldly on what had long been forbidden save in secrecy.  
For denying the Trinity, people had been executed but a century before.  They 
were now free to follow where speculation might lead them. (9) 
The serious challenge science and reason posed to traditional revelational 
epistemologies of orthodoxy encouraged a reinterpretation and sometimes 
consequently a renunciation of traditional dogmas. 
The challenge of reconciling the new Reason with the revelation of Christ (and 
all the implications therein) was accepted by many liberal Christian thinkers 
across Europe and America during the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.  The doctrinal diversity of these thinkers exacerbates the process of 
defining liberalism in doctrinal terms.  However, a brief recount of their thinking 
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 will serve to evidence a more developmental understanding of liberalism. 
In Liberal Protestantism (1968) author Bernard Reardon offers a biographical 
exploration of liberal thought.  For all the difficulty of finding doctrinal cohesion 
between his biographies they nonetheless provide evidence of a common 
genesis of liberal thinking - a willingness to explore perennial truths with new 
words in light of new experience and new knowledge in order to grasp these 
same truths more deeply.   This is a thesis to be returned to later using a 
structural developmental approach.  Of immediate interest is the rhetoric of 
Reardon's selected liberals that first estranged them from the conservative fold 
and then (sometimes posthumously) identified them as liberals of their day.   
 
Reardon identifies Albrecht Benjamin Ritschl as belonging to the "the 
spearhead of the liberal Protestant movement" (1968:20).  Ritschl, born in Berlin 
in 1822, sought to defend the uniqueness of Christ and the Christian experience 
while being "ready to cut loose from traditional positions in order to impart to 
Christian theology a new aspect, suited to the age" (Reardon, 1968:34).  In his 
The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation (1870) Ritschl traced 
the historical development of doctrine, laying the groundwork for his own 
polemic in Theology and Metaphysics (1881) (in Reardon, 1968).  The legacy of 
Ritschl's thought was furthered by the Ritschlian School of thinkers from 1874 
beyond 1879 (34).  Ritschl was undoubtedly orthodox compared to some more 
modern liberals choosing to describe themselves as Christian.  His liberalism is 
recognisable in the context of a far more orthodox and conservative society 
steeped politically and culturally in the traditions of Reformed Christianity. 
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French liberal, Jean Reville (1854-1907) described liberals as those who "found 
their beliefs on free inquiry and moral experience" (in Reardon: 51).  F.W. 
Newman, brother of the more famous, John Henry Newman offered an early 
voice for English liberals in his Phases of Faith (1850) claiming that, "to set up 
any fixed creed as a test for spiritual character is a most unjust, oppressive, and 
mischievous superstition" (52).  The liberal reluctance even to fix the notion of 
God in a creed is evident in other sources.  
 
 
  
In the latter half of the nineteenth century Matthew Arnold challenged the 
traditional Protestant notion of God by conceiving him as a stream of tendency.  
R.J. Cambell, minister of the Methodist City Temple in London defined God in 
The New Theology (1907) as "the mysterious Power which is finding expression 
in the universe, and which is present in every tiniest atom of the wondrous 
whole" (55).  Other liberals challenged the transcendent view of God. 
J.F. Bethune-Baker (1961-1951), professor of divinity at Cambridge was an 
advocate of immanentist theology, "The historic process of human experience is 
God's own experience" (56).  Hastings Rashdall, echoed such immanentist 
sentiments in his Christology in Philosophy and Religion (1909):  
...we have recognised that in a sense God dwells in and reveals Himself in 
Humanity at large, and in each particular human soul...If God can only be 
known as revealed in Humanity, and Christ is the highest representative of 
Humanity, we can very significantly say 'Christ is the Son of God, very God of 
God, of one substance with the Father." (in Reardon:57) 
L.P. Jacks (1860-1955) takes Rashdall's Christology a step further by making 
the term Christ synonymous with an enigmatic "fellow worker in the pursuit of 
Eternal Value...If (one) chose to call it Christ, or more simply the Spirit, I should 
not quarrel with him" (in Reardon:58).  In each voice there is a willingness to 
reinterpret, to explore truth and experience of God beneath transient words. 
 
The liberal movement in America was initiated by William Ellery Channing and 
popularised in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emmerson (1803-1882).  Channing 
shunned the doctrine of justification as a "whittling down of man's (sic) 
responsibility as a moral agent" (59).  Similarly, Emmerson accentuated the 
importance of moral responsibility encouraging the individual to seek 
redemption through an original journey unhampered by preconceived 
theological models, "even those which are sacred in the imagination of men" 
(59).  Such original journey's of faith do little for the doctrinal cohesion of liberal 
theology. 
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 New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann continued to challenge traditional 
theistic notions of God throughout the twentieth century as he demythologised 
Gospel texts in The History of the Synoptic Tradition (1968) and New 
Testament and Mythology (1985).  Bultmann's historical criticism added weight 
to the earlier notions of Alfred North Whitehead.  In Process and Reality (1929) 
and Religion in the Making (1927) Whitehead offered a conception of God as a 
divine process rather than an external being.   
 
Theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, imprisoned by the Nazi Party during World War 
II wrote the material for the edited Letters and Papers from Prison (1972).  In 
these papers Bonhoeffer proposed a religionless, nontheistic Christianity.  
Similarly, Paul Tillich, a refugee from Nazi Germany conceptualised God as the 
Ground of Being - more immanent and internal than traditional theistic 
conceptions.  Tillich's works are quoted extensively by modern liberals such as 
Bishop John Shelby Spong.  Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion in the 
University of Cambridge, Don Cupitt continues to challenge traditional theistic 
notions of God with his explorations into the constructions of theistic language 
(1987).  Cupitt seeks to redesign for a 'structurally democratic, creedally 
minimalist, and consistently libertarian' church (1989: Cover). 
 
It is apparent that concrete doctrine is a weak starting point for defining 
liberalism, suffice to say that a lack of value on dogma and doctrine is one of its 
defining features.  Liberalism in each of the above cases seems to reflect a 
desire to rediscover meaning lost in the self-perpetuating language of creeds.  
Before one has a desire to transcend creed, move deeper into the same, or 
seek to rediscover old intentions lost in the dynamic complexities of language, 
one must at some point recognise the inadequacy of a model once held to 
describe a reality now lived.   It is this inconsistency that perhaps drives the 
liberal to redefine, reinterpret, and sometimes to reject.  There is also the 
realisation of one's own ignorance, a partial acognosticism born of an 
understanding of the at once powerful and inadequate symbolic function of 
language.   All this is against the certainty, absolutism, and provincial cohesion 
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 of fundamentalism.  It is a clash of worldviews that finds ample expression in 
the works of modern liberals.  An examination of the thoughts of such modern 
liberals will serve finally to locate this definition of liberalism in a current context. 
Episcopal Bishop and Harvard lecturer, John Shelby Spong is perhaps both the 
most popular and controversial liberal of the new millennium.  His prolific 
populist writings have made him the unofficial spokesperson of liberal Christians 
in an America with a strong fundamentalist heritage.  Spong's more popular 
works Rescuing the Bible From Fundamentalism (1986), Why Christianity Must 
Change or Die (1998), and his autobiographical Here I Stand (2000) offer a 
clear expression of liberal identity.  Before exploring Spong's own liberal 
theology it is important to re-emphasise the primary purpose of such exploration 
as being to highlight the theology's genesis from more basic developmental 
structures. 
Spong's Why Christianity Must Change or Die  (1998) is an elaboration of  
Twelve Theses under the title, A Call for a New Reformation.  These theses are 
as follows: 
1. Theism, as a way of defining God, is dead.  God can no longer be 
understood with credibility as a Being, supernatural in power, dwelling above 
the sky and prepared to invade human history periodically to enforce the divine 
will.  So, most theological God-talk today is meaningless unless we find a new 
way to speak of God. 
2. Since God can no longer be conceived in theistic terms, it becomes 
nonsensical to understand Jesus as the incarnation of the theistic deity.  So, the 
Christology of the ages is bankrupt. 
3. The biblical story of the perfect and finished creation from which human 
beings fell into sin is pre-Darwinian mythology and post-Darwinian nonsense. 
4. The virgin birth, understood as literal biology, makes the divinity of Christ, as 
traditionally understood, impossible. 
5.  The miracle stories of the New Testament can no longer be interpreted in a 
post-Newtonian world as supernatural events performed by an incarnate deity. 
6. The view of the cross as the sacrifice for the sins of the world is a barbarian 
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 idea based on primitive concepts of God that must be dismissed.  
7. Resurrection is an action of God, who raised Jesus into the meaning of God.  
It therefore cannot be a physical resuscitation occurring inside human history. 
8. The story of the ascension assumed a three-tiered universe and is therefore 
not capable of being translated into the concepts of a post-Copernican space 
age. 
9. There is no external, objective, revealed standard writ in Scripture or on 
tablets of stone that will govern our ethical behaviour for all time. 
10. Prayer cannot be a request made to a theistic deity to act in human history 
in a particular way. 
11. The hope for life after death must be separated forever from the behaviour-
control mentality of reward and punishment.  The church must abandon, 
therefore, its reliance on guilt as a motivator of behaviour. 
12. All human beings bear God's image and must be respected for what each 
person is.  Therefore, no external description of one's being, whether based on 
race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, can properly be used as the basis 
for either rejection or discrimination. (Summarised in Spong, 2000:468-469) 
Spong justifies and clarifies his claim to be a Christian in the epilogue of Why 
Christianity Must Change or Die by stating his own creed: 
I believe that there is a transcending reality present in the very heart of life.  I 
name that reality God. 
I believe that this reality has a bias toward life and wholeness and that its 
presence is experienced as that which calls us beyond all of our fearful and 
fragile human limits. 
I believe that this reality can be found in all that is but that it reaches self-
consciousness and the capability of being named, communed with, and 
recognised only in human life. 
I believe that heaven, the domain in which this reality has traditionally been 
domiciled, is not a place but a symbol standing for the limitlessness of Being 
itself. 
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 I believe that this realm of heaven is entered whenever the barriers that seem to 
bind human life into something less than that for which it is capable are set 
aside. 
  I believe in Jesus, called Messiah or Christ. 
I believe that in his life this transcendent reality has been revealed so 
completely that it caused people to refer to him as God's son, even God's only 
son... 
I believe that Jesus was a God presence, a powerful experience of the reality of 
that Ground of Being undergirding us all at the very depths of life.  (1999:220-
221) 
Spong's reinterpretation of the Apostolic Creed and his theses against  
Orthodoxy are tied closely to his understanding of the function and limitations of 
language.  The existence of such a connection between linguistic 
understanding, faith, and structural development is a foundational assertion of 
this thesis.  As such it will be analysed and expounded in more detail in a later 
chapter.  However Spong's own observations on this relationship provide a lucid 
introduction to this concept of language and liberalism.  Speaking of the New 
Testament narrative Spong states: 
It was an interpretation based upon the theistic concepts of God present in that 
era of human history.  The language employed the vocabulary of a premodern, 
non-scientific world.  There was no other alternative for processing the God 
experience in the first century of the common era.  That interpretive language 
was then incorporated into our creeds, our liturgies, our prayers, and our 
theological concepts.  It is this language that has become all but nonsensical.  
The frame of reference that produced those understandings of reality has 
disintegrated. (1998: 222-223)  
Spong continues, expressing what in many forms is an understanding 
motivating many liberal thinkers: 
The words, the concepts, and the theological reasoning by which they 
interpreted their experiences have all become empty and meaningless.  To 
reject that interpretive language was inevitable, but to reject the interpretive 
language is not to deny the power of the experience. (225) 
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 Spong's understanding of the interpretive problem of religious language is 
echoed in the writings of another liberal author - Dr Peter Cameron. 
 
Dr Peter Cameron came to Australia as principal of St Andrew's College in the 
University of Sydney.  In 1993 he was convicted of heresy by the Presbyterian 
Church and removed from his position.  In response Cameron wrote an account 
of this period titled Heretic, Necessary Heresies (1993) and his polemical, 
Fundamentalism and Freedom (1995).  Cameron is aggressive in his attack 
against fundamentalism.   
I don't share the currently fashionable approach among liberal academics, 
which is to be as charitable and conciliatory as possible, and to stress the pure 
motives of the Fundamentalist and even the positive contribution which 
Fundamentalism has made to modern society. (1995:3) 
Cameron allocates the weight of his writings to the debunking of 
fundamentalism.  In the latter chapters of Fundamentalism and Freedom  
responses to questions he is commonly asked provide an insight into the nature 
of his liberal-labelled beliefs.  These beliefs may be explored, likened to 
Spong's, and used to construct the working definition of liberalism used herein 
under the understandings of the Bible, God, Christ, and sin. 
Understanding of the Bible 
Liberal Christianity emphasizes the existence, experience and knowledge of 
God and Truth as preceding and exceeding the Bible.  Carl Jung puts this view 
succinctly when he states, "God stands, omnipotent and free, above His Bible" 
(in Cameron, 1995:131).  God is a priori to Scripture and accessible apart from 
Scripture.  This is a significant conceptual departure from a fundamentalist 
understanding of the same.  For the fundamentalist, access to God (in the 
salvific sense) is exclusively through Scripture.  The logical extension of this 
concept is that one cannot be a Christian (and therefore have relationship with 
God) without access to the very words of Scripture.  The logic is that one cannot 
act what one does not believe and believe what one cannot articulate. 
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 Cameron uses the analogy of the law courts.  fundamentalism sets the Bible as 
the statute on which all laws are to be interpreted.  Naturally the establishment 
of early precedents affects later interpretation.  The statutes are not questioned 
in and of themselves.  They are non-negotiable absolutes.  By analogy 
fundamentalists do not question the authority of Scripture.  Its absolute and 
exclusive authority is ultimately arrived at by faith, attestation to its historical 
accuracy, and its own internal claims to inspiration. 
The liberal extension of this analogy views the statute as a result rather than a 
beginning.  To reveal the analogy in Cameron's own words, "It is therefore 
much more honest... to see the Bible as result rather than beginning." 
(1995:132).  The process of which the Bible is a result is a very human process, 
subject to the confines of language, the particulars of individual experience and 
culture, limitations of knowledge, and the peculiarities of context: 
In fact, then, the Bible is a collection, a human collection, of very human 
response to the divine, and it is precisely because of its human characteristics 
that it can mean so much to us.  If it really were literally the word of God it would 
be unintelligible to us, just as divine music would be meaningless to human 
ears.  To speak or behave, therefore as the Fundamentalist does, as if 
Christianity is a question of responding to the Bible, is to fail to do justice to 
what the Bible is - it is itself response. (1995:134) 
Bishop John Shelby Spong echoes such conceptual understandings in 
Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism and Why Christianity Must Change or 
Die.  He questions the Bible as an unquestionable statute and finds its 
traditional literal applications as law and precedent, lacking relevance and form 
in a modern context: 
 The Bible is not the word of God in any literal or verbal sense...The 
Gospels are not inerrant works, divinely authored.  They were written by 
communities of faith, and they express the biases of those communities...They 
reveal changing, evolving theological perspectives...Next, we need to be 
prepared, when we actually read the texts of the New Testament, to discover 
that there is an enormous gap between the theological claims that have been 
made for Jesus in the life of institutional Christianity and the record that was 
actually contained in the Gospels. (1995:72-3) 
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 For the definitive purposes of this thesis it is necessary to summarise and 
simplify this conceptual difference between fundamentalist and liberal 
perspectives of the Bible.  In essence, for the fundamentalist, the Bible is the 
exclusive beginning of a relationship with God for all humanity whereas for the 
liberal, the Bible is the humanly subjective result of a relationship with God.  The 
former negates other expressions of relationship; the latter embraces other 
expressions of relationship. 
Understanding of God 
An understanding of God is central to the identity of Christian faith - indeed any 
faith, though many would prefer not to use the word God for all its cultured 
connotations.  A.W. Tozer expresses such sentiment in The Knowledge of the 
Holy: 
What comes into our minds when we think about God is the most important 
thing about us. The history of mankind will probably show that no people has 
ever risen above its religion, and man's (sic) spiritual history will positively 
demonstrate that no religion has ever been greater that its idea of God. (11) 
The liberal understanding of God is necessarily linked to its understanding of 
the Bible.  If the Bible is understood as an enculturated response to the divine 
as Cameron and Spong attest then the liberal concept of God is always more 
cautious, more basic, more universal, more symbolic than the literal and 
descriptive definitions of the fundamentalist.  Indeed it is the effect of this 
cautiousness that is most criticised by the fundamentalist.  It lends itself to a 
passive agnosticism or more particularly a sort of ineffectual acognosticism.  
This is an important criticism to be discussed later.  For now, it is duly noted to 
contextualise the following definition. 
The God of the fundamentalist is concrete and anthropomorphic. He is known 
by the literal descriptions of Him in the Bible.  The God of the liberal is "the 
inescapable centre and depth of all that is" (Spong, 1998:70).  In the words of 
Tillich, God is best conceived of as the Ground of all Being.  Cupitt claims that 
the word God is inextricably linked to the "archetype of the jealous, angry 
Father" (1989:87).  His reinterpreted concept of God is as "the medium in 
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 which we live and move and have our being, the dance of signs" (88).  Liberal 
theologian Peter Cameron writes, "It has been said that God cannot be 
expressed, but only addressed.  I'm not sure that he can even be addressed: 
only embraced" (1995:211).  Liberal theology perceives God as closer, more 
immanent, more inextricable, inseparable, and foundational to life than 
Orthodox Christianity allows.   
Liberal theology led by feminist reflections continues to question the masculine 
notion of the fundamentalist God: 
The fundamental feminist question about the maleness of God in the imagery, 
symbolism and concepts of traditional Christian thought and prayer leads to 
new reflection on the doctrine of God. (Carr, 1993:223) 
Carr calls the masculine understanding of God a 'tradition analogical 
understanding that 'stresses the similarity between human concepts and God's 
own selfhood' (1993:223).  She advocates a metaphorical theology that: 
"Should focus rather on the God-human relationship and on the unlikeness of all 
religious language in reference to God even as it affirms some similarity" (223). 
In structural developmental terms the masculinisation of God is the result of 
Mythic-Literal structures arresting development into metaphorical 
understandings through the institutionalisation of an idea.   At this point the 
dichotomy between fundamentalist and liberal understandings seem vast 
enough to pose the question: In what sense is liberal Christianity - Christian?  
Understanding of Christianity 
Spong poses this obvious question in Why Christianity must Change or Die:  
But can Jesus be understood apart from that interpretive theistic context?  Has 
not Christianity continued in our day to set such doctrines as the Incarnation 
and the Trinity at the very centre of its life?  Can Jesus be lifted out of this 
ancient theological context and still be Lord or Christ for anyone? (1998:71) 
Liberalism seeks to reconstruct Christology after the process of deconstruction 
and demythologising enabled by historical criticism of the Gospels and early 
Orthodox Christianity.  The fundamentals of fundamentalism (The virgin birth, 
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 the transfiguration, the incarnation, and even the bodily resurrection of Christ) 
are powerful but enculturated symbols to the liberal. To believe these as literal 
truths does not ensure access to eternal salvation, rather an understanding of 
the construction of these mythologies points to an ethic and a truth powerfully 
known and lived in the minutiae of life.  This is the essential difference between 
a fundamentalist and a liberal Christology.   
Cupitt succinctly reveals this difference in understanding between conservative 
and liberal Christology in Radicals and the Future of the Church (1989): 
 The crucial point about the Trinity...is just how far the full co-equality and 
co-eternity of the Second and Third Persons is an invitation to 
demythologize...the full coequality and coeternity of the Son means that 
everything in the Father is, the Son is also.  And when the Son completely and 
irrevocably commits himself to becoming human then God has become human, 
without remainder.  So everything that God is, this fellow human being beside 
me now is. (87-88)  
In fundamentalist understanding Christ is spiritually separate to all humanity - 
the perfect sacrifice for all alone worthy of worship first for who he was. In liberal 
understanding Christ is a reflection (even the most perfect reflection) of God in 
every being, leading the way to worship first for what he did.   These two 
perspectives could perhaps be reconciled logically but as products of different 
structures they are the expressions of worlds apart. 
 
And so the Gospel of Jesus Christ for a liberal Christian is embedded in all 
humanity.  It is the existential affirmation of purpose beyond both self and death 
guided by unconditional love and all of its extended implications.  It is the sort of 
Gospel understood by St Francis of Assisi, "Go out and preach the Gospel, and 
if you must, use words".  It need not be articulated, to exist or to bring freedom.  
Belief as articulated propositional knowledge is after the fact.   
Understanding of Sin 
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Another significant difference between fundamentalist and liberal understanding 
centres on the notion of sin.  For a fundamentalist sin is understood primarily as 
depravation, "All have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3:23). 
 
 
 The moral corruption of the human condition is not reconcilable with the purity 
of God.  Such depravity necessitates punishment.  All are deserving of the most 
eternal punishment for rebellion against God.  Salvation is through the penal 
substitution, the vicarious sacrifice of Christ on the cross.  To receive this 
salvation one must understand it.  One cannot understand unless one has 
heard the Gospel.  If one does not hear the Gospel then one was not (in the 
wisdom of God) chosen to be saved.  This is the inevitable conclusion of a 
Calvinistic fundamentalism based on a very literal and canonical interpretation 
of select passages including the aforementioned Romans 10:13-15: 
Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved.  How then, can they 
call on the one they have not believed in?  And how can they believe in the one 
of whom they have not heard?  And how can they hear without someone 
preaching to them?  And how can they preach unless they are sent? (NIV, 
1983:2046) 
It is in this context and against this definition that the liberal understanding of sin 
may be generalised as emphasising deprivation rather than depravation. 
 
Sin viewed as deprivation emphasises pity ahead of punishment, compassion 
ahead of retribution, ignorance ahead of intention, and remorse ahead of guilt 
while maintaining the severity of sin's effects and its absolute opposition to the 
character of God.  Nineteenth century theologian and prolific author, George 
MacDonald exemplifies the liberal view insisting that Christ came to save 
people from their sins, and not from the punishment for their sins: 
Christ died to save us, not from suffering, but from ourselves; not from injustice, 
far less from justice, but from being unjust. (in Raeper, 1987:252) 
 MacDonald recognised the ideological power of the doctrine of vicarious 
sacrifice and penal substitution calling it: 
 ...a mean, nauseous invention, false and productive of falsehood...It is 
the meagre, misshapen offspring of the legalism of a poverty-stricken 
mechanical fancy, unlighted by a gleam of the divine imagination...Better the 
reformers had kept their belief in purgatory, and parted with what is called 
vicarious sacrifice. (In Raeper, 252)  
MacDonald despised the Victorian notion of hell as the ultimate deterrent from 
sin.  His notion of hell was as a place of purification, not of punishment.     
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Spong echoes these sentiments in a chapter entitled Jesus as Rescuer: An 
Image that has to go from his book Why Christianity Must Change or Die 
(1998).  Spong incorporates MacDonald's notion of penal substitution under the 
doctrine of atonement - the view that the death of Christ was necessary for the 
restoration of God's work after the fall of creation into the original sin.  He 
identifies the manifestation of the academic theology of the cross in such 
common expressions found in fundamentalist discourse as: 
Jesus died for my sins.  He shed his precious blood on the cross of Calvary for 
my salvation.  I have been washed in the blood of the Lamb.  Through the 
sacrifice of Jesus, I have been saved.  The stain of sin on my soul has been 
cleansed. (1999:83-84) 
The liberal, as defined in fullest expression by the likes of Spong and Cupitt, 
perceives sin as a lack of wholeness, a necessary evil from which we "struggle 
to become our deepest and truest selves" (Spong, 1998:97).  The liberal view of 
salvation therefore is of a predictable process of cause and effect girded 
definitively by God, the Ground of Being.  The liberal's view of salvation is of a 
far more mundane and holistic evolution of self relative to the instantaneous 
salvation of fundamentalism through conversion and the experience of being 
born again.   
 
Summary 
Liberalism has been defined factoring its perception of the Bible, its 
understanding of God, its Christology, and its concept of sin.  These factors are 
inextricably linked.  They by no means constitute an exclusive list of liberal 
tendencies.  They do however form a core that gives meaning to the periphery 
of the liberal discourse.  
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Liberalism as defined herein, can never be equated exclusively with a set of 
doctrinal propositions.  However, the logical outworking of its structure will 
favour some contents and oppose others. Doctrine is a means to an end and 
not an end in and of itself.  Doctrine, as that which is articulated and believed 
enables reflection.  Doctrine exists in relationship with other forms of knowledge 
and action.  It is not the source of all knowledge and action.   
 
 
  
The definitive factor of liberalism is its discrimination between the symbol and 
symbolised.  Its doctrinal propositions are expressed in close relation to this 
understanding.  Unless the doctrinal outworking of liberalism is based on this 
discriminative ability they may just as easily be held with a fundamentalist 
mindset.  This dynamic and interdependent relationship between doctrinal 
contents and the ways in which they are held and understood is a central 
understanding of Christian liberalism as defined in this thesis. 
 
This exists in contrast to fundamentalism as formerly defined.  The contents of 
fundamentalism lend themselves to the subordination of all forms of 
understanding.  Fundamentalist belief is static, content based and exclusive.  
Liberal belief is dynamic, form based, and reconciliatory.   Fundamentalists view 
liberals as holding contaminated beliefs.  Liberals see this contamination as 
rather the recognition of common experience with different expressions (the 
universal in the particular) mixed with a degree of cognitive humility. 
 
Development, Structure and Content in liberalism and 
fundamentalism 
The remaining questions concern the interaction between structure and content 
in the process of development.  Can liberal contents be held 
fundamentalistically and vice-versa?  Can a child be a liberal in the definitive 
sense of this thesis?  The anticipated answers to these questions are "yes" and 
"no" respectively.  The following discussion provides the foundation for an 
answer. 
 
As noted in the thesis rationale the relationship between contents of faith and 
structures of faith is multidimensional and infinitely complex.  To say that such a 
relationship did not exist would be to deny a basic premise of structural 
development.  To say that the relationship was totally and absolutely 
interdependent would be to ignore the biological, maturational facets of 
development and to surrender oneself to a theory of pure socialisation.   
However, consistent with Fowler's structural developmental discourse it may be   
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 acknowledged that, "...readiness for structural change is in part a function of 
biological maturation and of psychosocial, cognitive and moral development" 
(1981:276).  Fowler divides the contents of faith affecting and affected by  this 
structural change, into three areas: centres of value, images of power; and 
master stories (276).  For the purposes of this section the discussion will be 
confined to master stories of fundamentalism and liberalism. 
 
Master stories, "are the characterizations of the patterns of the power-in-action 
that disclose the ultimate meanings of our lives" (Fowler, 1981:277).  In the 
context of fundamentalism master stories are expressed formally in creed and 
theology.  The master stories of liberalism are less developed and less 
structured. Liberalism is process definitive rather than content definitive.  
Liberalism shares as powerful symbols the literal truths of fundamentalism.   
The underlying structural difference between the two necessitates a difference 
in the relative willingness of each to use particular contents in particular ways 
for particular purposes.  In principle, structures filter master stories.  They 
emphasise some contents, reject others for fear of misinterpretation and loss of 
symbolic power, and develop comfortably and qualitatively within others. 
 
Fowler exemplifies this principle within the Christian tradition succinctly without 
exploring it in detail: 
Within a given faith tradition, say Christianity, appropriations of the Christian 
story and vision will be shaped in important ways by the structural stage of the 
theologian or community doing the appropriating.  The apocalypticism of Hal 
Lindsay's The Late, Great Planet Earth organizes the content of Christian faith 
in a way designed to appeal most to Mythic-Literal or very early Synthetic-
Conventional faith.  Robert Schuller's television preaching and writings 
represent a presentation of culture-Christianity aimed dominantly at Synthetic-
Conventional listeners.  C.S. Lewis's apologetic writings aim, if I am an accurate 
judge, to bring sophisticated agnostics and conventional Christians to decide for 
commitment to Jesus Christ understood in the framework of an Individuative-
Reflective faith.  James Cone's early theology aimed at calling Synthetic-
Conventional black Christians into self-awareness and passionate solidarity for 
justice in terms of Individual-Reflective commitments. (1981:301) 
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 Each of these people represents different stage structures within the meta-
narrative (story) of Christianity.  The problem is that the bearers of earlier 
stages may well question the theological legitimacy of the bearers of latter 
stages and the latter the maturity of the former. 
 
The above reflection provides the context for an answer to the initial questions: 
can a child be a liberal Christian; and can liberal contents be held 
fundamentalistically and vice-versa?  The answer to the first is no inasmuch as 
it is unlikely for a child to have developed formal operations.  This assumes an 
holistic definition of liberalism - broader than belief.  A child socialised in a 
liberal context may well articulate liberal statement beliefs.  This anticipates an 
answer in the affirmative to the second question.  As beliefs are the tip of the 
holistic paradigmatic iceberg they may well be poor representation of what lies 
beneath.  There are more reasons (beyond actually believing something) for 
saying that something is believed.  Having given these answers it is necessary 
to maintain that structures do lend themselves to particular beliefs assuming 
that these beliefs are understood in fullness of their symbolism rather than by 
the rote and repetition of socialisation.  
 
While fundamentalism as affiliated with Mythic-Literal and early Synthetic-
Conventional structures lends itself to the latter (the rote and repetition of 
socialisation) it is important to note that there are limited channels for 
development within the emphasised contents of fundamentalism.  Fowler calls 
these "Adult versions".  In speaking of societies 'untroubled by the issues raised 
by pluralism' he writes: 
Undoubtedly in such societies adult persons construct dimensions and 
directions of richness within the structural frames of the Intuitive or Mythic styles 
that children in societies that sponsor movement to later stages never develop. 
(1981:299) 
This is a caution not to oversimplify the stage-content relationship within 
fundamentalism and liberalism.  Such a caution provides an appropriate 
conclusion to this conceptual synthesis. 
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 To repeat and expand the central thesis, fundamentalism may be 
conceptualised as a manifestation of early developmental structuring 
tendencies within the socio-religious context of a meta-narrative.  A meta-
narrative is a metaphysical belief system able to subordinate all other contents.  
Social dynamics characteristic of fundamentalist communities, and mechanisms 
maintaining cognitive consonance tend to perpetuate stage equilibrium and 
arrest further development. 
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 2.2.4    Protestant Socio-Historical Approaches to  
           Fundamentalism  
 
The socio-historical approach to Protestant fundamentalism traces its origins 
and development in space-time.  It is a focus on the particulars of a 
fundamentalism rather than a derivation of underlying particulars that could be 
generalised to identify other fundamentalisms.  Such treatments are essential, 
because they provide detail and concrete examples of content, without which 
theory cannot be generated of effectively substantiated.   
 
James Barr's, Fundamentalism (1981), George Marsden's, Fundamentalism 
and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth Century Evangelicalism 
(1980) and Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (1991), and 
Ernest Sandeen's The Roots of Fundamentalism: British and American 
millenarianism, 1800-1930 (1970), each provide historically descriptive 
accounts of a Protestant fundamentalism focussed on a particular epoch in 
American history. Such historical definitions of Protestant Fundamentalism tend 
to trace its progress throughout the twentieth century identifying historically 
definitive events. Such events include the publication of the Scofield Reference 
Bible in 1909 and The Fundamentals between 1910 and 1915.  Similarly, the 
Evangelical Revivals, the Scopes Trial of 1925, the televangelist empires, and 
fundamentalist movements such as Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority and Pat 
Robertson's 700 Club are primary concerns of the historical approach.  These 
examples of fundamentalism are linked by their common genesis from a belief 
in Biblical inerrancy, and consequent distrust of modernity.   
 
Fundamentalism with a capital F, was coined in America during the second 
decade of the twentieth century.  In 1910, a group of Princeton Presbyterians 
issued five fundamental dogmas for the Christian faith: (1) the inerrancy of 
Scripture, (2) the Virgin Birth of Christ, (3) Christ's atonement on the cross for 
sin, (4) the bodily resurrection of Christ, and (5) the objective truth of miracles.  
The five dogmas were in part a reaction to the increasing voices of the liberal 
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 Protestant movement. Between 1910 and 1915 the dogmas were reinforced 
when conservative theologians produced a series of twelve pamphlets known 
as The Fundamentals.  Financed by oil millionaires Lyman and Milton Stewart, 
nearly three million copies of each pamphlet were distributed to clergy, 
academics, and theology students in America.  The Fundamentals provided a 
rallying point for the conservatives against the perceived evils of modernism, 
liberalism, the so called higher criticism, and perhaps the most notorious of all - 
Darwinism. 
 
Fundamentalism, recognised as such, was a reactionary movement to the 
modernism of the 1920s.  It began as a movement between evangelical 
Christians deeply convinced of a spiritual crisis in American culture.  The 
movement spread to embrace a number of traditions including evangelicalism, 
pietism, millenarianism, Reformed confessionalism, Baptist traditionalism, and 
revivalism.  George Marsden in Fundamentalism and American culture 
observes that: 
Fundamentalism was a "movement" in the sense of a tendency or development 
in Christian though that gradually took on its own identity as a patchwork 
coalition of representative of other movements.  Although it developed a distinct 
life, identity, and eventually a subculture of its own, it never existed wholly 
independently of the older movements from which it grew. (1980:4) 
Marsden's observation supports the use of fundamentalism as encapsulating a 
movement common to many denominations.  Modern Christianity seems too 
eclectic to separate totally the dimensions and dynamics of fundamentalism 
from evangelicalism or Pentecostalism.  This is certainly the case (to be made 
in detail later) in the school community studied.  This community served as a 
melting pot for many Protestant traditions. 
 
The modernism and secularisation to which fundamentalism was a response, 
was identified in several mutually dependent forms.  The theory of evolution, the 
relativisation of morality, and the modernism of biblical criticism were the 
primary social evils targeted by fundamentalists.   
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 The fundamentalist reaction was expressed in twelve paperback volumes 
published between 1910 and 1915.  The volumes known as The Fundamentals 
were authored by an array of conservative scholars from both America and 
Britain.  On completion, three million individual volumes were distributed.  The 
Fundamentals was composed of articles dedicated to the defense of Scripture, 
traditional apologetics, and polemics against various modern isms 
(Marsden,1980:120).  These documents provide an historical starting point for a 
description of the Protestant Fundamentalist movement.  To cover this history is 
not the intention of this thesis.  What is of primary importance are the principles 
on which the socio-historical authors of fundamentalism have defined the 
movement.  Do these principles conform or deviate from developmental 
descriptions?  What problems do they pose for the developmental discourse? 
 
George Marsden's Fundamentalism and American culture (1980) and 
Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism (1991) are the products of 
his intensive studies of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s.  His treatment of 
fundamentalism enlightens the developmental understanding. 
 
Marsden differentiates between fundamentalism and evangelicalism.  He 
describes this distinction somewhat poetically by quoting Jerry Falwell's own 
slogan, "a fundamentalist is an evangelical who is angry about something" 
(1991:1).  Marsden deals with the two movements separately as is necessary 
when applying definitions as they have been used historically.  The 
developmental definition of fundamentalism focusses more on its theological 
and psychological intersection with evangelicalism. Cohen (1988) contends, 
that a fundamentalist is an evangelical who takes their biblical beliefs to their 
logical literal extremes.  Falwell's slogan is subtly revealing of fundamentalism's 
tendency to see evangelicals as too moderate, or not realising the full 
implications of Scripture.  In developmental terms, Shinn (In Selvidge, 1984) 
argues that: 
Fundamentalism manifests characteristics of stage 3.  In a more enlightened 
form or phase, commonly called evangelicalism, it manifests a few of the 
characteristics of stage 4.   (92)  
A developmental approach perceives Marsden's socio-historical movements 
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 (as he calls them) as phylogenetic manifestations of a stage transition within the 
Christian tradition. 
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 2.2.5  Multi-Religious Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
Adding strength to the theory of structure interacting with faith, is the significant 
body of work identifying fundamentalism as a multi-religious phenomenon. In 
Fundamentalisms Observed (1991), Marty and Appleby edit a collection of 
accounts of fundamentalisms from Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, 
Confucian and Sikh traditions.  What are the common characteristics that 
inspire such a project?  How do these characteristics support or problematise 
the developmental approach? 
 
Marty and Appleby defend the use of the term fundamentalism: 
No other coordinating term was found to be as intelligible or serviceable.  And 
attempts of particular essayists to provide distinctive but in the end confusing 
accurate alternatives led to the conclusion that they were describing something 
similar to what are here called fundamentalisms. (1991:viii) 
The introductory chapter characterises fundamentalism as fighting back, fighting 
for, fighting with, fighting against, and fighting under (ix-x).  Marty and Appleby 
conclude their substantial volume with the chapter, An Interim Report on a 
Hypothetical Family.  Throughout this chapter they collate the characteristics of 
the fundamentalisms observed.   For the convenience of review, each 
characteristic is italicised and then discussed in relation to the developmental 
approach. 
 
Religion of the community is the irreducible basis for communal and personal 
identity (817).  Revealed truth is whole, unified, and undifferentiated (818). 
Fundamentalisms seize upon particular historical moments, matched to sacred 
texts and traditions, and interpreted according to an uncanny calculation of time 
and space (819):  The epistemology of Piaget's concrete operational stages is 
concrete, absolute and centrated (Miller, 1993).  Such thought is intolerant of 
different or other particulars (fundamentalisms) because it cannot differentiate 
its own from the whole of truth.      
 
Absolutist literalist hermeneutic (819), Containing dramatic eschatologies (819), 
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 Fundamentalisms arise or come to prominence in times of crisis, actual or 
perceived (822):  As discussed in a later section, commentators approaching 
fundamentalism from a psycho-apocalyptic perspective (Strozier, 1994; Halsell, 
1989) note its characteristic literalisation of apocalyptic literature.  Such literal 
interpretations of the apocalypse perpetuate a sense of imminent danger and 
crisis in which fundamentalism thrives.  Marty and Appleby, themselves note the 
connection:   
The richly symbolic and connotative scriptural descriptions of the Final Age are 
often reduced by fundamentalists to denotative blueprints of the order to come, 
demystified in the service of detailing the concrete plan of action required for 
socio-political ends. (837) 
As evidenced in a later section on hermeneutic approaches to fundamentalism, 
the literalist hermeneutic is a distinctive of concrete operational text-type-
perceptions (Oser and Gmünder, 1991:158). 
 
Fundamentalists name, dramatise and even mythologise their enemies (820): 
The demonisation of the other serves to distance encounters and perpetuate 
the myth in the absence of evidence. Fundamentalists set boundaries, protect 
the group from contamination, and preserve purity (821): The demonisation of 
enemies and the boundaries and mechanisms of self-protection serve to isolate 
fundamentalist communities from encounters necessary to facilitate the 
developmental aspects of social awareness and perspective-taking.  Such 
isolation and demonisation arrests development in these aspects. 
 
Fundamentalists seek to replace existing structures with a comprehensive 
system (824):  Fundamentalism applies the particulars of its revelation or 
enculturated authority as a total ideology.  This is synonymous with the 
episodic, narrative-dramatic, and system felt meanings of early stage world 
coherence in which participants do not differentiate between the ultimate and 
the particular.  
 
Reaffirm old doctrines as ideological weapons against a hostile world (826), 
Charismatic and authoritarian male leaders (826), Mass appeal of 
fundamentalism (830):  Fundamentalism reflects mass submission to textual, 
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 or human (text-interpreting) authority.  The submission to traditional, 
charismatic, or male authority (as reasons for submission) is indicative of early 
stages of the developmental aspect - locus of Authority.  The stages are 
characterised by attachment dependence relationships based on size, power, 
visible symbols of authority (charisma?), and incumbent acceptance of authority 
roles. 
 
The treatment of fundamentalism in diverse religions raises an important 
developmental issue.  The issue serves to highlight the developmental 
understanding imputed throughout this thesis.  There are two types of 
fundamentalists in the popular sense.  It is a contention of this thesis that the 
broader base of fundamentalists reflect early stages of development.  This is 
the group that adheres to the contents and particulars of its faith because it 
knows no other way.  A second group of fundamentalists, are those who have 
glimpsed the developmental crisis of identity that universalisation can bring.  It 
is a glimpse of the "vortex of nihilism" that Boone (1989) alludes to.  In faith 
development terms, some experience the temporary alienation and 
hopelessness of relativism as permanent, and retreat to the security of the 
particular with renewed conviction.  They have not recapitulated their contents 
through more developed structures, they have retreated to their contents, 
unwilling to restructure.  It is a transitional crisis resolved by regression to 
equilibrium.   The importance of the distinction is the recognition that 
fundamentalisms are real responses to real crises on both ontogenetic and 
phylogenetic levels.   The total rejection of the particular, from which the latter 
group retreat, is perhaps as developmentally arresting as the absolute and 
exclusive acceptance of the particular.  
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 2.2.6  Epistemological Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
An interesting approach to fundamentalism seeks cohesion and explanation in 
terms of competing epistemologies. Karen Armstrong (2000) represents this 
approach most extensively while other researchers (Bruce 1984; Momen, 1992) 
have utilised it briefly.   
 
Moojan Momen, explains the dichotomy between fundamentalism and 
liberalism in terms of cognitive styles.  Momen (1992) describes fundamentalist 
cognition as convergent, field-independent, objectivist and absolutist, in relation 
to a liberal cognition that is divergent, field-dependent, subjectivist and relativist. 
Such interpretation is absorbed in the developmental approach with the 
distinction that the capacity for divergent thought is a characteristic of a 
developing mind.  However, divergent thought does not replace convergent 
thought.  Developing structures incorporate, rather than discard the capacities 
of structures underlying fundamentalism.  
 
Steve Bruce, examines divisions between Christian movements as allegiances 
to different sources of salvific knowledge (1984:5).  He associates each group 
with its proximate source of authority.  Liberal Protestantism is proximate to 
reason and culture.  Conservative Protestantism is proximate to the Bible.  
Catholic and Orthodox Christianity is proximate to the Church.  Charismatic and 
Pentecostal movements are proximate to the Spirit.  The epistemological 
division is insightful.  In developmental terms, the Church, the Bible, Culture, 
and the Spirit respectively, possibly represent competing phylogenetic 
representations of complementing and developing ontogenetic epistemologies. 
   
Religious commentator Karen Armstrong's most recent work, The Battle for 
God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (2000) combines a 
multi-religious historical definition of fundamentalism with an epistemological 
approach.  Armstrong describes the existence of a dynamic tension between 
mythos and logos motivating the fundamentalist reaction to modernity.  Mythos 
concerns matters of meaning rather than practicalities.  It is concerned with the 
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 "origins of life ... the foundations of culture and ... the deepest levels of the 
human mind" (xiii).   Logos concerns "rational, pragmatic, and scientific thought 
... [it] must relate exactly to facts and correspond to external realities if it is to be 
effective" (xiv).  Armstrong's concepts of mythos and logos represent alternative 
epistemologies and hence serve to combine historical and epistemological 
definitions of fundamentalism. 
 
Armstrong's epistemological treatment of fundamentalism seems more 
sociological than psychological.  Her concepts of mythos and logos seem to 
operate more as social facts than individual states of consciousness.  Her 
discussion of the social manifestations of mythos and logos is compatible with 
and enlightening of the developmental approach.  A core contention of this 
thesis has been that ontogenetic development may be manifested and captured 
in phylogenetic socio-historical forms that in turn affect ontogenetic 
development.  History is in part a developmental dialectic between stages of 
development (Oser & Gmünder, 1991).  Armstrong's epistemologies reflect 
stage capacities - mythos develops before logos: 
Unlike myth, which looks back to the beginnings and to the foundations, logos 
forges ahead and tries to find something new: to elaborate on old insights, 
achieve a greater control over our environment, discover something fresh, and 
invent something novel. (2000:xv) 
Armstrong's valuation of both epistemological types serves to enlighten the 
developmental metaphor.  Development is not independently successive, it is 
dependently incremental.  In Fowler's terms, the universal and the particular are 
of equal importance - they exist symbiotically.  In Cohen's terms, non-fantasy 
and fantasy are not mutually exclusive.  In Armstrong's terms, the mythos and 
the logos are "both essential...regarded as complementary ways of arriving at 
truth" (xiii)".  The developmental nature of this relationship is a core 
understanding of the thesis. 
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 2.2.7   Hermeneutic Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
Protestant fundamentalism has been described as the outworking of a particular 
hermeneutic.  Is this justifiable? Does it challenge or support a developmental 
approach?  
 
Kathleen Boone, author of The Bible Tells Them So: The Discourse of 
Protestant Fundamentalism (1989) explores fundamentalism as a textual 
approach or text centred reading practice.  Boone argues that the 
fundamentalist approach to all forms of narrative is predominantly literal:  
Ask anyone what distinguishes fundamentalist interpretation from that of other 
Bible readers, and you are likely to be told that fundamentalists take the Bible 
literally.  Asked what that means, fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist alike 
will agree that literalistic reading is based on "common sense," with hidden" or 
"deeper" meanings rejected in favor of the "plain" or "obvious" sense. (1989:39)   
She goes on to define such literal interpretation as containing the assumptions 
that any verse may shed light on and be linked to another, and that the Bible "is 
a repository of rational propositions and empirical information".  Coupled with a 
belief in inerrancy and infallibility fundamentalism is antagonistic to Higher 
Criticism - historical criticism, form criticism and redaction criticism. 
 
James Barr explores this fundamentalist hermeneutic in considerable detail.  He 
contends that fundamentalism is selectively literalist and therefore equally 
relativist.  He maintains that what is distinctive about fundamentalism is 
inerrancy, which it maintains with an alternating hermeneutic. 
Boone attribute Barr's explanation to the fact that his study of fundamentalism 
was focussed on scholarly evangelical intellectuals (45).  The distinction is 
important in developmental terms. 
 
Developmentalists Oser and Gmünder (1991) claim that "Each developmental 
stage provides a different frame for comprehension, interpretation, and change" 
(140).  They observe a trend of text-type-perception in studies of Bible text 
interpretation, noting that: 
166
 
 
 Elementary school pupils perceive parables as "mere stories," while students 
on the verge of Piaget's formal-operational stage of cognition exhibited the 
ability to interpret the texts properly according to their literary type, i.e., as 
parables. (158) 
The evidence for such stage specific hermeneutics comes from the fields of 
literary aesthetics and developmental semiotics (155).  Developmental theories 
posit the concretisation of text perception in early stages.  The contextual forms 
of text are not recognised as such.  A child or a second language speaker may 
not recognise the context of a subtle joke or figure of speech, instead taking it 
literally or seriously.  
 
Boone's assessment of the fundamentalist hermeneutic reflects this point: 
Thus, when fundamentalists champion the truth of scripture, they do so by 
exploiting the popular assumption that myths or fables cannot be "true".  
Similarly, their literalistic interpretation of tropes reflects the even more popular 
assumption that the concrete sense of a passage is its true sense. (47)  
Perhaps the most substantiating claim to the fundamentalist hermeneutic 
comes from America's most prominent fundamentalist - Jerry Falwell: 
Ask an Evangelical whether or not he believes there are flames in hell, and after 
a thirty-minute philosophical recitation on the theological implications of eternal 
retribution in light of the implicit goodness of God, you will still not know what he 
really believes.  Ask a Fundamentalist whether he believes there are really 
flames in hell and he will simply say, "Yes, and hot ones too!"  (in Boone:47) 
The developmental contention is that their respective answers or reticence to 
answer has much to do with their stages of ontogenetic development and the 
phylogeny of which they are part.  The former sees the concreteness of 
language describing hell while the latter questions the intention of the concept 
of hell in the gospel narrative. 
 
Scholarly fundamentalism-evangelicalism is caught in a hermeneutic trap.  If it 
concedes the non-literality of one text held traditionally to be literal (i.e. the six-
days of Creation) then it exposes itself to the ridicule of "common-sense" 
fundamentalists.  Such scholarship is bound by its presuppositions to protect 
the authority and inerrancy of Scripture.   Thus, it is caught between the 
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 expectations of traditional literal interpretations and the inevitable need to re-
interpret some of these understandings in light of incontrovertible evidence 
rendering literal interpretation impossible - all the while protecting the inerrancy 
of text.  This plight is further problematised by the need to maintain that the 
gospel is clear to all, plain for all to see, and in the words of Paul - that God is 
not the author of confusion.    
 
The popular fundamentalist uses Scripture in a way that is often suspect to the 
scholarly fundamentalist.  The developmental conundrum for the latter is this: if 
sound doctrine, formulated by a sound hermeneutic is the surest outward sign 
of salvation then those who have the structural tendency to interpret Scripture 
otherwise are not assured of their Salvation.   Under the weight and 
seriousness of salvation this hermeneutic becomes elitist.  Bound by inerrancy 
to a deterministic, positivist, one-dimensional interpretation, somewhat ironically 
different churches divide sharply as to what that interpretation is.  Perhaps, 
such division is testament to a developing hermeneutic.   
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 2.2.8    Psychological Approaches to Fundamentalism  
 
There are several approaches to fundamentalism that may be classified as 
adopting a psychological discourse.  Cohen's theory of synergistic mind-control 
(1988); Vogt's pathological analysis (1995); and Winell's psychotherapeutic 
approach (1993) represent unity and diversity within the psychological 
discourse. Each of these approaches serves to shed light on a developmental 
approach. 
 
Edmund D. Cohen introduces The Mind of the Bible-Believer (1988) with his 
general thesis of Evangelical Christianity in the context of psychology: 
Despite the concentration of emphasis on the Bible in what follows, this is 
essentially a psychology book.  My contention is that the Bible is history's most 
successful psychological manipulation, achieving with uncanny facility what 
motivational researchers and psychological warfare experts of our own day 
have only dreamed of. (7)  
Cohen is content to use Evangelical Christianity where I have used 
fundamentalism because he sees all Bible-based Christianity as leading to 
pathology. 
 
In essence, Cohen sees fundamentalism as a form of evangelicalism that is 
truer to the assumptions and Biblical basis that evangelicalism holds.  The basis 
for his uncompromising treatment of Bible-based Christianity is the pathology he 
contends it breeds.  In evidencing this contention, Cohen quotes Conway and 
Siegelman's study on cults: 
Of forty-eight groups in our study...more than thirty...had emerged out of 
fundamentalist or other branches of conservative Christianity.  Moreover, these 
thirty Christian sects combined ranked higher than the most destructive cults we 
studied in terms of the trauma they inflicted upon their members.  Long-term 
effects included emotional problems such as depression, suicidal tendencies 
and feelings of guilt, fear and humiliation, and mental disorders such as 
disorientation, amnesia, nightmares, hallucinations and delusions. (in Cohen: 
164) 
Cohen identifies two reasons for the pathological effects of Bible-based 
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 Christianity and seven devices of mind control. To understand and critique his 
two reasons and seven devices in the context of developmentalism one must 
first understand Cohen's definition of a healthy and normative psychology.   
 
According to Cohen, a healthy, normal psychology is characterised by 
"productive use of fantasy to come to terms with non-fantasy" (152).  He uses 
non-fantasy to avoid the stigma of positing a reality.  He identifies a basic 
human teleological drive to come to terms with the non-fantasy.  This drive is 
facilitated and enabled through cognitive freedom to interrelate the experiences, 
events, stories, and images of life.  There is a distinct similarity between 
Fowler's description of the coordinating function of faith and Cohen's necessary 
relatedness.  How does fundamentalism affect the process of interrelation? 
 
Cohen argues in a somewhat Kantian fashion that all humans have a deeply felt 
innate sense that the freedom of interrelatedness is important and true.  He 
calls this conscience or an aura of reality.  The pathology of fundamentalism-
evangelicalism lies in its valuation of ideology over the sense of 
interrelatedness.  Cohen argues that the underlying non-fantasy desire for 
interrelatedness is broken by evangelicalism in two ways: (1) the detachment of 
fantasy from non-fantasy such that the process of mediated relatedness is 
broken and (2) the demonisation (taboo) of interrelatedness beyond the 
confines of the provincial fantasy (163).  He asserts that even the believer has a 
repressed sense of this reality (162).  When this desire for total interrelatedness 
escapes the inevitably non-sufficient parametres of the evangelical discourse it 
experiences a profound crisis.  This crisis gives rise to the pathological 
symptoms previously identified.   Cohen posits seven devices of mind-control 
that collectively repress the aura of reality. 
 
Before summarising these devices in light of developmental tendencies it is 
necessary to ask whether Cohen's theory thus far is compatible with 
developmental theory?  As previously noted, Fowler's concept of faith and 
Cohen's concept of meaningful interrelatedness are very similar.  I find little 
contradiction between them.  While Cohen does not consider the notion of 
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 stages he implies that normal continuing human function lies in the honesty with 
which the teleological need for interrelatedness is met.  This supports, rather 
than discounts the possibility of stages but it also adds a very significant insight 
to the understanding of developmental stages.   
 
The insight Cohen unknowingly provides is that the sense of interrelatedness, 
as unconsciously experienced by the individual is not stage dependent.  A 
healthy interrelating individual may exist at any stage.  However, Fowler's 
theory of development enlightens Cohen's theory by revealing that the scope of 
interrelation changes the more the faculties enabling integration develop.  For 
Cohen, this development occurs through fantasy; for Fowler, it occurs through 
the particulars of content.  For both, it is arrested, when content itself over-rides 
the process. Fowler call this arrest, Freud calls it repression and Cohen calls it 
mind-control.  While Cohen and Freud tend to equate religions with such arrest, 
Fowler (1981), like Spong (1999) and Cameron (1995) seek to verify the 
possibility of development within religious tradition. 
 
Cohen argues that such an attempt to remain within the broader discourse as a 
liberal reflects a certain sentimental naivete.  He believes that Christian 
liberalism is merely a stage in the realisation that the whole is corrupt.  He 
argues that well-intentioned liberals prolong the mind control by defending the 
very value of Scripture that they seek to escape (165).  While this is a legitimate 
point, Cohen could perhaps be accused of failing to see the healthy integrative 
power of Christian concepts.  While he is correct in recognising that liberals are 
not Christians in any Orthodox sense, he does not acknowledge that 
Christianity, like any other fantasy (perhaps more so) can serve to reveal the 
non-fantasy that Cohen is so eager to protect.  This could in part, reflect 
Cohen's theory of Christianity as an orchestrated conspiracy; a synergism (138) 
of mind-control. 
 
Cohen details seven devices of evangelical mind control in the latter part of his 
book.  The seven devices are: (1) The benign, attractive persona of the Bible, 
(2) Discrediting "the world", (3) Logocide, (4) Assaulting integrity, (5) 
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 Dissociation induction, (6) Bridge burning, and (7) Holy terror.  These devices 
provide excellent descriptions of the means of stage arrest in fundamentalism.  
As such, they will be revisited and applied in later sections.  All devices are 
reflected in Winell's (1993) observations of recovering fundamentalists.  Devices 
(2 and 7) are especially consonant with Strozier's analysis of apocalypticism in 
fundamentalism. 
 
Device (1), The attractive persona of the Bible, refers to the tendency for 
Christians to proclaim the whole of Scripture in terms of its most benign and 
benevolent parts.  The total authority of the Bible is allowed to go unchallenged 
because only the most benevolent socially acceptable parts of it are centred in 
the discourse.  Cohen argues that the few intellectually honest who give 
themselves to the whole of Scripture are often characterised by the most 
undesirable aggressive and chauvinistic behaviours.  There is perhaps some 
correlation here to Marty's (1991) broader characterisation of fundamentalism 
as militant and aggressive.    
 
Device (2), Discrediting "the world", refers to the demonisation of unbelievers 
and the eschewing of any credibility in scholarship or thinking beyond the Bible 
such that outside ideas are rarely entertained or examined for compatibility.  
Device (3), Logocide,  (literally, the killing of words) refers to "The Biblical 
assault on key words, loading them with ponderous, contrived, dissonant 
meanings" (186).  Device (4), Assaulting integrity, refers to mechanisms that 
repress honest feelings, thoughts, and doubts that the believer may have by 
demonising them.  Device (5), Dissociation induction, is the effect of 
dispossessing the "evidence of one's own faculties by the commands of others, 
or peer group pressure”(261). Device (6), Bridge Burning, refers to the 
severance of social ties that would yoke the believer with the unbeliever.  
Cohen argues that the resultant isolationism reduces the chances of empathy 
and dialogue. Device (7), Holy terror, refers to the fear factor that motivates 
conversion and discourages deconversion.  The punishing God with the power 
to send the unbeliever to a literal hell and control all manner of earthly woes is 
the source of this fear.   In developmental terms these devices serve to arrest 
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 development by insulating the believer from unbelievers and the accompanying 
opportunities for introspection.   
 
Testing such theory are the experiences and reflections of those in direct 
psychotherapeutical contact with ex-fundamentalists.  The work of Winell 
(1993), and Vogt (1995) provides empirical and reflective support for Cohen's 
pathological grounds of critique.  Winell identifies similar psychological 
manipulations to Cohen.  In a chapter titled, Recognizing manipulations she 
explores fear manipulations (Cohen's holy terror), guilt manipulations, 
denigration of self (integrity assault), denigration of the world (discrediting the 
world), group pressure (bridge burning), the power of authority, thought control, 
and closed system of logic (logocide).  Other psychotherapeutic approaches to 
fundamentalism (Yao, 1987, and Moyers, 1998) examine fundamentalism in 
terms of the psychology of restrictive religious groups. The clinical observations 
of these authors reflect the pathological symptoms described by Cohen. 
 
Clinical psychologist Marlene Winell recounts her patients’ stories in Leaving 
the Fold: A Guide for Former Fundamentalists and Others Leaving Their 
Religion (1993).  Before analysing some of these descriptions in light of Cohen's 
devices and the broader notion of developmental arrest it is important to note 
that: 
Religious training can vary even within the same denomination or the same 
church.  One leader may emphasize God as a fearsome judge who will 
someday send everyone to heaven or hell.  Another may paint God more often 
as a heavenly father, who is merciful and generous to those who want to be 
saved. (115) 
Which one represents fundamentalism?  Cohen argues that the latter portrayal 
of God is a partial betrayal of Bible-based Christianity and therefore not 
fundamentalism in a definitive sense.  He argues that the overt portrayal of God 
as benevolent within a Bible-based dichotomous view of the world, simply 
enables the covert effects of the broader doctrines of sin, damnation and 
salvation to go unchallenged.  This is essentially a fulfillment of his benign, 
attractive persona of the Bible device.  It perpetuates the transcendent authority 
of the Bible such that the individual is relieved of any triangulating 
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 epistemologies to process (in Cohen's words - to interrelate) the experiences of 
life.  This in turn hinders development through the sharing of a common 
epistemology with non-believers. 
 
Within the fundamentalist discourse there is recognition of what is commonly 
called a PK (priest's kid) or MK (missionary kid) syndrome.  The syndrome 
describes the tendency for children of the most Bible-based adults to reject 
Bible-based authority.  Winell confirms such anecdotal evidence: 
A report from the 1990 International Conference on Missionary Kids at Nairobi, 
Kenya, stated "AMK's [Adult Missionary Kids] and children of alcoholic parents 
have almost identical problems." (117) 
Clinical psychologist, Max Vogt offers similar observations in Pathological 
Christianity: The Dangers and Cures of Extremist Fundamentalisms (1995) 
comparing the fundamentalist God to the alcoholic parent.  
 
Winell identifies common dysfunctions arising within fundamentalist families 
including the burden of shame, abuse of patriarchal power, stifling of 
independent thought, devaluation of feelings, higher purpose neglect, 
avoidance of responsibility, denial, and physical and sexual abuse (118-128).  
Vogt echoes these descriptions citing client cases describing fear, shame, 
depression, disempowerment, as the pathological symptoms of fundamentalism 
(1995).  Such pathological symptoms of fundamentalism are perhaps, more 
specifically described as disruptions to the healthy interrelatedness (Cohen) that 
characterises the development of faith (Fowler).  
 
 Fundamentalism and stage crises 
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Fowler's describes his theory of development in extremely optimistic terms.  The 
stages represent the most benign and benevolent manifestations of 
development.  Fowler's stages represent a progression into enlightenment.  
While this is a noble pursuit it does not reflect the nature of crisis that arises 
with new stage capacities and the potential for dysfunction.  Erikson's use of 
crises at each stage characterises a more dichotomous approach to 
development.  What Fowler tends to neglect is that the crises of stage transition 
may last a lifetime.  While cognitive structures may continue to develop, their 
 
 
 application to, and conflict with the contents of previous stages may be 
prolonged or repressed. Fundamentalism offers quite overt remedies to 
Erikson's crises of development.  To recall, Erikson's crises are trust vs. 
mistrust, autonomy vs., shame and doubt, initiative vs. guilt, industry vs. 
inferiority, identity vs. role confusion, intimacy vs. isolation, generativity vs. 
stagnation, and integrity vs. despair. 
 
In childhood as throughout later life fundamentalism encourages trust in 
authority of community and trust in God.  The crises of shame, doubt, and guilt 
are resolved (arguably repressed) by the doctrine of atonement, and 
forgiveness.  The crisis of inferiority vs. industry is resolved through the efficacy 
generated by the intense social involvement and commitment within 
fundamentalism.  The fundamentalist environment creates a sense of urgency, 
intensity and importance that breeds industry and action.  The same sense of 
community and purpose facilitates resolution of identity and role confusion.  
Protestant fundamentalisms, at least doctrinally, offer identity in Christ as 
children of God, working for his kingdom.  The militancy of fundamentalism 
encourages the identity and industry found in a cause worth fighting for.  
Metaphors of battle and warfare are common in fundamentalist discourse -
identity in the face of a common enemy.  The intensity of some 
fundamentalisms creates an environment in which intimacy is normal. In 
Christian fundamentalisms, evangelical and charismatic movements are very 
successful in avoiding the stoicism and repression of emotion that causes 
isolation rather than intimacy.  There exists in such movements, a fascination 
with the affective dimension of the inner being.  Participants are encouraged to 
"bear their souls, share their burdens, be broken vessels before Christ".  
Fundamentalisms create a structure for generativity in later life.  The intensity, 
sense of purpose, and metaphor of battle creates a dynamism in which it is 
difficult to stagnate.  In Erikson's final stage, the fundamentalist may resolve 
despair with a hope of eternity, life beyond death, new beginnings, reward in the 
world to come having fought the good fight.  The attractiveness of 
fundamentalisms is that they offer articulated, cohesive, and concrete answers 
to the crises of life.   
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The pathology of fundamentalisms, as argued by Cohen, Winell, Strozier and 
Vogt is twofold; they intensify and articulate such crises to the point where they 
create that which they seek to resolve; and creedal, institutionalised, formulaic 
solutions tend to bypass the very problems they seek to resolve.  This is 
because preconceived linguistic solutions to problems may allow the individual 
to bypass their own act of conceptualization (meaning-making) which leads to a 
more real and internalised resolution.  The problem of fundamentalism in 
developmental terms, is that crises are resolved only within an exclusive 
provincial discourse.  The provincialism and exclusivity of fundamentalisms, and 
the metaphor of warfare in which they are engaged, means that they will not 
develop into the universality of Fowler's latter stages.  The question, for 
fundamentalism, is whether the development toward such universality is 
empirically demonstrable or doctrinally desirable.  
 
While Vogt and Cohen treat fundamentalism as a pathological psychology they 
neglect the elements of fundamentalism that actually facilitate development at 
early stages.  Vogt and Cohen would probably argue that the positive elements 
of fundamentalism are, by definition, elements not unique to it and therefore 
simply psychological lures into the more pathological elements that come with 
full immersion in the discourse.  The description of fundamentalism as 
pathological perhaps neglects the capacity of the discourse to facilitate 
development of its participants into very stable stage 2 or 3 (perhaps 4) 
equilibriums.  The developing power of fundamentalist dynamics that attain 
such equilbriums is also a power abused when it arrests development from 
such equilibriums into stages 5 and 6.  In developmental terms, Cohen and 
Vogt would argue that the facilitating power of fundamentalism is undesirable if 
it facilitates a particular stage and then necessarily arrests.       
 
 
Psychoapocalyptic Approaches to Fundamentalism  
Several authors have analysed apocalypticism as a motivation for 
fundamentalism.  Psychiatrist, R.D. Laing (In Global Vision, 1992) suggests that 
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 fundamentalism is the result of an innate apocalyptic psychology that 
mistakenly literalises and externalises deeply symbolic apocalyptic literature.  
Similarly, psychohistorian Charles Strozier (1994) posits fundamentalism as a 
psychological response to apocalyptic mythologies.  These theories may be 
absorbed into the developmental discourse.  However, developmentalism 
regards apocalypticism as contents both activated by, and arresting of particular 
structures. 
 
The apocalypse is a revelation concerning the ultimate purpose of the divine.  In 
the Christian tradition apocalyptic writings are found in Ezekiel, Daniel, and 
most significantly - in Revelation.  The apocalypse is concerned primarily with 
eschata or end times.  In the Christian tradition the apocalypse relates: 
The specific forms of our forthcoming destruction, including the seven-year 
period of tribulation with its ferocious and unfolding violence of trumpets, seals, 
and vials that ends with the great battle of Armageddon between the forces of 
good and evil on the Plain of Jezreel near Megiddo in part of what is present-
day Israel. (Strozier, 1994:154). 
There are many competing interpretations of the apocalypse between 
Christians and within fundamentalism.   
 
Perhaps the most contested events of the apocalypse concerns the millenium of 
Revelation 20.  In this period of 1000 years Christ is said to reign with believers.  
Christians in general are divided into three schools of thought concerning the 
millenium.  Premillennialists believe that Christ's second-coming occurs before 
the literal 1000 years.  Amillennialists believe that the reign of Christ is the now 
present in a symbolic 1000 years between his ascension and second-coming.  
Postmiliennialists believe that Christ's second coming will be ushered in by 
1000 years of peace under the church.  All three groups believe that the 
apocalypse is to be literally fulfilled. 
 
While Strozier (1994) restricts his analysis to Christian apocalypticism it is worth 
noting that many fundamentalisms share dramatic eschatologies.  In Islamic 
Shi'ism believers await the return of the last Imam as the Mahdi or messianic 
deliverer.  The return of the Mahdi signals the beginning of an Islamic 
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 government that will rule the earth.  Haradi Jews exist in self-imposed exile 
awaiting the return of their messiah to release them from suffering.  In the 
Japanese fundamentalism Sukyo Mahikari believers await a final eschatological 
ordeal known as the Baptism by Fire, after which the world will reunite under the 
Japanese emperor (Marty and Appleby, 1991:820).  These diverse 
eschatologies of fundamentalism differ in their psychological effects.  It is unfair 
to assume that the political activism or the social withdrawal of some 
premillennial sects may be generalised to other eschatological traditions. What 
is most significant to the thesis at hand is the genesis of apocalyptic scenarios 
reflecting mythic-literal structures of interpretation. 
 
According to Fowler's mythic-literal description participants develop an ability to 
bind experiences "into meaning through the medium of stories" (1981:136).  
Apocalyptic writing is a form of story-telling.  The characteristic of 
fundamentalism is that it applies such stories very literally: 
The  richly symbolic and connotative scriptural descriptions of the Final Age are 
often reduced by fundamentalists to denotative blueprints of the order to come, 
demystified in the service of detailing the concrete plan of action required for 
sociopolitical ends. (Marty and Appleby, 1991:837)    
What Swearer (In Marty and Appleby) goes on to call the "objectification of 
revelation" (837), Strozier (1994:150) calls "literalized metaphor".  Fowler, views 
such tendency as a stage characteristic of mythic-literal faith:  
For Stage 2 meanings are conserved and expressed in stories.  There is also a 
sense in which the meanings are trapped in the narrative, there not being yet 
the readiness to draw from them conclusions about a general order of meaning 
in life. (1981:137) 
In the domain of hermeneutics developmental theory seems to provide some 
insight to fundamentalist apocalypticism.  But, is Christian apocalypticism a 
factor in other domains of development?  
 
Strozier (1994) identifies elements of apocalyticism that reflect and perpetuate 
the structuring characteristics of early developmental stages.  The scheme of 
moral judgment embraced in the Christian fundamentalist apocalypse is one of 
punishment-reward obedience.  Believers fear the punishment of the day of 
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 judgment while rejoicing in the rewards they will receive for their belief.  
Strozier's recount of interviewee's fears and expectations of the apocalypse 
serves to evidence this point.  It is worth quoting in full: 
For many it is a question of emphasis [fear or reward]: the violence of tribulation 
during which the blood will run up to the bridles of horses or the regenerative 
image of Jesus descending from the clouds to a cleansed but preserved earth 
over which he will rule with the faithful.  The difference in emphasis corresponds 
in large part to the class position of respondents.  Sam and Monroe, both well 
educated, once successful, and still financially secure men, moved relatively 
quickly through the violence of the end times to images of hope in the 
millennium and in heaven.  In contrast, Otto, Mary, and others dwelt on the 
violence of the end, and often got stuck on it.  Their lives at the bottom of the 
social scale were full of struggle and the forces of society and history often 
seemed to work against their best interests.  It was interesting, however, that 
they too, sought to embrace images of the earth's renewal.  Mary beamed with 
excitement when she described the millennium, and Otto expected to be 
raptured within the decade. (74) 
The fundamentalist dichotomisation of believers and unbelievers, reward and 
punishment inspired by the apocalyptic literature is reflected in earthly terms.  
The effects on Fowler's developmental aspects of social-awareness, 
perspective-taking, are significant. 
 
Two elements of the Christian apocalypse are relevant to these developmental 
concerns - separation from the world, and the nature of the Anti-Christ.  The 
Christian fundamentalist is constantly "set apart" from "the world" in Scripture.  
A common theme to many apocalyptic traditions is the separation between the 
imperfections, injustices and sufferings of this world and the perfection and 
justice of the next.   The believer is constantly affirmed in Scripture that they are 
not of this world; "living in it, but not of it".  Non-believers are described as 
having "worldly ways".  Biblical or otherwise, the distinction between this world 
and the next is applied to unbelievers and believers respectively.  This 
separation has a very real psychological if not physical meaning for the believer. 
The physical separation of fundamentalists varies.  Some choose to engage the 
world in order to proselytise or bring social reform from within.  Their separation 
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 exists cognitively as a distinction between themselves and the lost they are 
seeking to help.  Others, acquire a form of fatalist resignation to the events of 
the apocalypse or a desire to be set apart from worldly temptations and 
withdraw into their own communities.  Strozier cites the Branch Davidians, and 
the Church Universal and Triumphant as such examples. 
 
Developmentally, such total mental and physical withdrawal leads to a lack 
empathy and intimacy.  In Erikson's terms: 
Avoidance or withdrawal ...because of a fear of the loss of self may lead to the 
counterpoint of intimacy-and the danger of this stage-namely a deep sense of 
isolation and a resulting self-absorption. 
Isolation or distantiation, to use a more extreme term, involves not only 
a withdrawal from or avoidance of intimacy.  When the prospect of closeness to 
another or others is too threatening it may give rise to a readiness to isolate 
and, if necessary, to destroy those persons or forces whose essence seems 
dangerous to one's own. (In Fowler, 1981:80) 
In Fowler's terms, such withdrawal and isolation necessarily restricts expanded 
capacities for development including: 
- an augmented capacity for accuracy in taking the perspective for others and in 
balancing their perspectives with a newly decentrated grasp of one's own outlook...[and] 
- a widened, more inclusive accounting for the interests, stories and visions of others in 
the course of composing and maintaining one's own normative perspectives (bounds of 
social awareness). (1981:300) 
In the context of apocalypticism such development arrests. 
 
A second feature of apocalypticism that restricts such developmental capacities 
is the concept of the Antichrist.  The Antichrist is the concrete manifestation of 
the Devil appearing at the end of the age.  The Antichrist is characterised as a 
great deceiver, bringing a message of peace to the world and working great 
miracles.   Such characterisation is based on a collection of references 
including 1 John 2:18,22; 2 John 7; 2 Thess. 2:9; and 1 Tim. 4:1.   The identity 
of the Antichrist is the subject of much speculation amongst fundamentalists.  
Some perceive it to be a structure, others perceive it to be an individual.  Such 
characters and institutions as Hitler, the Pope, the Catholic Church, the united 
Nations, the World Bank, and the Illuminati are regularly associated with the 
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 Antichrist.  What is the effect of such a concept in developmental terms? 
 
The most obvious implication, as Strozier's interviews demonstrated, is that 
fundamentalists are inherently suspicious of peace initiatives outside of their 
own churches.  This suspicion has a deep psychological effect, in that it usurps 
the basis for common objectivity and empathy with the aims of other discourses.  
The ultra-fundamentalist can find no common cause outside of fundamentalism.  
The peaceful but deceptive nature of the Antichrist (regardless of truth value) is 
the ultimate block to diplomacy, compromise, empathy, or discussion between 
fundamentalism and other faiths.  The most reasoned arguments, the most 
common ethical causes, the most compatible doctrines are refuted on the basis 
that - the Antichrist comes as an angel of light.  The Antichrist concept is the 
penultimate cause of separation between fundamentalist perceptions and the 
later stages of development of Selman's social-perspective taking.    Summarily, 
the nature of fundamentalist apocalypticism and the effects of Christian 
apocalypticism as a case study are congruent with early developmental 
structures and perpetuate the same. 
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2.2.9   Developmental Approaches to Fundamentalism   
          (Shinn, 1984) 
 
The final section of this review is brief because its focus, Fundamentalism as a 
Case of Arrested Development (Shinn, In Selvidge, 1984:91-98) is a very brief 
paper.  However, it stands as a somewhat obscure but conceptually 
foundational work at the intersection of developmental theory and 
fundamentalism.  
 
Robert Shinn's Paper is the only direct application of developmental theory to 
fundamentalism known to the author of this thesis.  This section is added almost 
as a postscript because the paper was not discovered until late in the writing of 
this thesis.  Shinn's paper appears amongst a series of short papers constituting 
the book, What Makes Fundamentalism so Attractive? (Selvidge,1984).  His 
thesis is that Christian Fundamentalism manifests at Stage 3 (Synthetic-
conventional faith) of Fowler's theory.  He argues that, "In a more enlightened 
form or phase, commonly called evangelicalism, it manifests a few of the 
characteristics of Stage 4" (92).   
 
Shinn evidences his claims on Fundamentalism's cohesive orthodoxy, 
authoritarian influence, parochialism and fanaticism, vicarious trust in external 
authority, lack of symbolic distinction, anthropomorphic images of God, 
millennial themes, Biblical inerrancy, and tribalism.  He does not elaborate on 
these claims, relating them rather through very brief anecdotal accounts in 
which he refers to "stage 3 evangelicals and charismatics...stage 3 or 4 
Reformed-Calvinist conservatives...A stage 5 friend...a left-wing stage 4 biblical 
scholar" (95-96).  Shinn notes that "Characteristics from different stages can co-
exist in any stage" (92) while maintaining that "Stage 3 is the plateau on which 
most people live out their lives" (94). 
 
While Shinn's article is titled, Fundamentalism as a Case of Arrested 
Development, he does not explicitly address the actual mechanisms of this 
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 arrest.  Rather, he briefly describes the correlation between Stage 3 and 
Protestant Fundamentalism.  As a whole, the article offers a succinct 
introduction to the basic concept of linkage between Fowler's developmental 
theory and the notion of fundamentalism. 
 
This thesis concurs with Shinn's basic premise, that Fundamentalism bears an 
uncanny resemblance to certain developmental structures.  The task of this 
thesis is to examine the initial resemblance in sufficient detail to determine its fit.  
I do not feel committed to find such a fit and indeed there are some significant 
questions raised for the popular scope of fundamentalism in light of the analysis 
herein.   This thesis seeks to broaden both the developmental base and the 
religious scope of fundamentalism utilised by Shinn.  The actual mechanisms of 
arrest are also addressed in detail.   
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2.2.10 Conclusion 
 
The approaches to fundamentalism discussed in this section have revealed the 
descriptive power of the developmental discourse while highlighting some gaps 
in understanding that exist in its modern form.  The developmental discourse 
can accommodate the insights of historical, psychological, hermeneutic, and 
sociological approaches to fundamentalism.   
 
The following application of Fowler’s Aspects of Faith to fundamentalism draws 
on the developmental tradition, its concepts, dimensions, and dynamics as 
analysed and contextualised by the study thus far.  It is an interpretative 
application of seven aspects that group many traditional domains of 
development to encompass the phenomenon of faith. As discussed in Part One 
of this chapter, faith is an appropriate metaphor to encompass the phenomenon 
of religious fundamentalism. 
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2.3  Fowler’s Aspects of Faith and Fundamentalism 
 
2.3.1          Introduction 
 
Choosing Analytical Discourses 
 
There are many paradigmatic lenses through which fundamentalism and 
liberalism might be viewed and interpreted.  Structural developmental 
psychology is but one such lens. I choose it because I believe in its ability to 
focus with relative clarity the core issues of the fundamentalist-liberal 
continuum. It is a balanced discourse between extreme nativism and 
behaviourism, genetic determinism and social constructivism, absolutism and 
relativism.  A balanced approach is no guarantee of credibility but it does 
negate a certain amount of human prejudice born of affiliation with an exclusive 
extreme.   
 
It is important to acknowledge some of the discourses that could have been 
used to explain these phenomena.  To acknowledge these discourses before 
departing from them is not to negate their value but to locate their collective 
insights in a single discourse - the structural developmental discourse. 
 
This said, fundamentalism and liberalism might be examined as mega-memes, 
selfishly competing to survive in a world of ideas red in tooth and nail.  They 
might be examined as attributions serving more base human needs, or perhaps 
as competing discourses of power - empowering and disempowering their 
participants.  They might be examined as elaborate yet eclectic and 
circumstantial webs woven for the ends of cognitive consistency, or 
semantically as nothing more or less than the illusions and realities of worlds of 
words with no more definitive reference than the speaker of the same.  They 
185
 
 
 might be examined as worldviews - the sum of enculturated contents and 
cognitive dynamics, or as historically traceable movements - the random 
products of real time and space convergence.   They might be examined as the 
manifestations of predictable and perennial social facts, or as manifestations of 
a more primal struggle between id, ego, and superego - more to do with deeply 
rooted sexual desire than religious truth. Then, most commonly, they might be 
examined from within as manifestations of the struggle between a literal Devil 
deceiving a fallen humanity from the true knowledge of a biblically revealed 
God.       
 
The Structural Developmental Approach  
 
Developmentalists, Piaget, Kohlberg, Erikson, Oser and Gmünder and James 
Fowler offer more specific descriptions of stage development.  It is from their 
theories that the stage-structure descriptions applied in the review were drawn.  
What follows is a more focussed analysis of fundamentalism using Fowler's 
seven aspects of faith. 
 
Using Fowler's Aspects as a tool for an analysis of fundamentalism is clearly a 
qualitative exercise.  There is a temptation to attempt to define too precisely the 
structures of application.  To do so is to fail to appreciate the structural 
developmental discourse worked within - it is to problematise abstract concepts 
with a concrete definition.  The language of Aspects is descriptive.  Only the 
existence of stages and their progression is assumed to be prescriptive.  
Perhaps clearer understanding of the mechanics of cognitive structuring will be 
provided through future developments in neurological studies.  For now, this 
discussion takes place within the boundaries of the language of the age and the 
developmetal discourse, accepting that vision and application are always limited 
to a degree.  This said, the abstract aspects to be applied herein give more 
clarity to an understanding of fundamentalism.  
  
 
 
186
 
 
  
 
 
2.3.2 Fundamentalism and Form of Logic  
 
Form of Logic is the parent aspect to all other aspects of faith in that it describes 
the primary structures of cognition from which other aspects derive.  According 
to research pioneered by Jean Piaget, a form of logic describes the emergence 
of structurally different ways of perceiving concepts of time, space, causality 
and quantity.  Given these concerns in the context of cognition, Piaget is often 
described as a genetic epistemologist.  He proposed that development leads to 
increasing differentiation and thus conformity with reality.  It is contended 
herein, that fundamentalism is a domain specific religious expression of the 
structural dynamics of early forms of logic.  
 
Piaget identified four periods of cognitive development; sensorimotor, 
preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational.  He referred to 
sub-periods as stages (Miller, 1993: 42). It would seem logical, if stages of logic 
are universal and social transmission is a developmental factor, that the social 
structures of religion must affect and be affected by such forms.  The question 
is, whether a stage of logical reasoning can give rise to a socially identifiable 
form of religion. A second question is whether traces of early religious logic are 
protected from later structural scrutiny thus arresting development in a particular 
domain.  If such dynamics did occur, they would no doubt affect discourses 
other than religion.  Politics, economics, ethnicity, sexuality, and science are but 
a few such discourses likely to share fundamentalist expressions.  The label, 
fundamentalist, once applied to a specific Protestant movement is now applied 
to a variety of discourses, even naturalism itself (Glynn, 1997).  However, these 
discourses are not of immediate concern.  Of immediate concern is how existing 
descriptions of religious fundamentalism reflect the structural characteristics of 
forms of logic. 
 
The preoperational period is characterised by the emergence of semiotic 
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 function, egocentrism, rigidity of thought, and semilogical reasoning (Miller, 
1993:53-56). What follows is a cursory application of such structuring 
tendencies to religious fundamentalism.   
 
 Semiotic Function 
 
Semiotic function (what Fowler calls symbolic function) is simply the, "ability to 
use one object or event to stand for another" (Miller, 1993:51).  As development 
occurs there is an increasing ability to represent mental events and objects 
symbolically.  While this ability is a characteristic of preoperational development 
it is not until later stages that, signs and symbols can be carefully differentiated 
from the objects and events they represent: 
This notion that words or other signs are arbitrarily assigned to objects is not 
easy for a child to grasp.  Young children think that an object's name is as 
intrinsic to the object as are its colour and form.  When asked why spaghetti is 
called spaghetti, a young child may say that it looks like spaghetti and feels like 
spaghetti and tastes like spaghetti, so we call it spaghetti! (Miller, 52) 
Are there any characteristics of a fundamentalist community of faith that reflect 
or create conditions for the operation of such a principle of semiotic function? 
 
Fundamentalist communities (like any close knit communities) are characterised 
by a centralised and identifying discourse.  This discourse is most identifiably 
expressed in religious language - rhetoric, slogan, and cliché.  The uniqueness 
of the fundamentalist discourse is its isolationist claims to absolute truth in the 
realm of the metaphysical.  One may consider the creeds and canons of 
fundamentalist community as the linguistic signs and signifiers of this 
metaphysical reality.  The developmental concern in such a cohesive and often 
epistemologically isolated community is twofold; firstly, there is an inevitable 
divorce between creed, ritual, and tradition as the signs, and contextually 
understood reality as the signified; and secondly, there is a preoperational 
inability to separate sign and signified in the children of the community.  
Children are actively encouraged to use the signs of the discourse long before 
they have the semiotic ability to recognise the arbitrary relationship between the 
sign and the signified.  This is inevitable; what is developmentally arresting is 
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 the failure to address the relationship between the two at later ages.  Examining 
or questioning the relationship between the two before indoctrination is 
complete may lead to doubt.  It is through questioning that the cohesion of 
community may be weakened.  Hence the reinforcement of obedience, 
conformity and blind faith, and the demonisation of doubt characterise 
fundamentalist communities.  This notion will be explore further under the 
Aspect - Symbolic Function.     
 
 Egocentrism 
The egocentrism of the preoperational form of logic is not to be understood in 
terms of selfishness with its negative connotation.  Rather it is: 
(a) the incomplete differentiation of the self and the world, including other 
people, and (b) the tendency to perceive, understand and interpret the world in 
terms of the self.  One implication is that the child cannot take another person's 
perceptual or conceptual perspective. (Miller, 53) 
Egocentrism is a central factor in Fowler's Aspects of Social Perspective Taking 
and Social Awareness. 
 
In a fundamentalist community where shared discourse is of paramount 
importance self perception is made synonymous with community perception.  
The tools of perception are received within community, rather than constructed 
from experience.  There is no clear demarcation between the two (receiving and 
constructing) but it is a qualitative distinction assumed by developmentalism 
nonetheless.  The developing ability to construct autonomous perceptions 
through encounter with the other is restricted by the isolationism and doctrinal 
prejudices of fundamentalist community.  In Protestant fundamentalism such 
egocentric isolationism is rationalised through a literal (and arguably 
acontextual) application of such Scriptures as: 
(2 John 10-11) If anyone comes to you and does not bring this teaching, do not 
take him into your house or welcome him.  Anyone who welcomes him shares 
in his wicked work. 
(Rom 16:17) I urge you, brothers, to watch out for those who cause divisions 
and put obstacles in your way that are contrary to the teaching you have 
learned.  Keep away from them.  
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 (2 Thes 3:6) In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, we command you, brothers, 
to keep away from every brother who is idle and does not live according to the 
teaching you received from us. 
(2 Thes 3:14) If anyone does not obey our instruction in this letter, take special 
note of him. Do not associate with him, in order that he may feel ashamed.  
(2 Cor 6:14) Do not be yoked together with unbelievers.  For what do 
righteousness and wickedness have in common? Or what fellowship can light 
have with darkness?   
This division between believers and unbelievers is also central theme of the 
Koran.   
(5.51) O you who believe! do not take the Jews and the Christians for friends; 
they are friends of each other; and whoever amongst you takes them for a 
friend, then surely he is one of them; surely Allah does not guide the unjust 
people. 
(9.29) Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the latter day, nor do they 
prohibit what Allah and His Apostle have prohibited, nor follow the religion of 
truth, out of those who have been given the Book, until they pay the tax in 
acknowledgment of superiority and they are in a state of subjection. 
(9.30) And the Jews say: Uzair is the son of Allah; and the Christians say: The 
Messiah is the son of Allah; these are the words of their mouths; they imitate 
the saying of those who disbelieved before; may Allah destroy them; how they 
are turned away! 
(47.8-12) And (as for) those who disbelieve, for them is destruction and He has 
made their deeds ineffective.  That is because they hated what Allah revealed, 
so He rendered their deeds null. Have they not then journeyed in the land and 
seen how was the end of those before them: Allah brought down destruction 
upon them, and the unbelievers shall have the like of it. That is because Allah is 
the Protector of those who believe, and because the unbelievers shall have no 
protector for them. Surely Allah will make those who believe and do good enter 
gardens beneath which rivers flow; and those who disbelieve enjoy themselves 
and eat as the beasts eat, and the fire is their abode. 
Group and individual identification in fundamentalism is a measure of belief. 
The popular concept of belief and unbelief in fundamentalism is one of 
professed creed rather than ethical action.  There is an assumption that the act 
follows rather than precedes the profession of belief. One who lives the same 
but does not profess the same is not a true believer.  Indeed, according to 
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 Protestant fundamentalism, to say that work and belief are reciprocally 
exchangeable is tantamount to the heresy of salvation by works.    
 
Summarily, the doctrinally embedded distinction at the level of language (the 
sign) between believers and unbelievers reinforces egocentric perspectives 
because it does not encourage the believer to look for synonymy beyond the 
linguistic particularities of belief.  
 
The rigidity of thought that characterises the preoperational period is perhaps 
best described using the concepts of centration, state focus, appearance focus, 
and reversibility. What are these preoperational characteristics and how are 
they affected by and affecting of, fundamentalism? 
 
Centration is the tendency to focus on a single feature of an object or event 
while ignoring other potentially important features.  Fundamentalisms are often 
characterised by a form of scriptural centration.  All other theoretical possibilities 
for the cause of an event are unconsidered in the context of a scriptural 
worldview.  A child brought up in a fundamentalist community learns quickly to 
attribute a divine sense of authority to a canonised text.  Scripture is a powerful 
locus of authority.  If this sense of authority is instilled during a preoperational 
period of development, it is likely that the authority will remain largely immune 
from the later effects of decentration.  Decentration is the tendency to diversify 
and re-integrate epistemological sources.  
 
There is perhaps a connection here to Marty's characterisation of 
fundamentalism as a reaction to modernity.  Modernity and science offer new 
attributions for old events, experiences, and occurrences. Learned centration is 
threatened by new explanations especially in the stages before new 
interpretations can be used to protect the discourse of centration.  Historical 
fundamentalism has reacted (often violently) against many new explanations 
threatening centrated traditional understandings.  Heliocentric and round-earth 
cosmology, evolution, old earth geology, expanding universe theory, 
pathological bases for neuroses, and more recently genetic predisposition to 
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 homosexuality, have all received violent reactions from fundamentalists of their 
respective eras.  They each represent an approach to phenomena that 
decentrates and thus threatens, the fundamentalist worldview.  
 
State focus refers to the tendency to focus on the before and after states of an 
event while ignoring the transforming process that, if observed, may affect the 
perception of the final state.  Similarly, appearance focus is the tendency to 
focus on immediate sensory appearance rather than reality.  There is an 
inability to detect distortion, illusion, and deception by triangulating appearance 
with rational process.  A preoperational child may believe that a stick actually 
bends as it is placed in water and distorted by the refraction of light (Miller, 
1993:54).  The appeal of much magic relies on this deception of perception.  
What prolonged influence do such mental behaviours have in later life?  What 
perceptions in adulthood remain unchecked by the triangulation of process?  
 
To provide one example, state and appearance focus is apparent in the 
fundamentalist dichotomy between the believer and the unbeliever on either 
side of conversion.  This is definitely not to contend that conversion is an invalid 
transformation or that it is an illusory phenomenon.  Nor is it to contend that the 
labels of believer and unbeliever cannot denote a significant and deep-seated 
difference.  However, it is to contend that there are elements in fundamentalism 
that have encouraged a popular understanding of conversion that is state based 
and illusory due to its neglect of the conversion process.  This is the sort of 
conversion wherein salvation is perceived as an immediately attainable state 
rather than a process.  Such salvation is not worked out "with fear and 
trembling," it is attained with immediacy.  It is both instantaneous and formulaic.  
It is a salvation accepted on appearance of a profession of faith.  It is the sort of 
conversion valued from a person at the end of the sword, the top of the fire, or 
the end of a line of converted others.  Such state observed conversion is 
evident in many Pentecostal fundamentalist movements.   
  
James Barr, author of Fundamentalism observes the connection between 
Pentecostalism and Fundamentalism: 
192
 
 
 The doctrine of most Pentecostal groups seems to be uncompromisingly 
fundamentalist, and in this sense probably more extreme than the mainstream 
type of conservative evangelicalism taken as typical in this book. (1981:207-8) 
The charismatic movement, as an umbrella movement to Pentecostalism is 
characterised by its emphasis on religious experience and emotion. In both 
cases such experience and emotion are seen to be responses to the Spirit.  The 
work of the Spirit is responsible for the process of conversion.  The discourse of 
the Spirit is esoteric.  It is explicitly unobservable.  It is described esoterically 
within the Pentecostal discourse as a Spirit of Power, a Holy Wind, the fire of 
the Holy Spirit, the unquenchable fire, the outpouring of the new wine. 
Pentecostals claim to be born in the Spirit.  Many claim to have had the 
experience of being slain in the Spirit, healed by the Spirit, convicted by the 
Spirit, touched by the Spirit.  These understandings of the Spirit are strongly 
associated with the Spirit of the New Testament discourse.    
 
Conversion is often reduced to believing in Christ, however the fundamentalist 
rarely questions what belief in Christ means.  Usually an agreeable articulation 
of the same (I believe in Jesus) serves as confirmation of salvation.  The 
articulation of these words can be the result of so many different things, so 
many diverse experiences, and so many different meanings that the literal 
language has become, in the words of Solskice - dead metaphor.  Purely literal 
understanding of language prizes the language above the meaning.  In such 
instances belief in Christ is reduced to a historical acknowledgement of his 
existence in space and time.  The understanding of concepts beneath this belief 
(vicarious suffering and atonement, the divinity of Christ, Original Sin) are 
beyond the cognitive grasp of many fully developed adults let alone children 
who profess a belief in Jesus.   
 
Fundamentalism assumes that professions of faith in Christ point always to the 
same meaningful and cohesive body of underlying understanding, if indeed it 
understands the presence of the paradigmatic iceberg below a single linguistic 
tip at all. 
 
It is always more impressed by the articulation of a belief than by the living 
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 expression of belief without its articulation.  Again, there is reason for this found 
in the contents of fundamentalist belief.   The fundamentalist is adamant that 
good works are no means to salvation.  Good intention, Christ-like behaviour, 
nor the mere reality of having been created by God, serve to affect the outcome 
of one's salvation.  Salvation by works would negate the doctrine of vicarious 
suffering and atonement.  Good works in secular contexts are often demonised 
by fundamentalists as works of the Devil, come as an Angel of Light.  The 
articulated belief in Christ is all that separates the Christian from the non-
Christian, the saved from the unsaved.  There is no tangible, experiential, 
existential, or physical way of distinguishing between the saved and the 
unsaved except that one says the words I believe in Christ.  The additional 
qualification and believes in one's heart... is immeasurable and indicative of 
qualities found in those who do not believe with their lips.    
 
The fundamentalist's normalisation of instantaneous conversion is a 
manifestation of this understanding of belief.  Mass crusade conversions, and 
alter-calls are features of the fundamentalist discourse.  The familiar rhetoric of 
such occasions cements the notion of instantaneous conversion wherein one is 
converted from being hell-bound to heaven-bound in an instant.  The answer to 
the question "how do I become a Christian?" is,"pray the sinner's prayer and 
believe in Jesus".  There is a certainty that the transition from the asking of the 
question to the enactment of the answer is something that changes eternal 
destiny in an instant.   This is the reasoning behind the practice of deathbed 
conversions.  It is affirmed in the fundamentalist mindset by the salvation of the 
sinner on the cross beside Christ. 
 
James Fowler describes the fundamentalist conversion experience as a 
"conversional change that blocks or helps one avoid the pain of faith stage 
changes" (1981:286).  In a broader context fundamentalism provides "cast-iron 
images of identity and faith" while the convert "remains in that stage for life" 
(Fowler: 286).  Fundamentalism deliberately halts development because it finds 
truth primarily in content rather than in process or the interaction 
(accommodation and assimilation) between the two.   
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As a practice in context, instantaneous conversion reveals again the 
preeminence of the articulated word in the fundamentalist worldview.  
Psychologist Marlene Winell, author of Leaving the Fold quotes from a letter of 
one of her clients on this point: 
I also saw how deeply destructive the Evangelical mentality had been to me, 
not only as I applied it myself, but as it was applied to me as a potential convert.  
Once someone recites the formula "I accept Jesus as my personal Saviour" 
they have become what they should be and the rest is hardly important ... 
Overall the person becomes an object, a thing to be manipulated into the proper 
configuration.  (1993:204) 
In fundamentalism one may change in an instant one's eternal destiny with a 
change in the language of one's belief in Christ.  The articulations I don't believe 
and I believe are literally - worlds apart.  They are commiserated or celebrated 
respectively as the infallible expressions of being.  As such, being is reduced to 
the literal word. 
 
The interchangability of faith and belief in fundamentalism is a result of such 
reductionism.  Faith is reduced to belief because there is no other way of 
separating the faith of Christians from the faith of non-Christians.  Alan Watts, a 
writer on eastern and western spiritualities notes somewhat poetically: 
 Faith is an openness and trusting attitude to truth and reality, whatever it 
may turn out to be.  This is a risky and adventurous state of mind.  Belief, in the 
religious sense, is the opposite of faith-because it is a fervent wishing or hope, 
a compulsive clinging to the idea that the universe is arranged and governed in 
such and such a way.  Belief is holding to a rock; faith is learning how to swim-
and this whole universe swims in boundless space. (In Babinski, 1995:29) 
This distinction was expressed in detail in earlier in this thesis.  It is a distinction 
central to the developmental approach to religion and the language of 
conversion and one Babinski himself says he has grown to recognise (29). 
 
The parallel between the Pentecostal perception of conversion and the state 
focus and process neglect of early development is twofold; firstly, the 
immediacy of conversion and its measurement primarily by the states of 
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 speaking in tongues and physical submission to the Spirit is appearance 
focussed; secondly, process scrutiny is placed beyond the limitations of human 
scrutiny when it is placed in the realm of an enigmatic Spirit such that it 
becomes an untouchable attribution.  Indeed the discourse of Protestant 
fundamentalism often protects its own assumptions from internal scrutiny by 
usurping the legitimacy of rational human perception at such times.  The 
questioner may be told that "God's ways are higher than man's" or warned, 
"lean not on your own understanding" - Scripture is the filter for science and not 
vice-versa.  Such statements serve to circumvent the scrutiny of the conversion 
process such that the appearances either side of conversion are protected.  
This dichotomy between the hell-destined and heaven-destined states of the 
individual either side of an immediate conversion understandably reinforces an 
evangelical zeal characteristic of many fundamentalisms.     
 
The final aspect of rigidity of thought, reversibility, refers to the mental ability to 
reverse the steps of a process or series.  The preoperational child lacks 
reversibility.  While the operational teenager or adult may well have the ability of 
reversibility, like all other developmental aspects its application may vary.  It has 
been contended throughout this paper that fundamentalism is affected by and 
affecting of development.  Lack of reversibility may be compartmentalised by 
particular discourses in which the individual engages.  Religious 
fundamentalism is one such discourse.  One of the significant characteristics of 
conversion from fundamentalism is an increasing application of reversibility to 
the individual's fundamentalism.  Winell's (1993) and Babinski's (1995) accounts 
of former fundamentalists frequently describe deconvert's new sense of 
introspection, a self-criticism enabled by the perception of self from the 
perspective of others.  At this stage the arguments and apologetics that kept the 
other at a distance are turned on one's own belief system.  The rigour once 
applied to other's assumptions is newly applied to one's own assumptions.  The 
locus of authority, be it Scripture or interpreter, is challenged by reversibility 
because the very act of reversing implies that there is an epistemological 
standard (rationalism?) beyond the traditional standards held up to scrutiny.       
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 Semilogical Reasoning refers to the preoperational tendency to relate thoughts 
loosely rather than logically.  This is obviously a recurring tendency, regardless 
of age.  However, in children especially there is a tendency to 
anthropomorphise cause and effect relationships - natural events are explained 
in terms of human or divine behaviours.  Piaget described this stage as 
artificialism (1973: Ch 11).  The child moves from egocentric explanations of 
phenomena (realism) to animistic explanations (animism), human explanations, 
divine explanations (artificialism), and finally mechanistic explanations 
(atomism).  Development from semilogical to logical reasoning reflects this 
continuum.   
 
Religious fundamentalism is characterised by divine artificialism.  In some ways 
fundamentalism's suspicion of naturalism may reflect a stage conflict.  The 
divine locus of authority, and the powerful sense of divinely orchestrated cause 
and effect is challenged by the new insights of atomism.  Fundamentalism may 
retreat into, or redefine, its artificialism through encounter with atomistic 
structures. 
 
The Protestant fundamentalist embrace of artificialism is evidenced by concern 
with the miraculous in everyday life, supplicational prayer, sharing times during 
church services for what the Lord has done in my life this week, and divine 
attributions for current events.  The latter was evidenced recently by prominent 
fundamentalist Jerry Falwell's highly publicised comments regarding the causes 
of September 11th attacks: 
What we saw on Tuesday could be miniscule if in fact God continues to lift the 
curtain and allow the enemies of America to give us probably what we 
deserve...I really believe that the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists 
and the gays and lesbians who are actively trying to make an alternative 
lifestyle...all of them who have tried to secularize America, I point the finger in 
their face and say, "You helped this to happen".  (In Van de Weyer, 2001:95) 
The divine mandate claimed by Taliban spokesmen as justification for the 
attacks provides evidence of fundamentalist artificialism from a different 
religious tradition.    
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 Artificial (in the Piagetian sense) interpretations of current events form a 
significant body of Protestant fundamentalist literature.  Divine artificialism 
coupled with the psychology of fundamentalist eschatology has produced and 
popularised fundamentalist classics such as Hal Lindsey's The Late Great 
Planet Earth (1970) and David Wilkerson's Set the Trumpet to thy Mouth 
(1985). Charles Strozier, author of Apocalypse: On the Psychology of 
Fundamentalism in America, notes the literal apocalyptic nature of 
fundamentalism: 
The apocalyptic energizes contemporary fundamentalism, which in it its many 
garbs has become a familiar global happening.  It is not at all clear how one 
should properly define "fundamentalism," but all students of the subject, from 
Selma to Tehran, have noted that fundamentalism has a decidedly apocalyptic 
character. (1994:2) 
Such literal apocalypticism is perhaps the ultimate manifestation of Piaget's 
divine artificialism.  Author, Grace Halsell (1987) explores the very real political 
ramifications of fundamentalist apocalypticism under the Regan and Bush 
administration in Prophecy and politics: militant evangelists on the road to 
nuclear war.  Halsell's expose provides a clear link between the psychology of 
apocalypticism and its social effects.  
 
These characteristics of Piaget's form of logic relate to all other Aspects of 
development.  The following Aspects extend Piaget's characteristic structures 
into areas more immediately identifiable with the social discourse of 
fundamentalism.   It is important to remember that each Aspect is itself a 
representation, a sign, of structures of development infinitely more complex and 
dynamic in reality than the language used to express them. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
198
 
 
 2.3.3 Fundamentalism and Locus of Authority 
 
Locus of authority is essentially an epistemological issue.  What sources of 
knowledge are valued?  What ways of knowing are dominant?  In Fowler's own 
words a locus of authority inspires the questions: 
To whom or what does a person look for validation or legitimation of his or her 
most significant felt meanings?  How is that "locus" constituted?  How is it 
justified? (In Dykstra & Parks eds., 1986:36) 
The dominant source of authoritative knowledge affects both the content of 
valued knowledge and the processes by which content structures, and is 
structured, in the developmental model. 
 
Early developmental stages attribute authority and hence, authoritative 
knowledge, to sources upon which it is dependent for other immediate basic 
needs.  The locus of authority in early stages is extrinsic.  In childhood, such 
authority is inevitably located in parents and immediate adults such as teachers.  
Fowler terms the participants in this stage incumbents of authority roles.  In 
early formal operations, the locus of authority shifts to the consensus of valued 
groups.  It is possible that the crisis of transition between these early stages is 
reflected in the manifest tension between parental and peer influences during 
adolescence.   
  
As noted previously, Piaget identified four stages of a child's conception of the 
world; realism, animism, artificialism, and atomism (1973).  During the stage of 
artificialism the child attributes all things to the purposes of humans (human 
artificialism) and later, in some cases to God (divine artificialism).  In both 
cases, authority is located in external others.  Valued knowledge is received 
and accepted from the most immediately powerful others.  This externalised 
locus of authority, found on the fulfilment of egocentric needs, may be 
contrasted with the intrinsic locus of authority at later stages.   
 
In later stages of development authority is located more within internalised 
experience - intrinsic authority.  The external authorities that dictate the 
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 knowledge of youth become subject to the authority of individual experience 
and eventually of cumulative human wisdom.       
 
The fundamentalist locus of authority is essentially and primarily external and 
received.  Authority is located outside of the self in Scripture and its canonised 
interpreters.  The Christian Bible and the Muslim Koran share the claim to be 
the definitive Words of God.  The Vedas and Upanishads of Hinduism and the 
Tripitaka of Buddhism play less of an authoritative role in their respective 
fundamentalisms, perhaps due to a lesser emphasis historically on 
canonisation.  This is not to say that scriptural interpretation has not been an 
issue of authority in these fundamentalisms.    
 
In Protestant Christian and Sunni Islamic fundamentalism Scripture is a locus of 
authority perceived to record the very words of God. However, words are 
necessarily, read, understood, and applied.  Out of this necessity, authority is 
invested in interpreters of The Word.  In the case of Protestant fundamentalism 
the words of particular preachers or evangelists become almost as authoritative 
as Scripture.  In Catholic fundamentalism the interpretive locus of authority may 
be attributed to the Pope as bearer of the authority of apostolic succession.  
The externalised locus of authority is observed in the priest, pastor, minister or 
televangelist of Protestantism; the imam, ayatollah, ulama, faqih, or marja'al-
taqlid of Shi'ism; the mullah, mufti, or alim of Sunnism; the guru of Hinduism; the 
bodhisattva of Mayhayana Buddhism; or the arahat of Theravada Buddhism.  In 
each case the external authority is made congruous with the divine or the 
ultimate to the point that other epistemologies are subordinated.  
 
An external locus of authority is an ontogenetic necessity.  Children cannot 
derive authority from experiences that they have not had.  External authority 
limits very real dangers faced by children before they are able to comprehend, 
internalise, and abstract the reasoning behind a command.   Yet for creative 
interactionism to occur experience must eventually be allowed to inform a 
rational understanding of external authority; it is in this way that external 
authority may develop to be communicated and made relevant in new 
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 environments.  When an external locus of authority perpetuates its own 
existence divorced from an understanding of that which perhaps it initially 
sought to protect, it becomes a dead metaphor, a symbol without the 
symbolised - an idol.  Fundamentalism tends to perpetuate external loci of 
authority by subordinating empirical and rational knowledge with the knowledge 
of revelation and the authority of divine mandate. 
   
Fundamentalism may be characterised by its maintenance of external authority 
and its suspicion of experiential or human epistemologies.  The fundamentalist 
is suspicious of subjective knowledge, knowledge from experience, or intuitive 
gnosis because the self is not to be trusted.  In Christian fundamentalism the 
self is innately flawed and inherently blind - the legacy of the Original Sin.  In 
such fundamentalist theology true knowledge begins with the fear of God.  The 
denial of self, the fear of intellectual deception, and a distinctive distrust of 
secular science tend to reinforce the power of extrinsic authority within the 
community of faith.  It is a psychological principle of fundamentalism that the 
individual capacity for critical thought is surrendered to a single higher authority 
said to be the best interpreter of the Ultimate authority. 
 
The distinctive fatalism of both Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism evidence 
such a surrender of dynamic critical perception.  Their respective cliches, "thy 
will be done", "The Lord works in mysterious ways", "God's ways are higher 
than man's" and  "if Allah wills it" are spoken most often when experience 
seems incongruous with religious expectation.  They represent the relegation of 
intrinsic dissonance by resignation to a higher authority.  To entertain such 
dissonance would be to value the intrinsic (self) over the external (God) and 
thus to succumb to human pride - the idolatry of self.   
 
These observations concerning the locus of fundamentalist authority cannot be 
divorced from the contents of fundamentalisms.  These contents are discussed 
extensively by the socio-historical researchers of fundamentalism such as Marty 
and Appleby (1991), Marsden (1991), and Armstrong (2000).  It is suffice to say 
here that the common apocalyptic themes, fear of post-death retribution, and 
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 grand narratives of fundamentalisms reflect and create the extremes of its state 
and structure of mind.  Content and structure in fundamentalism collectively 
deny personal or intrinsic, intuitive knowledge; distrust human wisdom and 
human experience; and accordingly arrest development into the intrinsic 
epistemologies that Fowler describes as later stages of the Aspect of faith - 
Locus of Authority.   
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 2.3.4  Fundamentalism and Social Awareness and   
                         Perspective Taking 
 
While all Aspects of faith are codependent it is particularly difficult to separate 
Social Awareness from Perspective Taking.  Perspective taking or role taking 
refers to the ability to perceive the world, to perceive others perceiving the 
world, and to perceive being perceived by others.  Fowler's work in this area 
draws heavily on Robert Selman's stage theory of perspective-taking.  
Psychosocial development entails an increasing ability to abstract perception 
and stand outside of oneself.   
 
Fowler's associate Robert Selman associates perspective taking abilities with 
developmental structures.  He postulates three steps in social perspective 
taking: simple perspective taking, interpersonal perspective taking, and mutual-
interpersonal perspective taking (In Fowler, 1981:72-773).  Fowler describes 
these using personal applications.  He describes the three stages respectively 
as, "I see you seeing a third object",   "I see you seeing me", "I see you seeing 
me; I see you seeing me seeing you" (72,73).  In essence Fowler and Selman 
are arguing that developmental progression enables more objective 
understandings of self through the recognition of others.  
 
Social Awareness as an aspect of faith, refers to the principles of inclusion and 
exclusion by which an individual engages or disengages other individuals 
according to their social group.  It is an issue of self-identification.  In Fowler's 
terms, social awareness: 
Focusses on the extent of inclusiveness and accuracy of construal of the 
reference groups in relation to which persons ground their identity and define 
their moral responsibility. (In Dykstra & Parks, 1986: 36) 
Developmentally, this sense of social awareness moves from the local to the 
universal.  
 
Fundamentalism actively discredits the value and integrity of other perspectives 
and socio-religious groups.  There is no unity in diversity, one beyond the many 
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 for a fundamentalist.  In fact, fundamentalists see themselves as the only One 
of the many as evidenced by the title of Reconstructionist apologist, Rousas 
Rushdoony's The One and the Many (1971).  As such, the same mechanisms 
of fundamentalism that restrict developed perspective taking tend to affect 
social awareness. The application of such social awareness and perspective 
taking to fundamentalism and stages beyond, is in their respective willingness 
to first observe and then appreciate the position of others.  It is a contention of 
this thesis that fundamentalism arrests development of perspective taking. 
 
Fundamentalists believe that all other beliefs (perspectives) are wrong.  
Whether their fault is in emphasis, morality, or theology is immaterial, for any 
default from the one true faith that so many different fundamentalist churches 
claim, has the same inevitable and terrible consequence - eternal damnation.  
Fundamentalism implicitly discourages advanced perspective taking because it 
may lead to empathy, and empathy leads to appreciation, appreciation leads to 
doubt, and doubt is the mark of a weak faith.  It is the weakness of Job, Peter 
and Thomas.  Fundamentalism's demonisation and censorship of other 
perspectives, its isolationism, ironically weakens the understanding of its own 
tenets of faith.  A creed understood in isolation is perhaps not appreciated or 
embraced as much as a creed deliberately formed through critical reflection of 
other's creeds.   
 
Winell (1993), Babinski (1995) and Edlin (1999) note that such censored 
perspective taking often has an adverse affect if the fundamentalist is exposed 
to new perspectives later in life.  The precocious identity formed and protected 
in youth has difficulty surviving the exposure to new perspectives that early 
adulthood may bring.  Many fundamentalist churches and schools have bridging 
courses to counter the increased exposure to new perspectives encountered at 
secular universities.   
 
The apologetics course for school leavers known as Mind Wars (1996) is one 
such example.  The title page of the course booklet includes the question: "Will 
you survive?" and the answer, "Only if you are prepared".  The course is 
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 marketed as a "university survival course".  
 
Such intensive courses (delivered over a weekend) lend themselves to the 
"banking education" rejected by Paulo Friere.  Without the complementary 
process of learning content through experience such teaching has a tendency 
toward precocious identity formation.  The individual is immersed with content 
without time or objective context to process it.  This content is prematurely 
internalised and manifests itself superficially as rhetorical rebuttals of other's 
perspectives.   This has the effect of arresting the need for depthful interaction 
of perspectives that leads to developed perspective taking. 
 
Throughout early developmental stages (I & II) identification is with immediate 
others - usually family.  In these early years children construct especially 
powerful images of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and religion. These categories 
are by no means mutually exclusive.  A child's physical need to belong and the 
accompanying egoism involves identification with the most significant others.  
This is perhaps a survival response of all infant life. The competitiveness that 
child egoism inevitably provokes may later manifest in sibling rivalry, gender 
rivalry, racial rivalry or religious rivalry.  Increasing contact with others may 
increase the bounds of social awareness unless a learned fear of difference 
dominates the encounter.  Usually learned fears of difference will prevent an 
encounter from taking place inasmuch as social segregation perpetuates the 
fear of otherness and thus encounter with it. The developmental concern is the 
equilibration or balance of power between the actual experiences the young 
have and the precocious discourses through which they interpret such 
experiences. The provincial awareness that characterises fundamentalism is 
indicative of such stage structures. 
 
In later stages of development (V & VI) social awareness "extends beyond class 
norms and interests" eventually leading to "identification with the species [and 
a] transnarcissistic love of being" (Fowler, 1981:245).  At these stages one finds 
an identification with a common humanity that accepts even those who reject 
this same notion.  There exists a distinctive sense of the one beyond the many 
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 that unites rather than divides, and includes rather than segregates.  At such 
stages, social labels apply only to describe specific aspects of difference, rather 
than holistic being.     
 
Fundamentalisms as total ideologies cannot afford to admit the integrity of other 
perspectives.  Perspective taking promotes empathy and empathy with others 
does little to protect the absolutism of one's own beliefs.  Distance allows 
differences to exist in a void of empathy.  Fundamentalism thus reflects the 
social awareness and perspective taking of early stages of development.  
Moreover, it tends to perpetuate such stages through the structuring power of 
contents utilising metaphors of difference and alienation from collective 
humanity. 
 
In the discourse of Protestant fundamentalism these differentiating metaphors 
appear as, the sheep and the goats, the lost and the found, the saved and the 
unsaved, the elect and the fallen.  The notions of true prophets and false 
prophets, true teachers and false teachers, deceivers, false angels of light, and 
wolves in sheep's clothing, create a climate of suspicion in Protestant 
fundamentalism.  In a structure where absolute truth is paramount and 
problems of interpretation rarely legitimated, dissent attributed to spiritual 
deception and demonisation of the other is commonplace.  This demonisation 
(almost literally) of difference is a powerful deterrent to those whose doubts 
might otherwise cause them to leave the fold.  Social awareness is dictated by a 
prejudicial discourse.  The demonisation of difference over jot or tittle prohibits a 
natural synthesis of awareness through social encounter.  Thus, 
fundamentalism tends to concentrate on difference rather than commonality.  In 
all guises fundamentalisms tend to be hostile to ecumenical movements.  Some 
branches of Protestant fundamentalism expect the Antichrist to be the leader of 
a World Church.  Indeed, it is not an uncommon contention in Protestant 
fundamentalist literature that the Catholic Pope is the Antichrist of Revelation.   
 
Ecumenicism or synthesis is often seen as heretical compromise, a watering 
down of faith - an unequal yoking.  The consequences of heresy and 
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 deconversion in all fundamentalisms are extreme.  Immediate ex-
communication and social ostracism are the least of such consequences.  The 
bounds of social awareness in fundamentalism are patrolled by such 
indoctrinated fears of other. 
  
The concept of otherworldliness is yet another structuring content of Protestant 
fundamentalism that limits the bounds of social awareness.  Protestant 
fundamentalists see themselves as strangers in the world and in the world but 
not of the world.  The world is inherently evil and fallen.  There is a sense in 
Christian, Buddhist, and Hindu fundamentalism in which truth is to be found in 
transcendence and detachment from the world.  In Hinduism moksa describes 
release from the life-cycle of samsara.  In Buddhism, nirvana describes the 
ultimate state of release from the principal suffering characteristic of human life. 
Taken literally, this sense of otherworldliness has seen in extreme cases the 
establishment of separatist fundamentalist communities seeking independence 
from the political, social, cultural, and economic systems of an inherently evil 
world.  Younger generations raised in physical or religious isolation are 
inevitably likely to accept the reality with which they are first presented.  The 
reality of many fundamentalisms is one of fear - a fear of otherness.  It is a fear 
that is rarely tested in social isolation.  Such isolation stunts psychosocial 
development - even development into a conscious embrace of the very truths 
fundamentalism seeks to protect. 
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 2.3.5 Fundamentalism and World Coherence 
 
The Aspect, World Coherence refers to relationships between the various 
discourses encountered and held at any given stage.  The relationships 
between discourses (Fowler calls these genres) develop from episodic 
fragmented and tacitly held relationships of early stages (I, II & III) to more 
explicit and unitive systems in later stages (IV, V & VI).  In Fowler's words, 
World Coherence, "represents a focus on each stage's particular way of 
composing and holding a comprehensive sense of unified meanings (In Dykstra 
& Parks, 1986:37).  World Coherence naturally moves from the concrete to the 
abstract over time as new connections, patterns, and categories are imposed 
on existing contents and experiences.  There are two interesting dynamics in 
fundamentalism's sense of world coherence.  The first is its tendency to 
accelerate development until stage four; the second is its tendency to arrest 
development into stages five and six. 
 
Fundamentalists of all faiths are plied with all-encompassing meta-narratives 
from an early age.  Children in fundamentalist communities of faith are overtly 
exposed to ultimate contents of faith.  There exists an educational immediacy 
driven by a fear of contamination from other sources and the saving power of 
true knowledge.  It is a fear fuelled by belief in a young age of accountability 
that ultimately determines the course of eternal life.  Fundamentalisms identified 
by a rejection of secular modernity recognise the importance of separatist 
education for the protection of their worldview.  Independent Christian 
fundamentalist schools are distinctive in their overt teaching of a cohesive Bible-
centred worldview.  The Dayanand Anglo-Vedic schools of Hinduism, the home-
schooling of Muslim dakwah children in Malaysia, the Agudist schools that feed 
students into the yeshiva in Jewish Israel are all examples of the necessary 
separatism of fundamentalist education.  The distinctive of such schools is 
primarily the meta-narrative of their religious worldview, and the perception that 
they exist in spite of a surrounding and hostile secular environment.   
 
A meta-narrative is an all-encompassing story.  It is a cosmology of the 
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 universe, an assessment of the human condition and purpose, an explanation 
of history, and a vision of the future.  The meta-narrative is at the top of a 
hierarchy of subordinate contents where contents represent the minutiae of life 
and experience.  The meta-narrative is the plot dictating all details of the story.  
The highest level of the Protestant fundamentalist meta-narrative affirms a 
triune God of all creation, a fallen humanity, and an atoning Christ who will 
return to judge the living and the dead for an eternity in heaven or hell.  The 
highest level of the Jewish Orthodox meta-narrative affirms a single God 
seeking to bring redemption to a disobedient world through His chosen race 
(the Jews).  His penultimate act will be to send a Messiah to liberate His people 
from oppression.  The highest level of the Muslim meta-narrative is summed up 
by the shahadah, "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his 
Messenger".  The meta-narrative is often expressed through a profession of 
faith (the shahadah) or a creed (The Apostle's Creed).  
 
The meta-narrative, with all its implications, is intended to permeate all aspects 
of life.  In the context of education and schooling it permeates, even dominates, 
curriculum.  It is this distinctive of fundamentalism that accelerates the 
development of a coherent worldview.  From a young age fundamentalist 
children are taught to make apparent causal connections between the meta-
narrative and life experience.  Fundamentalists are often characterised by the 
concreteness, the absoluteness, and the internal coherence of their worldview.  
With the assumption of coherence comes a supreme confidence.  The 
emphasis on internal coherence implicit in fundamentalism facilitates 
development into Fowler's stage four where world coherence is explicit and 
there is 'clarity about boundaries and inner connections of [the] system’ (stage 
four).  Fundamentalists learn about the why before they experience the what.  
There is little equitable epistemological synthesis between experience and 
attribution. There is little value placed on learning from experience.  The 
fundamentalist's doctrine is a fait accompli.  It does not evolve or develop - it is 
to be learned and embraced through obedience, rather than constructed and 
embraced through experience. It is for this reason that fundamentalism tends to 
limit development to stages of world coherence that are explicit having clarity 
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 about boundaries and inner connections of the system.  To embrace 
multisystemic and unitive systems of coherence would be to succumb to the 
most subtle and potent of heresies - compromise. 
 
Fowler describes later stages of world coherence as "multisystemic, unitive 
actuality felt and participated unity of One beyond the many".  Fundamentalisms 
essentially view themselves as the One amid the many. This is perhaps the 
essential difference between fundamentalist and liberal understandings within 
the same tradition.  The precocious childhood teaching of the fundamentalist 
meta-narrative may contribute to this self-perception as the One amid the many.  
The isolation and canonisation of the fundamentalist meta-narrative often 
removes it from the critical focus of its bearer.  It becomes a closed system of 
logic protected from inspection by the powerful distancing and demonisation of 
its critics. 
 
A meta-narrative may arrest development when it is learned precociously, 
uncritically, and remains detached from internalised and contextualised 
understanding.  The difference between intrinsic (internalised) and superficial 
understanding is arguably a developmental difference.  Intrinsic understanding 
of a meta-narrative results from creative, logical, and original abstraction and 
extrapolation beyond the familiar responses of a discourse passively received 
rather than actively constructed.  It should be acknowledged here that a 
developmental epistemology underlies these assumptions.   
 
World coherence forms a worldview and fundamentalist worldviews (like others) 
are protected and perpetuated by creed, doctrine, ritual, and canon 
administered in the security of community.  These are the modes of the meta-
narrative and the means of social transmission.  At the same time, 
fundamentalism has been described as a reaction to modernity.  The 
connection between these two characterisations of fundamentalism is 
enlightening.  It reveals the power and preference of an epistemology tied to the 
language of creed and canon.  The unquestioning allegiance to creed and 
canon characteristic of fundamentalism reflects a form of world coherence 
210
 
 
 based on an external locus of authority and an early developmental 
understanding of the symbolic function of language. Piaget's observation that a 
child's "real religion, at any rate during the first years, is quite definitely anything 
but the over-elaborated religion with which he is plied" (1973:399-400) 
expresses the problem of fundamentalist systems that teach the content of 
world coherence before the ability to process it maturely has developed.  What 
makes this a problem unique to fundamentalism is the absolute authority given 
to the contents, the value contents are given though detached from internalised 
understanding, and the inclusion of contents that promote fear of self-criticism.   
 
Seldom do we seek to learn what we think we already know.  This is the 
developmental danger of a precociously received discourse. If the child of 
fundamentalism is rewarded for memorising a scripture, singing a chorus well, 
repeating or forming a new analogy to reinforce preexisting contents, and 
punished for loitering on the boundaries of the discourse by using abstraction to 
question the sacred fundamentals - then the child will not develop the social 
awareness, unitive world coherence or symbolic function of later stages of 
development. 
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 2.3.6  Fundamentalism and Symbolic Function 
 
The Aspect of Symbolic Function refers to the structured understanding of the 
relationship between the symbol and the symbolised.  A symbol is one thing 
that represents another.  Fowler's conception of symbolic function is perhaps 
indebted to theologian Paul Tillich's work in Dynamics of Faith (1957).  Tillich (in 
Cohen, 1988:37) identifies a symbol as pointing beyond itself and participating 
in that to which it points.  In the developmental discourse which is necessarily 
structuralist, language is both a symbol of reality and a reality itself.  Language 
reflects a world beyond itself but creates a world within itself.  Language speaks 
of existence and speaks into existence.  This is an essential concept for the 
development study of faith and religion. 
 
During Piaget's preoperational period, semiotic function enables 
representational thought.  However, representational thought is not perceived 
as such during this stage.  The sign and the symbol of semiotic function are 
synonymous with their realities.  There is little differentiation between the two; 
"This notion that words or other signs are arbitrarily assigned to objects is not 
easy for the child to grasp.  Young children think that an object's name is as 
intrinsic to the object as are its color and form" (Miller, 1993:52).  Differentiation 
between the object and the sign or symbol increases throughout development. 
 
In developmental terms symbolic understanding moves from the literal (no 
understanding of symbolic function), to the separative (distinguishing symbol 
from symbolised), to the irreducible (deliberate reconstruction and rejoining of 
symbol and symbolised).  For Tillich and Fowler, religious symbols are as 
potent as their 'actualisation through unification of reality'.  Tillich labels this 
reality the ultimate concern and Fowler labels it, ultimate environment.  In 
fundamentalisms there is a characteristic tendency to defend the absolute 
uniqueness of a religious symbol.  Any deviation, any unfamiliarity is 
immediately unacceptable.  This accounts for the absolutism and separatism of 
many fundamentalisms. This absolute defence of the religious symbol could 
represent either the early stages of development wherein the symbol is 
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 defended because it is taken as a literal truth and not a symbol at all, or the 
later stages wherein the symbol is seen as the best possible representation of a 
reality that would be imperceptible without it.  There are several characteristics 
of fundamentalism that suggest it is more representative of early stages of 
symbolic function development. 
These characteristics include, literal interpretation and acontextual application 
of Scripture (text centred approach), prejudicial suspicion of other symbolic 
systems, reticence to reinterpret in light of evidence, and over-generalisation.  
There is little doubt that the hermeneutic most applied by Protestant 
fundamentalists is literalist.  Kathleen Boone explores Protestant literalism in 
The Bible tells them so - the discourse of Protestant fundamentalism (1989).  
Literalism, coupled with an inerrant view of Scripture lends itself to acontextual 
application.   
 
More extreme historical and contemporary examples include Protestant 
fundamentalist calls for the silence of women in church, instances of refusal to 
seek medical treatment, refusal of blood transfusions, defence of six-day 
creationism, call for the death penalty for homosexuals, denial of infant 
salvation, the condoning of slavery, flat earth belief, and geocentric cosmology - 
to name but a few.  That many modern fundamentalists would refute the 
fundamentalist interpretations of the past only reveals, as Barr suggests, that "In 
order to avoid imputing error to the Bible, fundamentalists twist and turn back 
and forward between literal and non-literal interpretation" (1981:40).   
In keeping with this paper's thesis, fundamentalists may develop in some 
Aspects within the closed system of logic that early stage structures reinforce.  
Early stages of symbolic function create literal interpretations that the abilities of 
later stages of symbolic function are used to verify.  If a literal interpretation 
causes too much dissonance or inconvenience it may be softened by a 
symbolic or figurative approach.  However, the stigma of changing one's 
interpretation within the fundamentalist community may be so great that 
symbolic understanding and particular contents of faith are best left 
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 unacquainted.          
 
The prejudicial suspicion of other symbolic systems of faith characteristic of 
fundamentalism suggests that boundaries are defined, not by close examination 
of symbolised ethical and experiential realities, but by the immediate familiarity 
of the symbols themselves.  Such symbols include ritual, language, and 
appearance.  It is the sort of separatism based on first and external impressions 
unsupported by longevity and depth of relationship.  It is the difference between 
intrinsic differentiation and extrinsic differentiation (Allport in Cohen, 1988:78).  
This same literalisation of symbol may in part account for the very factionalism 
within fundamentalism.  Preconceived reluctance to seek commonality leaves a 
form of defensive isolationism.  Coupled with a literalised understanding of 
symbolic function the potential for difference is increased.  This is so, simply 
because the number of fundamentals increases. 
  
Fundamentalism has been described as a reaction to modernity (Marty, 1991).   
This observation is congruent with the structuring of symbolic function just 
described.  A tradition that protects its symbols as literal truths will initially view 
any foreign element suspiciously - especially when the foreign element is 
considered produced or purported by an epistemologically inferior group.  
Fundamentalism's identification with traditional, orthodox, or old time religion 
signifies its inherent suspicion of the new.  James Barr, author of 
Fundamentalism (1981) attacks as delusion the Protestant Fundamentalist's 
self-identification with literal and orthodox interpretation by revealing the 
continuum drift between the self-proclaimed fundamentalists of the past and the 
present.  Cohen (1988), like Barr, argues that fundamentalists are often 
relativist in their reaction to modernity.  Babinski dedicates his testimonial, 
Leaving the Fold with a similar observation:  
To Protestant Fundamentalist Christians, who do not realize how liberal they 
have grown over the past few hundred years, and who may wish to consider 
alternatives to the "conservatism" they now embrace. (1995)  
While fundamentalists claim to interpret text literally they are selectively literal 
when insurmountable evidence makes a literal reading unfeasible.  The 
emergence of selective literalisation may well be an indication of transition 
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 between stages of symbolic function.  
 
Symbolic Function and Understanding of Language 
Words are symbols - descriptions of a reality that is paradoxically beyond yet 
contained within the phonetics of speech and visuals of writing.   Language is a 
representation of the world and a creation of the same.  This is a complex and 
contentious relationship between two poles of traditional emphasis.  An 
absolutist approach to language makes the link between language and reality 
inextricable and congruent such that little is lost in translation between the two. 
Fundamentalism has a characteristic linguistic absolutism. Don Cupitt 
summarises the view succinctly in The Long-Legged Fly (1987) believing that 
absolutists: 
...are in grip of the ancient myth that language follows and conforms itself to 
nature...the idea that the world itself is already in a preliminary way linguistic, 
apart from us and prior to us.  Human language follows, copies, obeys a pre-
existent cosmic order and linguisticality. (57) 
Language reflects reality with such clarity and accuracy that it becomes 
synonymous with it.  To make the distinction between the two is almost 
unnecessary. 
 
A relativistic approach to language makes the link between language and reality 
so tenuous, so subjective, that for all practical purposes reality cannot be 
spoken about (except the reality that it cannot be spoken about!).  
Words shape the way we see the world, so we fancy that the world has shaped 
our words.  In reality, language determines perception ... The word forms the 
perception (Cupitt, 1987:57)  
Relativism views the link between epistemology, cognition and language as so 
exclusive that there is no knowing beyond that which can be said.  In ancient 
mythology the philosopher Heraclitus thought the flux of language rendered its 
meaning so useless that he refused to speak.  This is the second extreme.     
 
In Metaphor and Religious Language (1985), Janet Martin Solskice examines 
the confusion resulting from literalisation and failure to recognise metaphor in 
religious language.  She quotes Marc Belth in a chapter entitled Metaphor and 
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 'Words Proper': 
Not to recognise metaphors, but to speak or write them is to be used by those 
metaphors and to be entangled in them.  To recognise them is to use them, 
consciously alert to the influence and consequences of their use...Indeed, a 
dead metaphor, a metaphor transferred into a literal statement is clearly mythic. 
(In Solskice: 70) 
Nietzsche viewed this transference of metaphor into literal statement as the 
"human tendency to view one's own manner of categorizing as 'fixed, canonic 
and binding' as the one true account of truth" (In Solskice: 78).  A structural 
developmental approach views this tendency as relative to stage development.  
 
The structural developmental approach encompasses both an absolutist and 
relativistic approach but denies the exclusivity of either one or the other.  It 
acknowledges that language is a symbol often many times removed by culture, 
socialisation and tradition but retains the purposefulness of its symbolic function 
and the existence of ways of knowing a priori to their articulation. In 
developmental terms:  
'...language is used to express and explore experience.  Language makes 
possible the "socialisation" of action schemata.  They can be named, 
remembered and spoken about with others.  Also inner states and feelings can 
be expressed (Fowler, 1981: 56).   
It is a principle of structural development that the use and understanding of 
language moves always from the literal to the symbolic, as from the concrete to 
the abstract. 
 
Fowler observes the relationship between language and thought in the Intuitive-
Projective stage: 
The production and repetition of vocal sounds, which elicit response and mutual 
imitation between parents and child, do not effectively come into the service of 
thought until the beginnings of the second year of life.  At that point, when the 
convergence of thought and language begins to occur, the child takes hold of a 
qualitatively new and powerful kind of leverage on the world of experience. 
(123) 
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Fowler goes on to say of the Stage One child, "And while the precursors of 
conceptual abstractions are present...only concrete symbols and images really 
 
 
 address the child's way of knowing" (129).  Similarly in Fowler's early Mythic-
Literal stage, "There is also a sense in which the meanings [of stories] are 
trapped in the narrative, there not being yet the readiness to draw from them 
conclusions about a general order of meaning in life" (137).  In his summary of 
the Mythic-Literal stage Fowler observes that, "Beliefs are appropriated with 
literal interpretations, as are moral rules and attitudes.  Symbols are taken as 
one-dimensional and literal in meaning" (149).  The application of literal and 
symbolic understandings of language to fundamentalism and liberalism 
respectively provides a powerful model for describing the characterising 
distinctions of the same. 
 
Fundamentalism is characterised by a sense of linguistic determinacy and 
literalisation synonymous with early Mythic-Literal, concrete stages of 
development. This may manifest itself as aggressive dogmatism, the defence 
(sometimes to death) of a particular creed, an obsession with heresy, 
subscription to Biblical inerrancy and infallibility, popularisation of instantaneous 
conversion, separation based on articulation, and an interchangeable 
understanding of faith and belief.   
 
The word dogmatism connotes aggressiveness.  This not to say that the 
aggressive defence of one's belief is wrong or limited to early stage structures.  
It is to suggest however that the need to be aggressive in defence of one's 
belief is linked proportionally to its exclusivity or accommodation and that these 
are linked in turn to one's understanding of language. Babinski in Leaving the 
Fold (1995) goes so far as to equate archetypal fundamentalists with Colin 
Wilson's violent male: 
The Violent male-and almost all violence is committed by males-seems to be a 
man who literally cannot ever, admit he might be wrong.  He knows he is 
right...this model describes not only many, many infamous criminals, but quite a 
few of the more infamous statesmen and churchmen of history, who were not 
called criminals only because they were powerful enough to define what was 
'crime' in their society. (in Babinski: 27)  
This characteristic aggressiveness is noted also by Grace Halsell in her expose 
of fundamentalist politics Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the 
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 Road to Nuclear War.  Similarly, Marlene Winell's Leaving the Fold describes 
the authoritarian nature of fundamentalism as, 'stifling to the individual and cruel 
in its implications for others' (1993:92). Peter Cameron describes 
fundamentalists as 'very much at home with authority, obedience, and 
conformity'.  The aggressiveness of fundamentalism is inextricably linked to the 
contents of its creed and the literalness of understanding. 
 
For the fundamentalist, belief is literally a matter of life and death - eternal life in 
union with God and eternal death and suffering without God.  These are the 
ultimate stakes.  As such they call for extreme measures and utmost 
seriousness.  They are the stakes that cause the fundamentalist to face 
persecution and rejection for sharing their beliefs.  They are the stakes that 
cause the genuine suffering of carrying the burden for the lost if the lost are 
close and loved.  Aggression is born of many things - fear, protectionism, guilt 
and hate to name a few.  Aggression is necessary in the propagation of belief 
when one believes in two mutually exclusive forces, good and evil, embodied in 
God and Satan, warring literally in spiritual realms for the souls of humanity.    
 
For the fundamentalist, eternal bliss and eternal suffering are monumental 
truths determined by seemingly fickle circumstances despite the assurance that 
God is sovereign and He does the converting.  There is an evangelical 
aggression born of the belief that any one conversation (confrontation) may 
change the eternal destiny of the evangelised. There is a tangible fear and guilt 
that people are being lost for lack of sowers of the Word - the propagation of 
Christianity often becomes a mission of guilt rather than a spreading of good 
news.  Such aggressive evangelism is a feature of almost all absolutist 
ideologies.  Is it an expression of a literal understanding of language indicative 
of early stages of development? To answer this question one must turn to the 
source of the doctrine of heaven, hell, and salvation motivating such aggressive 
evangelism - the Bible. 
 
At this point the discussion returns to the perspectives of fundamentalism and 
liberalism as previously defined.  A fundamentalist is adamant that the Bible is 
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 literally the Word of God, inspired by God, a book like no other, and the ultimate 
authority on all issues concerning life and God.  Now such tenets of belief may 
be held at many stages of development.  The case in point is that the way they 
lend themselves to be held is a characteristic of fundamentalism.  For such 
claims are usually made in denial of the legitimacy of any other system or 
articulation of belief.  There is little attempt to look for similarities beneath 
culture dressings, little tolerance for comparative religion.  An example of this is 
the understanding of belief in Christ. 
 
A literal interpretation of certain Scriptures finds that belief in Christ is the only 
means to salvation.  The pivotal verse John 3:16, "For God so loved the world 
that he gave his only Son, that whosoever believes in Him should not perish but 
have eternal life" is a summary of fundamentalist doctrine.  Coupled with 
literalisations of heaven and hell and the concept of original sin it is easy to see 
the black and white nature of the fundamentalist worldview.  The world is fallen 
and perishing (going to hell).  The only ones who escape this certain fate are 
those who believe in Christ.   
 
The literal understanding of such scripture assumes many things.  Such 
understanding assumes firstly; that heaven and hell are real places as 
described literally in the book of Revelation rather than symbols of states of 
being; secondly, that heaven and hell are divinely revealed truths rather than 
historically evolved and enculturated concepts; thirdly, that heaven and hell are 
totally separate from the realm of earth; fourthly, that the experience after death 
is of one or the other and not of both; and finally, that entry to either heaven or 
hell is determined by one's articulation of belief in Christ. 
 
Thus the doctrinal approach of fundamentalism is both born of literal 
interpretation and perpetuating of literal interpretation.  It ignores the symbolic 
function of language by failing to explore the essences of human experience 
below its writing and speaking, all the while severing itself from the possibility of 
synonymous language.  In Fundamentalism there is the absolute defence of 
particular words in their literal visual or phonetic form.  Fundamentalism while 
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 fulfilling the content requirements of early stages tends to retard growth into 
further stages: "A particular environment may halt, retard or accelerate the 
development, but does not modify the structures themselves" (Beilin, 1971:90).  
In liberalism there is the ability to abstract words from the truths they represent; 
the ability to recognise synonyms; the intrinsic ability to weigh the value of 
words between the power and flux of their ability to express and to create 
reality.   The former is an expression of Mythic-Literal structures.  The latter is a 
representative of later Conjunctive and Universal structures. 
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 2.3.7 Fundamentalism and Moral Judgment 
 
Reflecting the work of Kohlberg, the Aspect of Moral Judgment explores 
structures of reasoning in response to moral dilemmas.  Kohlberg used nine 
hypothetical dilemmas to explore such structures of moral judgement.  His 
thesis was that moral judgement reflected universal stage structures ranging 
from an early form of reasoning based on an egoistic concern with punishment 
and obedience to later forms based on morally interdependent social and 
universal relationships.     
 
The early stages of moral development, Punishment - Reward Orientation, and 
Instrumental Hedonism Orientation reflect a predominantly individualistic 
concern with well-being that is not yet linked to the well-being of the other.  
Such stages reflect a morality dictated by an external authority.  Such authority 
is obeyed out of habit, fear of retribution and expectation of reward, rather than 
obedience due to reasonable trust.  This is perhaps an inevitable consequence 
of comparative life experience between parent and child.  To speak allegorically 
one must have lived long enough to touch enough hot plates or to learn about 
heat and pain in order to understand and reasonably trust an order not to do so.  
Habitual obedience reinforced by punishment and reward is a necessary 
mechanism of basic survival.   
 
In later stages of development morality is perceived more as a practical matter 
of cause and effect in the context of a complex of social and universal 
interrelationships. Advanced reasoning allows for differentiation between 
contextual mores and moral imperatives, while recognising the symbolic 
relationship between the two.  There is a dynamic tension between the active 
embrace of previously passively obeyed laws and the desire to reform and 
reinterpret the same in light of an ever-changing life context.  The moral aspect 
of development reveals some interesting patterns in fundamentalism. 
     
As a general observation, the fundamentalist tendency to deny the inherent 
moral capability of the individual reinforces the necessity for and power of an 
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 external locus of moral authority.  A morality received from an absolute authority 
need only be obeyed, not intrinsically processed.  The various loci of 
fundamentalist authority described in the previous section act as such 
absolutes.  The conundrum for fundamentalism is that absolute moral 
submission to a perfectly moral authority fails to recognise that any concept of 
perfection is in part (or in whole) a product of imperfect human projection.   
Human agency and moral awareness are inseparable.  To separate the human 
and the divine is to make the human less so.  As such, any system of belief that 
denies and discourages the moral capability or responsibility of the individual so 
arrests development.   
 
Such arresting beliefs are observable in a variety of fundamentalisms.  The  
separation of law and grace in Christian theology has led fundamentalists to 
both extremes of the moral continuum.  Some early Lutherans and Calvinists 
were charged with antinomianism which they believed to be defensible in light 
of the doctrine of salvation by grace, not works (Ferguson & Wright, 1988:379).  
The moralism of eighteenth century neonomians reflected the opposing 
emphasis on works as an indication of grace such that the two became 
practically inseparable.  The significance of both extremes is their derivation 
from an external locus of authority (Scripture) given absolute authority over any 
intrinsic sense of morality.  The fundamentalist's view of the morality of the 
unsaved reflects a disregard for the moral capacity of those beyond the 
discourse of fundamentalism.  Barr writes concerning the fundamentalist 
attitude, "the morality of the unsaved person is likely to be both hypocritical and 
prideful: at most, it is lightened by occasional rays of light communicated by 
conscience and the like, but these partial forms of light only make darker and 
more blameworthy the darkness that generally prevails" (1981:25).   If an 
individual is not given agency in morality or even invited into the moral process 
as a conscionable being then they will not be encouraged to develop an intrinsic 
capacity for moral judgment. 
 
The deliberate separatism and isolationism of fundamentalisms has the effect of 
limiting the universal morality of Kohlberg's stage five.  Similarly, the separation 
222
 
 
 of moral capacity from individual being tends to effectively limit the loyalty to 
being indicative of stage six.  While fundamentalists see their morals as being 
universally applicable, they are morals that must be received from external 
sources, rather than evoked from within.  Hence, there is a tendency for 
fundamentalisms to be aggressively evangelistic with moral codes and mores.  
Similarly, when being is perceived as essentially morally flawed there is little 
encouragement of loyalty to existence.  In some fundamentalisms there is a 
distinctive subjugation of humanness, a suspicion of human desire, and a 
distrust of the human condition.  Such core beliefs find expression in many parts 
of the discourse.  In Protestant fundamentalism the human condition outside of 
the fold is characterised by darkness.  As Kathleen Boone observes, 
fundamentalists perceive themselves, "either steadfast in absolute truth or 
whirling in the vortex of nihilism" (1989:24).   When such absolute truth is 
accessible only through the select, acculturated and contextualised knowledge 
of Scripture there will be little loyalty to being (fallen as it is perceived to be) as 
a structure for moral judgment. 
 
The fundamentalist's moral judgment is distrustful of self, relying on external 
authority as a canon.  This is not say that a canon does not reflect or express 
the conscionable self; indeed it often does and is necessarily a first product of 
the same.  However, over time and through tradition it becomes removed from 
the process and context that first formulated it.  Such tradition becomes 
impervious to criticism and the dynamic reinterpretation that characterises 
development.  Development does not necessarily require a change of content 
but it changes qualitatively the way in which particular contents are held.  New 
ways of perceiving contents may well lead to new contents that express the 
perception more clearly, differentiated from unwanted stigma.  To discourage 
such change through blind, unquestioning, non-dialectic, acceptance is to arrest 
the moral development.   
 
Conclusion 
The above discussion is exploratory.  It is an introduction to, not an exhaustive 
analysis of, what is truly an inexhaustible subject.  It is also conceptual - born of 
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 the same resonance that precedes all theory and leads to further empirical 
investigation.  It is a theory of synthesis, informed by existing and extensive 
empirical and historical research in the fields of human development and 
fundamentalism.  If cognitive development has any credibility (and I believe it 
does) then it must factor, to a greater or lesser extent, in the expression of 
religious fundamentalism.   
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 2.3.8    Fundamentalism as Arrested Development 
 
Compartmentalisation 
It is essential to diverge at this point and encounter some of the obvious and 
legitimate questions raised in the previous section.  Is it the suggestion of this 
thesis that fundamentalists are stage regressive and liberals are stage 
advanced?  Can a child be a liberal?  Can a fundamentalist be an abstract 
thinker?  Can fundamentalist tenets be held with a liberal mindset and vice-
versa?  Is the content of belief related to the structure of believing?  These are 
complex questions.  They question the very application of a structural 
developmental discourse.  They must be answered with legitimate complexity 
so as not to over-simplify the contentions of this thesis. 
 
Answers to these questions can be given by stating and exploring five 
principles.  Firstly, fundamentalist and liberal beliefs are not exclusively 
interchangeable with fundamentalism and liberalism as defined herein.  
Secondly, fundamentalism is a manifestation of a normal and necessary stage 
of development. Thirdly, beliefs arising from stage structures protect the 
equilibrium of the stage by restricting further development.  Fourthly, social 
transmission can overbear other structuring areas.  Fifth, Knowledge and 
process are often compartmentalised for cognitive consonance. 
 
The sum of Fundamentalist beliefs does not equal fundamentalism.  From the 
very first chapter this thesis has contended that belief is part but not the whole 
of the faith that is fundamentalism.  It is futile to try to separate the two in any 
quantitative sense.   In a qualitative sense belief is an expression (an all too 
often inaccurate expression) of a more holistic faith.  Nor is belief totally 
separable from faith - for it reciprocates faith.   
 
This is an important distinction.  For it is not a contention of this thesis that 
those who claim to hold the tenets common to fundamentalism are necessarily 
in early stages of cognitive development.  It is the way in which these tenets are 
held and the reasons why they are held which are the primary developmental 
225
 
 
 concerns of this thesis. Fundamentalism lends itself to fundamentalists and 
vice-versa.  This is more than mere truism.  It is another way of saying that not 
all who claim to be fundamentalists are encompassed by its true definition 
herein. However, it has also been maintained that there is a significant 
connection between the content of a belief and the way in which it is held.   
 
Fundamentalism is a manifestation of a normal and necessary stage of 
development.  It is not an intention of this thesis to demonise fundamentalism.  
The following paragraphs will discuss the aspects of fundamentalism that 
require criticism from a structural developmental perspective.  These are 
namely the self-protection mechanisms that inevitably and meaningfully stunt 
faith development.  This having been anticipated it is important to assure the 
normality and necessity of stage structures generating fundamentalism. 
 
All children learn content before they are able to understand, internalise, and 
abstract principles from it.  All children project anthropomorphically.   It is 
inevitable that children will be exposed to content formulated with adult 
understandings that they will not yet be able to access.  Normal development 
often facilitates a growing appreciation and understanding (if not acceptance) of 
the parent behaviours so often misunderstood in childhood.   There are many 
ways of looking at and talking about the existence of such a progression.  In a 
religious context development is the basis of free will - the belief that humans 
have somewhere meaningful to will themselves.   It is the hindrance of willful 
development where it exists, that is the failing of Fundamentalism.  In many 
other areas it may serve indirectly, to facilitate development. 
 
Beliefs arising from stage structures protect the equilibrium of the stage thus 
restricting further development.  Leaving a worldview (or at least being seen to 
leave a worldview) is a difficult step.  It is for this reason that a crisis of faith is 
so named.  Again, there are many ways of talking about the self-protection of 
belief.  Dawkins (1993) and similar commentators speak in terms of memes - 
the selfish and self-replicating units of belief.  Fundamentalists themselves 
speak metaphorically of sheep leaving the fold, coals out of the fire, of 
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 backsliding, turning one's back on the Cross, and losing faith.  It is such labels, 
the associated guilt, the social separation, the fear of stepping into the unknown 
- of leaving the security of the familiar, of being deceived, of moral degradation, 
and ultimately the fear of eternal retribution, that form the front lines of 
fundamentalism. 
 
These fears and insecurities are entrenched in powerful mythologies and 
empowered by repetitive discourse.  Staying within this discourse is often easier 
than leaving it.  Psychologist Marlene Winell identifies the intense feelings of 
confusion and guilt as part of a gradual process of recovery: 
 Whether sudden or gradual, breaking away usually creates a state of 
serious confusion...Letting go of such a massive structure can leave you feeling 
totally adrift.  The sense of existential angst can be intense as you struggle to 
get a new foothold on life...the fears instilled by the religion itself can produce 
additional anxiety.  You were taught that if you did not believe you would go to 
hell...there may be times of near panic, when you wonder whether you've made 
a terrible mistake and will be forever damned.  You might have trouble with 
intense feelings in this phase because you have been taught to interpret them 
as "conviction of the Holy Spirit". (1993:17) 
Thus, fear of change (development) is the greatest maintainer of the 
fundamentalist equilibrium.   
 
The other great maintainer of equilibrium in Fundamentalism is censorship.  
Fundamentalist communities are often isolationist - in the world but not of the 
world and set apart.   The transference of cognitive development and the 
developing ability to abstract principles inevitably raises questions for the 
developing fundamentalist.  The aforementioned fear of doubt coupled with  
superficial answers (cliches), and a prepared diet of apologetic authors often 
serves to answer or distract such questions.  Minski suggests that; 'a child 
develops metal sensors that ward off the internalization of potentially 
threatening memes' (In Gabora, 1999:10).  Gabora gives the example of 
creationist reactions to the memes of natural selection in relation to this process 
(1999:10). 
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 Perhaps the biggest deterrent from asking ultimate questions of fundamentalism 
is the fear of loneliness and isolation should one not be satisfied with the 
standard answers.  It is easier to answer a question when one has access to 
other's answers.  Fundamentalism has so demonised and censored others 
answers that one is left in a metaphysical vacuum.  At this stage many retreat 
back to the familiar - rebuilding the broken threads of the web of discourse with 
the rhetoric of a thousand ready weavers. 
 
In structural developmental terms this retreat is a return to equilibrium.  If the 
accommodation is too painful and disruptive to the equilibrium then the 
assimilating content will be rejected - and the process of development halted.  
To explain this point further, a concept from the research discourse of worldview 
proves helpful - that is the concept of compartmentalisation as a mechanism of 
cognitive dissonance and cognitive critical mass. 
 
The psychology of worldview maintenance is a discipline in and of itself.  The 
concept of cognitive censoring and compartmentalisation appear in many forms.  
What is presently termed doubt and dissonance may be known as 
inconsistencies in other research paradigms.  Worldview researcher Liane 
Gabora provides an interesting perspective on the issue of dissonance leading 
to compartmentalisation, censorship, or as she calls it - annealing of the 
conceptual network: 
In regions of the conceptual network where inconsistencies abound, a cognitive 
analog of stimulated annealing is in order; there is a willingness to question 
previous assumptions - to 'loosen' conceptual relationships - so as to let new 
concepts thoroughly percolate through the worldview and exert the needed 
revolutionary effect.  In so doing there is a risk of assimilating dangerous 
concepts.  Repression arrests the process by which dangerous thoughts 
infiltrate the conceptual network, and deception blocks thoughts that have 
already been assimilated. (1999:1) 
The mechanisms for maintaining cognitive consistency presented here may be 
discussed within the structural developmental discourse. 
 
As the five interrelated factors of development (maturation, logico-mathematical 
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 experience, physical experience, social transmission, and equilibration) interact 
throughout the lifecycle the ability to abstract and transfer principles occurs.  
This ability is perhaps what causes the initial questions and doubts, which begin 
to affect the developing fundamentalist.  Creative thinking (or scheme 
transference) allows compatibility testing between areas of worldview.  
Ultimately this is what creates stronger worldviews.  It is a micro-process of 
assimilation and accommodation.  The fundamentalist approach to such 
compatibility testing is to provide standard solutions.  While inevitable, this 
tendency circumvents the normal process of assimilation and accommodation.  
Religious Psychologist Philip Helfaer would perhaps call this - precocious 
identity formation wherein one is given contents beyond one's cognitive grasp to 
use for identification (1972).     
  
When questions, doubts, and change persist due to scheme transference 
compartmentalisation may prevent the reaching of a critical mass necessitating 
worldview change.  Compartmentalisation refers to the closing off of certain 
areas to scheme transference.  In colloquial terms it is to put in the too hard 
basket any transference causing cognitive dissonance.  As a fundamentalist if 
one finds a seeming inconsistency in the Bible or in a sermon one may close off 
the ability to associate the two by compartmentalising them.  If one struggles 
with the moral implications of a theological concept one may learn not to relate 
the theological concept with its implications by adopting euphemisms to soften 
the implications or by compartmentalising the components (refusing to think of 
them simultaneously). 
 
Fundamentalists developing in this area often find it difficult to talk about the 
reality of hell.  They prefer to concentrate on the reality of heaven.  They talk 
about the hell-bound in very euphemistic terms.  When speaking of the millions 
who will and have perished without hearing the saving gospel they speak of the 
exception, the anecdotal convert or miracle instance of supernatural conversion. 
 
This notion of compartmentalised or selective (stunted) development is 
important to the overall thesis of this thesis.  It provides explanation for the 
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 seeming retention of fundamentalistically held contents by developmentally 
progressed individuals.  Thus, the discussion returns to its initial question, "can 
a fundamentalist be an abstract thinker where the ability to abstract represents 
developed thinking"? The answer is an emphatic and obvious "yes".  However, 
like all other developing humans there are social limits for abstraction.  In 
fundamentalism's case, the compartments of its own epistemology and the 
literalness of it tenets are taboo.  The socio-religious discouragement of 
abstraction and divergence subdues the developmental tendency, or at least 
restricts it to cognitive compartments that are seen not to threaten religious 
contents. 
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 2.3.9   Conclusion 
 
The synthesis between fundamentalism and developmentalism presented in 
this chapter and culminating in the previous part has made some significant 
claims and cautions.  The synthesis has revealed that the dynamics and 
dimensions of religious fundamentalism, observed internally and externally are 
powerfully described by developmentalists’ descriptions of early stages.  
Fundamentalism generally manifests the structuring tendencies of concrete and 
early formal stages of development across several domains as described by 
Piaget, Kohlberg, Fowler, Selman, Levinson, Erikson, Oser and Gmünder.   
 
The following chapter of this study derives several principles for the practice of 
a developmentally sensitive religious education.  These principles are grounded 
in the general finding of the synthesis so far; that fundamentalism does not 
enable a full and uninhibited appropriation of developed faith in all its 
dimensions.      
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 3.                              DISCUSSION 
  
3.1   Religious Education and Developmental  
Sensitivity 
 
Introduction 
 
A developmental approach to education is nothing new.  Augustine of Hippo 
expressed the essence of a developmental approach some 1600 years ago: 
But as we are now treating of instructing candidates, I can testify to you of my 
own experiences that I am differently stirred according as he whom I see before 
me waiting for instruction is cultivated or a dullard...of this or that age or sex. (In 
Groome,1980:254) 
Some 800 years later theologian Thomas Aquinas made the statement, 
“Quidquid recipitur, secundum modum recipientis recipitur” (That which is 
received, is received according to the recipient).  Piaget's reflects some 700 
years later: 
The principal goal of education is to create men [sic] who are capable of doing 
new things, not simply of repeating what other generations have done - men 
who are creative, inventive and discoverers.  The second goal of education is to 
form minds, which can be critical, can verify, and not accept everything they are 
offered.  The great danger is of slogans, collective opinions, ready-made trends 
of thought. (In Groome, 248) 
The developmental approach is further focussed by Fowler's developmental 
theory: 
Being and becoming a person in Christian faith is a process of formation and 
maturation.  It is a human developmental process and thus Fowler's description 
of life's faith journey can inform our educational practice. (Groome, 66) 
Finally, developmentalists Oser and Gmünder make the connection between 
education, religion, and development that is the closest point of departure for 
the following discussion: 
…religious education needs to pay more attention to the different levels of 
children’s interpretive capacities as well as to the structural-developmental orientation 
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 in general. (1991, 154) 
Such thoughts provide a context for discussion of an education that is both 
dynamic and developmental.  The uniqueness of the discussion is its 
contextualisation within the synthesis of religious fundamentalism and 
developmental theory. 
 
Religious Fundamentalist Schooling in Australia 
 
Fundamentalist schools exist as a deliberate philosophical alternative to secular 
state schools, secular private schools, and even mainstream church affiliated 
schools (Anglican and Catholic).  Fundamentalist schools are usually directly 
affiliated with Pentecostal denominations or umbrella organisations with strong 
links to fundamentalist denominations such as conservative Baptist, evangelical 
Anglican, Presbyterian or Methodist denominations.  In Australia alone there are 
over 70 schools affiliated with Christian Parent Controlled Schools (CPCS).  
CPCS has strong ties with the National Institute for Christian Education (NICE) 
and NICE is strongly influenced by the Association of Christian Schools 
International (ACSI).  How do such schools view their place in the broader 
national context? 
 
Principal of NICE Richard Edlin, rationalises the separatist view of such schools 
in his definitive The Cause of Christian Education (1999): 
 Academics in secular higher education circles have long prided 
themselves with their so-called objectivity.  The fact that this pretense at 
neutrality is logically impossible in an atmosphere where there are incredible 
pressures brought to bear by the academic establishment for the faculty to pro-
actively maintain a politically correct position on many issues, has been lost on 
many of them.  One of the ways that this political correctness has been evident 
has been the discrimination against scholars and scholarship that 
acknowledges strong religious viewpoints, especially conventional Christian 
ones.  While other deeply religiously based and strongly proselytizing 
perspectives like militant feminism and scientific rationalism are not only 
tolerated but actively endorsed on campus, Christians and their perspectives 
have been considered appropriate material for derision and scorn. (1999:47) 
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 This fear of secular discrimination and ironically, an equally powerful culture of 
reverse discrimination of secular academia within fundamentalist education, 
perpetuates its existence.  This is not to argue the ethics of either case (the 
chicken or the egg?) but to identify the philosophical bedrock of separatist 
fundamentalist education - the myth of neutrality. 
 
Edlin devotes a whole chapter of The Cause of Christian Education to debunk, 
as titled, The Myth of Religious Neutrality in Education.  The myth of religious 
neutrality is demonised in fundamentalist schooling.  It is seen as the Devil's 
most powerful weapon (convincing people that he does not exist).  Edlin sees 
the neutrality philosophy as the principal evil of western education: 
The frightful tragedy is that the claim that education is religiously neutral is a 
myth of gigantic proportions.  It's a lie that has had the most fearful implications 
for generations of Christians and their children.  One of the loudest trumpets 
that Christians must blow today is the clarion call that denounces this myth. 
(1999:42) 
Edlin's fears are well founded.  However, it is the contention of this thesis that 
Christian fundamentalism's fears are founded on secular reflections of its own 
base structures. The very irrational discrimination by secular education that 
Edlin writes about is itself, a defining feature of fundamentalist education.  Both 
fail to transcend the superficial literalities of language. Both secular and 
religious fundamentalism fear difference on the level of language.  This is not to 
deny the connection between language and that which it expresses; it is to say 
that one is an expression, not entirely synonymous with the other. 
 
Edlin's call for educational separatism is based on the fundamentalist view that 
Scripture is Truth, rather than reflective of truths.  This is a subtle but powerful 
difference in perspective.  In a chapter titled, The Place of the Bible in the 
Christian School, Edlin includes a section under the title All True Knowledge is 
Biblically Founded.  In this section he writes, "The Bible alone, as God's written 
revelation, has divine authority and reliability" (58).  He then quotes Stuart 
Fowler in Michielsen's (Chairman of CPCS), No Icing on the Cake: 
...Educational directions in the Christian school are not chosen on the basis of 
faith in reason, or in practical experience, or in human personality but by the 
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 leading of the faith that is directed by the saving Word of God given in the 
Scriptures". (In Edlin,1999:59) 
There is tendency in fundamentalism to separate reason, experience, and 
personality from Scriptural truth rather than to acknowledge them as inextricably 
related to one's interpretation of Scripture.    
 
Fundamentalism asks, how does one know what is truth and what is not, 
without the standard of Scripture?  It is a legitimate question given an 
understanding of truth as fixed and clearly able to be articulated in words.   
Such truth is static and packaged, known or not known, articulated or non-
existent.  It is a vision of truth that leads to what Piaget calls a "copying" and 
Paulo Freire, a "banking" form of education: 
For Piaget the teacher's job is never to transmit facts and concepts to passive 
recipients, but rather to direct the learning process so that students can act on 
both a physical and a mental level to arrive at facts and concepts as their own. 
(Groome, 1980:249) 
A fundamentalist system of belief that values a formulaic profession of belief as 
the defining moment in eternal existence will always teach its young to believe 
before it teaches them to think.   
 
The danger of such a predisposition to banking education is that of arrested 
development or as it has been called it in previous section precocious identity 
formation.  In writing of early presentations of a belief's story and vision, 
Groome (1980) warns: 
The presentations should also emphasize that there will always be more to 
discover about the Story and its Vision; to make the version of them presented 
sound too final at this stage can arrest the pilgrimage toward maturity of 
Christian faith. (253) 
R.S. Lee, author of Your Growing Child and Religion (1965) echoes this 
warning, "Direct religious education is premature and may result in so arresting 
the development of the child that he [sic] cannot pass through the phases 
necessary to his free growth" (162).  Hence, a central concern of this thesis is; 
that fundamentalism maintains the equilibrium of the Mythic-Literal stage of its 
genesis such that it arrests further development.  It stunts developmental 
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 growth in some aspects by presenting truth as fixed, content based, absolute, 
and statically knowable at its earliest articulation. 
 
In contrast, a developmental view of truth is directional but dynamic, 
developmental and multi-dimensional; content facilitating process rather than 
defining process, revealing rather than revealed.  One is not given the truth; one 
grows into it.  Creeds are its shells; they house it for a time in a given context.  
Thus, the question may be reciprocated given the ethical similarities, common 
experiences and common goals of adherents of different creeds - how do they 
know what is truth and what is not, without the standard of Scripture?  These 
are difficult concepts to explain but nonetheless they provide the structural-
philosophical premises for considering developmentally sensitive religious 
education.  
 
Developmentally sensitive education respects the equilibrium of stage 
structures while facilitating further development.  There are two cautions to be 
sounded before attempting to define some principles of developmentally 
sensitive religious education.  The first is to affirm the integrity of all stages of 
development.  Groome summarises Fowler's conviction that:  
"...each stage has its own integrity.  Stage four is not "more faithful" than stage 
three; rather, it is a more developed and mature expression of faith than stage 
three (In Groome, 1980:69).   
My criticisms of fundamentalism are directed not at its worth as a vehicle for 
expressing and realising stage structures, rather they are directed at the 
element of fundamentalism that assumes itself to be fully developed and is 
therefore arresting of further development, even into its own beliefs.   
 
The second caution concerns the application of structural developmental 
stages. These stages are not clearly delineated; they are "tentatively 
descriptive" not "definitively prescriptive" (Groome, 1980:66).  They are applied 
with caution and should be understood qualitatively rather than quantitatively. 
 Fowler himself advises such caution and is carefully nuanced and 
tentative in his claims.  He offers his findings as provisional, warning that the 
stages of faith development are not to be reified nor lead to a "pigeon hole 
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 mentality." They can be a useful "lens or filter system" for viewing the process 
of faith development, but they can also "blur and obscure" (Groome, 1980:66) 
To neglect such a caution and apply such theory with absolute certainty and 
measure would be to succumb to the same limitations of vision as 
fundamentalist structure.  This said, it is possible to begin a cautious 
identification of some principles of developmentally sensitive education in a 
Christian context. 
 
A developmentally sensitive education may embrace the following principles.  It 
is essentially: Holistic, Dynamic, Progressive, Experiential, Interpersonal, 
Intrapersonal, Meta-Contextual, Objective, and Critically Reflective. 
 
These are broad principles.  Their application to specific educational programs, 
and practical pedagogy depends largely on individual school contexts.  There is 
rarely total congruency between policy and the practice it seeks to inform and 
direct.  There have been extensive attempts to inform developmentally sensitive 
practice in religious schooling.  Groome's Christian Religious Education (1980), 
Lee's Your Growing Child and Religion (1965), Holm's Teaching Religion in 
Schools (1975), Goldman's Religious Thinking from Childhood to Adolescence 
(1964), and Elliott's Exploring Religions and Faith at School (1986).  All such 
attempts try to match pedagogical practice with the developmental levels of 
students thus avoiding what Objectivist Psychologist Robert Campbell calls the 
"adultomorphic" (2000:2) tendency to assume and project one's own cognitive 
structuring as age-universal. 
 
However, there have been few attempts to understand the fundamentalist - 
liberal divide within the context of Christian education that have approached the 
subject from any angle other than the content of belief.  The following exposition 
of the above principles is the culmination of the structural developmental theory 
herein.  They are offered as considerations for the implementation of 
developmentally sensitive religious education within Christian schooling.   
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 Holistic Education 
A holistic education caters for the emotional, intellectual, physical, social, moral 
and spiritual elements of a person.  This is not to say that emphasis is equal or 
that one element may not rightly be presumed within another.  It is to say that 
the educational neglect of a very real area of human experience may arrest 
development in that area.   
 
A holistic education is one in which faith is fostered in all dimensions as a 
social, moral, emotional, physical and intellectual phenomena.  Christian 
educators such as Groome have long recognised the importance of holistic 
education in a Christian context: 
We must be concerned about the development of the whole person.  We may 
not have the time or opportunity to be involved in developing all the human 
capabilities of our students, but such capabilities are our concern, even as our 
priority remains faith education. (1980:77)   
The total submission of the fides qua (that by which we believe) to the fides 
quae (that which we believe) will serve to compartmentalise rather than 
permeate an expression of faith.  In light of previous analysis, this is a danger 
posed by fundamentalism.  
 
Fundamentalism provides a total ideology – that is, its principles assume to 
permeate and subordinate all discourses of knowledge.  The grand narrative of 
fundamentalism has some positive effects in that the interconnectivity of 
knowledge discourses is valued and studied.  However, this is not to be 
confused with holistic education, which is equally concerned with the fides qua. 
  
 Dynamic Education 
A dynamic education is sensitive to the changing needs, perspectives, and 
understanding of the developing person.  It is not a one size fits all, all the time 
approach.  It recognises and caters for a variety of structural levels while 
facilitating development between such levels.  While all education needs 
structure there must be a certain amount of flexibility within structure to cater for 
contextual and individual change. 
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 Jean Holm, author of Teaching Religion in School (1975) offers a 
developmental scaffold of religion units catering from Year One to Year Five 
(British schooling).  She recognises that: 
The units would need to be tackled in a different way with older pupils, and the 
actual decisions about content and method would be taken in the light of the 
intellectual and emotional stages of development of the pupils concerned. (138) 
This is a dynamic approach to a developmentally sensitive education. 
 
Fundamentalism tends to foreground content rather than balance process in the 
context of religious education.  It “overlooks that contents, including religious 
contents, are not only actively affected by their recipients but actually first 
activated in that process” (Oser and Gmünder, 1991:168).  The result is a static 
content-based education or what Fowler calls precocious identity formation – 
the child identifies with contents given, not reached and is not encouraged to 
grow-into the contents known.  A dynamic education, in contrast balances 
content and process, always acknowledging the relationship between the two 
through accommodation and assimilation in individual development. 
  
    Progressive Education 
A progressive education makes the assumption that development leads 
somewhere qualitatively valuable.  Without this assumption there is little cause 
to voice concern about arrested development (or anything else!).  It is an implicit 
assumption in developmental psychology that maturity is a more desirable state 
than immaturity - but that maturity is the incremental effect of healthy 
encounters without maturity - or with maturity at lesser levels.  In the context of 
Christianity, progressive education makes the assumption that maturity is the 
purpose underlying learning and that maturity exhibits particular moral 
behaviours.   It is necessary to be cautious in any prescription of such 
behaviours less morals be confused with mores.  Nonetheless, it is important 
that developmentally sensitive education has a sense of direction.  It values  
journeys and destinations without drawing too fine a distinction between the 
two.   
 Experiential Education 
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An experiential education is one in which knowledge progresses in relationship 
 
 
 with life experience.   Thus, life experience is provided to complement and 
internalise knowledge.  Such an education is socially embedded.  Students are 
not preparing for the real world, they are participating in the real world.  An 
experiential education constantly provides students with opportunities for real 
and practical application at an appropriate developmental level. This means that 
religious education must be relevant and accessible: 
If religious education does not make connections with what young people see 
spirituality to be about, there is a greater likelihood that they will look at the 
religious education content in a kind of clinical anthropological way - interesting 
because it exists and people believe it, but the overall impression is that it has 
no compelling links with what students themselves experience as important 
issues of life. (Rossiter in Ryan, 1999: 3) 
This relationship between knowledge and experience would aid in avoiding 
precocious identity formation and the associated arrested development.  
Experiential pedagogy subjects knowledge to empirical inquiry, which 
consolidates understanding and internalisation. 
 
Fundamentalism places a high value and much emphasis on knowledge that is 
empirically inaccessible to the individual.  Indeed, one of the uses (misuses?) of 
the term faith describes the assent to such prepositional and empirically 
unverifiable knowledge.  While such faith is a common and necessary form it 
causes developmental problems when it is seen to devalue the use of available 
empirical or experiential learning.   In discourses where doubt is demonised and 
blind faith is rewarded, learning by dialectic or experience is not valued as 
highly as prepositional assent. 
 
   Interpersonal and Intrapersonal Education   
Interpersonal and intrapersonal education recognises that development is 
always subject to societal and self-awareness.  Humans develop in relation to, 
and in relationship with others.  Learning is interpersonal.  Humans become 
active in development through intrapersonal education.  As development occurs 
in awareness of self, the individual has an increasing ability to participate 
meaningfully, actively, and consciously in their own development.  Intrapersonal 
education provides opportunities for reflection and introspection in order to 
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 facilitate stage development from egocentric to universal perspective taking.   
 
Fundamentalist education is intensely intrapersonal and actively encourages 
self awareness within the boundaries of discourse.  It is also interpersonal 
fostering learning within close-knit communities.  The fundamentalist individual 
and community are typically self-aware.  The difficulty is that this closeness of 
community and awareness of self seem to exist in proportion to the 
demonisation of those outside of the community and the experience of the 
individual other.  Fowler’s schema suggests that this is a characteristic of early 
stage social-perspective taking.  In an educational context a developmental 
model could emulate the self-awareness fostered by fundamentalist 
communities while extending the definition of community to other discourses. 
 
 Meta-Contextual Education 
A meta-contextual education recognises both the incremental and contextual 
nature of learning.  It seeks to scaffold learning incrementally in all disciplines. 
Holm's model of incremental and contextualised units of religious education 
provides an example: 
If the students were keen to discuss problems of philosophical theology such as 
miracle or the problem of evil, then it would be essential to precede such a 
discussion by 'Asking Questions' and 'What is Belief?'... 
It is always important to ask: What knowledge and understanding would the 
pupils have brought to a particular study...What are the key elements which this 
unit assumes and builds on, and which must therefore be included if it is to be 
adequately done? (1975:180) 
At later stages of development students could participate in the process of 
scaffolding and constructing such learning contexts.  This meta-activity allows 
the learning contexts and mega-scaffolds (worldviews, discourses) of 
knowledge to remain dynamic.  In developmental terms such meta-contextual 
education mimics the fundamental processes of accommodation and 
assimilation. 
 
Fundamentalist education tends to protect the young from meta-language 
because it is seen as a product of a philosophically biased discipline that 
241
 
 
 questions the correlation between truth and language.  Meta-discussion of 
belief, faith, and fundamentals admits a human subjectivity that can only be 
resolved with an appeal to revelation, inspiration and inerrancy of the Word. 
 
 Objectified Education 
An objectified education assumes an underlying faculty of humanity - the ability 
to choose.  This is not to engage a discussion on the philosophy of free-will.  It 
is to recognise a principle that underlies fair, open, and honest representation of 
diverse beliefs in the context of schooling. Objective education recognises its 
own subjectivity while affirming the existence of very real criteria for human 
choices.  While it recognises the immediate truth of Edlin's claim that 
educational neutrality is a myth it affirms the value of being able to step outside 
one's own position. Whether or not such a step should result in change, 
rejection or affirmation (Lovat, 1992:4), it is necessary to facilitate the 
developmental processes of accommodation and assimilation. 
 
 Honest Representation 
In terms of Christian education, objectivity means honest representation. 
Honest representation refers to the ways in which teachers represent the other 
or difference.  It is a maxim in teaching religion that 'one should never represent 
others as they would not represent themselves' (Holm, 1975:55).  Empathy and 
understanding if not reconciliation come through a true appreciation of the 
sincerity and humanity of the other: 
One of our main aims in teaching about the other religions is to help our pupils 
to stand where the believer stands, to see what his (sic) religion must look - and 
feel - like to him (Holm:55).   
Honest representation is essential to the beginning of dialogue between 
worldviews and faiths. Senior lecturer in Religious Education, Maurice Ryan 
acknowledges the relationship between honest representation and the 
development of empathy in Study of Religion Courses in Australian Schools: A 
Critical Evaluation : 
In this way students are helped by the teacher to engage in warm empathetic 
study of religious traditions without clouding their judgments of those traditions 
with potentially prejudicial evaluations. (1999:3) 
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 There are traps and snares along the way to prevent honest representation but 
it is a process worth believing in if indeed Fowler's structural development 
represents desirable qualitative changes in the human psyche.  If any education 
is to have credibility it must first have the integrity to represent other systems as 
they would represent themselves.  This is the basic premise of objective 
education. 
 
 Critically Reflective Education 
A critically reflective education constantly reflects on its own practices in relation 
to the practices of others. Where policy documents guide the educational 
direction of a school there needs to be an understanding of the relationship 
between the transience of language and the permanency of a formal written 
policy.  Those who formulate such guiding documents need to do so with an 
awareness of the structures and worldviews that will be used to interpret the 
same.   
 
In the context of Christian education where school policy and ethos are couched 
in religious symbols these symbols need to be explained and their meanings or 
appearance as symbols not assumed.  This notion of explicit symbolism as a 
critically reflective practice extends to all levels of the formal policy or ethos' 
devolution into school community. Teachers need to take time to understand 
their role as facilitators of educational policy and formal ethos.  This needs to be 
an active role and not a passive one.  The rituals, activities, and ceremonies 
constructed around formal policy and ethos need to be explained and laid open 
for students to consciously participate in.  The cliches and rhetoric of teacher 
talk likewise need to be laid open for students to actively engage in rather than 
passively receive. 
 
Critical reflection is a necessary part of this process of laying open symbolism.  
Students need to access developmentally appropriate skills for understanding 
the layers of meaning that operate within the school context.  Likewise teachers 
need to be given the skills and freedom to engage the symbolic levels of the 
school context.  This process of inquiry can be difficult as teachers and students 
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 alike come to terms with their own and each other's worldview and faith.  There 
needs to be both intellectual and emotional support for participants learning to 
change or to live with difference.  Part of learning to live with difference is 
having empathy for the different.  The aforementioned social perspective taking 
necessary for higher stage development needs to be nurtured in this critically 
reflective environment. 
 
 Summary 
 All of these considerations of practice exist for the achievement of active 
participation.  Classroom pedagogy and school ethos should ultimately facilitate 
students' actualisation and internalisation of the objectives of a developing faith.  
Pedagogy needs to integrate theory with practice as a reality check for the 
meaning of symbols.  In an article on adolescent male spirituality, Julie Collins 
notes the importance of actualising symbols and rituals: 
First, rituals cease to have the power to transform us if our symbol systems 
have lost their energy.  Second, symbols lose their energy when the culture that 
creates them forgets what they mean.  Last...symbols are also debased when 
people no longer have a communal experience that centers them (1999:10). 
Formal educational policy and ethos will never leave the paper they are written 
on, if they are not actualised through the experiences of the students to whom 
they are applied. 
  
Summarily, a developmentally sensitive education places the philosophy and 
practice of learning in a dynamic relationship.  This relationship between 
structural developmentally driven theory and the everyday practice of schooling 
reflects the foundational processes of assimilation and accommodation that 
paradoxically maintain equilibrium and facilitate human development.  
Fundamentalism may be valued and understood in such a context.  Any 
criticism must be founded on its ability to maintain equilibrium while freeing 
development toward maturity in faith. 
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 4.         CONCLUSION 
 
4.1                          Summary of Findings 
 
The findings of this study are best summarised in response to the initial 
objectives described in Chapter One.  The following findings summary is 
presented in light of the analysis and synthesis throughout the three parts of 
Chapter Two.    
  
The encompassing objective of this study was to provide a synthesis between 
the discourses of religious fundamentalism and structural-developmental 
psychology.  Both discourses make universal claims.   Logically, these universal 
claims are mutually encompassing.  One way to refine a discourse is to find 
exceptions that challenge its rules and force redefinitions of its boundaries.  
Universal claims as powerful as those of fundamentalisms and 
developmentalism need to be theoretically and empirically tested against each 
other.  Theoretical scrutiny can raise questions for later empirical testing.  
Theoretical scrutiny can also use logic’s law of non-contradiction to search for 
internal coherence and the universal applicability of universal claims.  
Therefore, the objective of this study is to analyse these two discourses side by 
side and examine the problems faced and solved through synthesis. 
 
A primary objective was to examine the metaphor of development.  If the 
developmental discourse indirectly attributes the observed characteristics, 
dynamics and dimensions of fundamentalisms to early ‘stages of development’, 
is the metaphor of development appropriate? The study concluded that the 
metaphor of development must be separated from its economic value-laden 
context.  Similarly, it is not useful as a description of progressive ‘fit’, ‘efficacy’ or 
‘usefulness’.  The study emphasised the connectedness and internal 
consistency of stages. 
 
The study found a clear ‘fit’ between the independently described dynamics and 
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 dimensions of fundamentalisms and the stage descriptors of early 
developmental stages.  The contents and dynamics of fundamentalism resist 
the development of later stage structures. However, the study found that 
fundamentalism provides challenges to some traditional emphases and 
understandings of developmentalism and interactionism.   
 
The study of fundamentalism in light of developmentalism emphasises the 
structuring power of contents.  The place of nurture or socialisation has always 
been recognised within developmentalism, but rarely explored as an organised 
inhibitor, or mechanism of arrest to stage transition.  The contents of 
fundamentalisms directly oppose the epistemological tendencies of later stages.  
The structuring power of these contents raises the question of relationship 
between phylogenetic behaviours and ontogenetic development.  This question 
must be taken seriously by the developmental approach as it will help to define 
the relationship between innate structuring tendencies and environmental 
influences affecting development.     
 
The analysis also revealed the significance of compartmentalisation for 
developmentalism.  The study of fundamentalism reveals that development may 
be compartmentalised.  Structuring tendencies applied to one domain will not 
necessarily be applied to another.  This finding has implications for traditional 
understandings of the age-stage relationship in developmentalism.  The study 
of fundamentalism also reveals the powerful effects of stage transition, manifest 
as crises of faith and the affective conflict between maturation and content 
centred discourses constructed to maintain equilibrium.   
 
The study reveals the potential for a form of recapitulated fundamentalism 
prompted by dissonance between convergent epistemologies and the emerging 
divergent epistemologies of later development.  In this scenario, some 
fundamentalists seem to have recapitulated a form of fundamentalism in 
response to the early onset of, or transition to, later stages of developing faith.  
This tendency (discussed in light Oser and Gmünder’s stages of religious 
judgment in Chapter Two) raises questions about the unidirectional nature of 
246
 
 
 development and consequently about the appropriateness of the developmental 
metaphor.   
 
While identifying these gaps in developmental theory, the study affirmed the 
descriptive power of the developmental discourse in accommodating and 
synthesising a range of independent approaches to fundamentalism.  Chapter 
Two, Part Two revealed that developmentalism can accommodate both 
sociological and psychological approaches.  Its stage descriptors provide a 
powerful model for understanding the psychology of both fundamentalist and 
liberal epistemologies and their associated discourses. 
 
Finally, these findings were used to generate some basic principles for a 
developmentally sensitive approach to religious education.  These principles 
(outlined in Chapter Three) were posited in order to facilitate a full appropriation 
of stage equilibration and transition with a balance between contents, 
structuring tendencies and maturation.    
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 4.2    Further Research 
 
All new research is generated by the perceived need to fill a gap in existing 
research or theory.  At the conclusion of this thesis it is easy to look back and 
see the gaps that more research could fill, tangents further research could 
pursue; and the different discourses further research could apply to the same 
objective questions. What follows is a brief identification of the gaps that the 
very real constraints of time, money, knowledge, and resources have left open 
in this thesis. 
 
Longitudinal and retrospective studies of individuals who have 
consciously experienced faith transitions between fundamentalism 
and liberalism. 
 
Perhaps the most immediately beneficial study to triangulate the results of this 
thesis and to test and refine its theory would be a longitudinal study or 
retrospective study of individuals who have consciously changed (developed) 
from or to fundamentalism.  There is a significant body of such stories recorded 
in existing literature.  Authors such as Babinski, Spong, Cameron, and Winell 
have given their own accounts of change and recorded the accounts of others.  
However, these records have never been compiled or explored through the 
structural developmental discourse.  An analysis of these existing accounts in 
literature and further gathering of primary data would greatly focus the insight of 
the broad theoretic model proposed herein. 
 
Further study into the recapitulation of earlier faith stages.  
 
An intriguing contention of Fowler's structural developmental model is that latter 
stages of development tend to 'recapitulate previous faith stages' (1981:289).  
This process of recapitulation finds expression in several testimonies recorded 
in Babinski's Leaving the Fold (1995).  This reworking of previous stages is an 
important part of successful development in terms of finding equilibrium in 
successive stages.  Psychologist Marlene Winell shares the stories of many ex-
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 fundamentalists seeking equilibrium through recapitulation in Leaving the Fold: 
A Guide for Former Fundamentalists and Others Leaving Their Religion (1993).  
Again the analysis of such stories though the structural developmental 
discourse would serve to test and refine its theoretical base. 
 
Case studies into the devolution of ethos in faith based schools. 
 
Closely related to the concept of worldview and helpful in the context of 
schooling is the concept of ethos.  This was touched upon in the chapter on 
Christian Schooling.  Extensive research in the United Kingdom has developed 
some powerful models of ethos.  Case studies of school's master stories and 
their methods of devolution through formal and hidden curriculum would add 
valuable definition to the element of schooled social-transmission in structural 
developmental theory.  Specifically the notion of ethos as a reflection of 
institutionalised stages would be a worthwhile focus.    
 
Psycho-linguistic analysis of structural development between literal 
and symbolic understandings. 
 
A purer psycho-linguistic approach to the objective questions of this thesis is the  
last suggestion for further research of a far from all-inclusive list.  Cupitt (1987) 
and Solskice (1985) use this approach effectively to explore religion in general.  
A more deliberate application to fundamentalism may serve to better define and 
exemplify the language / meta-language element of structural development.  
The literalising tendencies of Mythic-Literal stages and symbolic understandings 
of Individuative-Reflective, Conjunctive, and Universalising stages would 
provide valuable depth in the relationship between language and development 
in the context of belief. 
 
These are but a few of innumerable ways of testing, refining, focussing, 
extending, and broadening the scope of this thesis. 
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 4.3      Conclusion 
 
Often a thesis raises more questions than it provides answers.  The former may 
be said to be as much a part of research as the latter.  At the end of the process 
of putting several years of work and experience into words, it is necessary to 
step back and reflect.  The paradoxical question for the developmentalist is, "will 
you still believe what you write now after another decade of your own 
development?".  At the completion of this thesis some five years from its 
conception I can look back and confirm its premise: that the ontogenetic 
structures of development exist, and that they manifest themselves in 
phylogenetic systems of belief.  I affirm the importance of the implications of this 
premise for a developmentally sensitive education, specifically in context of 
Christianity, faith, and fundamentalism.   
 
At the same time, hindsight brings the ever-increasing awareness of the 
subjectivity of the researcher.  This is not to discard the ability to speak 
meaningfully and objectively about anything, rather it is to be more aware of the 
function of language as a lens.  I also have respect for the discourses that 
compete with structural developmentalism.  I see such discourses as being 
generated from different emphases rather than as contradictory.   
  
No thesis is ever a closed book.  Metaphorically speaking, it is itself a chapter, 
perhaps a page or a word, in the perennial quest to model and communicate 
experience.   It draws from, and contributes to, a cumulative experience.  For 
some, it will inevitably serve to clarify what they disbelieve.  For others, it will 
solidify what they do believe.  One thing (though hopefully more) is certain; that 
on reaching the end of such a qualitative thesis there is the sobering and 
humbling awareness that "the more one knows, the more one knows one's 
ignorance". 
 
To end where I began, I reaffirm the descriptive power of structural 
developmental psychology while recognising that it provides only a partial vision 
of the proverbial elephant.  It will no doubt be absorbed into a mega-discourse 
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 of the future that "explains more variables, accounts for more contingencies, 
and solves more problems than the one it will ultimately replace" (Beck, 1999:2-
3).  
 
At the conception of this thesis, I was confident of the ability of the structural 
developmental discourse to absorb other existing discourses.  My confidence 
remains, but with a concession - that the variables, contingencies, and 
problems of this thesis's discourse will cause it to be (in developmental terms) – 
assimilated and accommodated. 
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